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Sudan
THE TRANSITIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL
The combination of the south's redivision, the introduction throughout
the country of the sharia, the renewed civil war, and growing
economic problems eventually contributed to Nimeiri's downfall.
On April 6, 1985, a group of military officers, led by Lieutenant
General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab, overthrew Nimeiri, who
took refuge in Egypt. Three days later, Dhahab authorized the
creation of a fifteen-man Transitional Military Council (TMC)
to rule Sudan. During its first few weeks in power, the TMC suspended
the constitution; dissolved the SSU, the secret police, and the
parliament and regional assemblies; dismissed regional governors
and their ministers; and released hundreds of political detainees
from Kober Prison. Dhahab also promised to negotiate an end to
the southern civil war and to relinquish power to a civilian government
in twelve months. The general populace welcomed and supported
the new regime. Despite the TMC's energetic beginning, it soon
became evident that Dhahab lacked the skills to resolve Sudan's
economic problems, restore peace to the south, and establish national
unity.
By the time Dhahab seized power, Sudan's economy was in shambles.
The country's international debt was approximately US$9 billion.
Agricultural and industrial projects funded by the International
Monetary Fund ( IMF--see Glossary) and the World Bank (see Glossary)
remained in the planning stages. Most factories operated at less
than 50 percent of capacity, while agricultural output had dropped
by 50 percent since 1960. Moreover, famine threatened vast areas
of southern and western Sudan.
The TMC lacked a realistic strategy to resolve these problems.
The Dhahab government refused to accept IMF economic austerity
measures. As a result, the IMF, which influenced nearly all bilateral
and multilateral donors, in February 1986, declared Sudan bankrupt.
Efforts to attract a US$6 billion twenty-five- year investment
from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development failed
when Sudan mismanaged an initial US$2.3 billion investment. A
rapid expansion of the money supply and the TMC's inability to
control prices caused a soaring inflation rate. Although he appealed
to forty donor and relief agencies for emergency food shipments,
Dhahab was unable to prevent famine from claiming an estimated
400,000 to 500,000 lives. He also failed to end hostilities in
the south, which constituted the major drain on Sudan's limited
resources.
Shortly after taking power, Dhahab adopted a conciliatory approach
toward the south. Among other things, he declared a unilateral
cease-fire, called for direct talks with the SPLM, and offered
an amnesty to rebel fighters. The TMC recognized the need for
special development efforts in the south and proposed a national
conference to review the southern problem. However, Dhahab's refusal
to repeal the sharia negated these overtures and convinced SPLM
leader Garang that the Sudanese government still wanted to subjugate
the south.
Despite this gulf, both sides continued to work for a peaceful
resolution of the southern problem. In March 1986, the Sudanese
government and the SPLM produced the Koka Dam Declaration, which
called for a Sudan "free from racism, tribalism, sectarianism
and all causes of discrimination and disparity." The declaration
also demanded the repeal of the sharia and the opening of a constitutional
conference. All major political parties and organizations, with
the exception of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the National
Islamic Front (NIF), supported the Koka Dam Declaration. To avoid
a confrontation with the DUP and the NIF, Dhahab decided to leave
the sharia question to the new civilian government. Meanwhile,
the SPLA kept up the military pressure on the Sudanese government,
especially in Aali an Nil, Bahr al Ghazal, and Al Istiwai provinces.
The TMC's greatest failure concerned its inability to form a
national political consensus. In late April 1985, negotiations
between the TMC and the Alliance of Professional and Trade Unions
resulted in the establishment of a civilian cabinet under the
direction of Dr. Gazuli Dafalla. The cabinet, which was subordinate
to the TMC, devoted itself to conducting the government's daily
business and to preparing for the election. Although it contained
three southerners who belonged to the newly formed Southern Sudanese
Political Association, the cabinet failed to win the loyalty of
most southerners, who believed the TMC only reflected the policies
of the deposed Nimeiri. As a result, Sudan remained a divided
nation.
The other factor that prevented the emergence of a national political
consensus concerned party factionalism. After sixteen years of
one-party rule, most Sudanese favored the revival of the multiparty
system. In the aftermath of Nimeiri's overthrow, approximately
forty political parties registered with the TMC and announced
their intention to participate in national politics. The political
parties ranged from those committed to revolutionary socialism
to those that supported Islamism. Of these latter, the NIF had
succeeded the Islamic Charter Front as the main vehicle for the
Muslim Brotherhood's political aspirations. However, policy disagreements
over the sharia, the southern civil war, and the country's future
direction contributed to the confusion that characterized Sudan's
national politics.
In this troubled atmosphere, Dhahab sanctioned the promised April
1986 general election, which the authorities spread over a twelve-day
period and postponed in thirty-seven southern constituencies because
of the civil war. The Umma Party, headed by Sadiq al Mahdi, won
ninety-nine seats. The DUP, which was led after the April 1985
uprising by Khatmiyyah leader Muhammad Uthman al Mirghani, gained
sixty-four seats. Dr. Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi's NIF obtained
fifty-one seats. Regional political parties from the south, the
Nuba Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills won lesser numbers of seats.
The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) and other radical parties failed
to score any significant victories.
Data as of June 1991
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