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Sudan
SADIQ AL MAHDI AND COALITION GOVERNMENTS
In June 1986, Sadiq al Mahdi formed a coalition government with
the Umma, the DUP, the NIF, and four southern parties. Unfortunately,
however, Sadiq proved to be a weak leader and incapable of governing
Sudan. Party factionalism, corruption, personal rivalries, scandals,
and political instability characterized the Sadiq regime. After
less than a year in office, Sadiq al Mahdi dismissed the government
because it had failed to draft a new penal code to replace the
sharia, reach an agreement with the IMF, end the civil war in
the south, or devise a scheme to attract remittances from Sudanese
expatriates. To retain the support of the DUP and the southern
political parties, Sadiq formed another ineffective coalition
government.
Instead of removing the ministers who had been associated with
the failures of the first coalition government, Sadiq al Mahdi
retained thirteen of them, of whom eleven kept their previous
portfolios. As a result, many Sudanese rejected the second coalition
government as being a replica of the first. To make matters worse,
Sadiq and DUP leader Mirghani signed an inadequate memorandum
of understanding that fixed the new government's priorities as
affirming the application of the sharia to Muslims, consolidating
the Islamic banking system, and changing the national flag and
national emblem. Furthermore, the memorandum directed the government
to remove Nimeiri's name from all institutions and dismiss all
officials appointed by Nimeiri to serve in international and regional
organizations. As expected, antigovernment elements criticized
the memorandum for not mentioning the civil war, famine, or the
country's disintegrating social and economic conditions.
In August 1987, the DUP brought down the government because Sadiq
al Mahdi opposed the appointment of a DUP member, Ahmad as Sayid,
to the Supreme Commission. For the next nine months, Sadiq and
Mirghani failed to agree on the composition of another coalition
government. During this period, Sadiq moved closer to the NIF.
However, the NIF refused to join a coalition government that included
leftist elements. Moreover, Turabi indicated that the formation
of a coalition government would depend on numerous factors, the
most important of which were the resignation or dismissal of those
serving in senior positions in the central and regional governments,
the lifting of the state of emergency reimposed in July 1987,
and the continuation of the Constituent Assembly.
Because of the endless debate over these issues, it was not until
May 15, 1988, that a new coalition government emerged headed by
Sadiq al Mahdi. Members of this coalition included the Umma, the
DUP, the NIF, and some southern parties. As in the past, however,
the coalition quickly disintegrated because of political bickering
among its members. Major disagreements included the NIF's demand
that it be given the post of commissioner of Khartoum, the inability
to establish criteria for the selection of regional governors,
and the NIF's opposition to the replacement of senior military
officers and the chief of staff of the executive branch.
In November 1988, another more explosive political issue emerged
when Mirghani and the SPLM signed an agreement in Addis Ababa
that included provisions for a cease-fire, the freezing of the
sharia, the lifting of the state of emergency, and the abolition
of all foreign political and military pacts. The two sides also
proposed to convene a constitutional conference to decide Sudan's
political future. The NIF opposed this agreement because of its
stand on the sharia. When the government refused to support the
agreement, the DUP withdrew from the coalition. Shortly thereafter
armed forces commander in chief Lieutenant General Fathi Ahmad
Ali presented an ultimatum, signed by 150 senior military officers,
to Sadiq al Mahdi demanding that he make the coalition government
more representative and that he announce terms for ending the
civil war.
On March 11, 1989, Sadiq al Mahdi responded to this pressure
by dissolving the government. The new coalition had included the
Umma, the DUP, and representatives of southern parties and the
trade unions. The NIF refused to join the coalition because it
was not committed to enforcing the sharia. Sadiq claimed his new
government was committed to ending the southern civil war by implementing
the November 1988 DUP-SPLM agreement. He also promised to mobilize
government resources to bring food relief to famine areas, reduce
the government's international debt, and build a national political
consensus. Sadiq's inability to live up to these promises eventually
caused his downfall. On June 30, 1989, Colonel (later Lieutenant
General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir overthrew Sadiq and established
the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule
Sudan. Bashir's commitment to imposing the sharia on the non-Muslim
south and to seeking a military victory over the SPLA, however,
seemed likely to keep the country divided for the foreseeable
future and hamper resolution of the same problems faced by Sadiq
al Mahdi. Moreover, the emergence of the NIF as a political force
made compromise with the south more unlikely.
* * *
Interested readers may consult several books for a better understanding
of Sudan's history. Useful surveys include P.M. Holt's and M.W.
Daly's, A History of the Sudan; Peter Woodward's, Sudan,
1898-1989; and Kenneth Henderson's Sudan Republic.
Richard Hill's Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881 assesses
Egypt's nineteenth century conquest and occupation of Sudan. For
an excellent analysis of the British period, see M.W. Daly's Empire
on the Nile and Imperial Sudan. The postindependence
period is discussed in Mansour Khalid's The Government They
Deserve; and Gabriel Warburg's Islam, Nationalism, and
Communism in a Traditional Society. Apart from these books,
the Sudan Notes and Records journal is essential for
studying Sudan's historical development.
Over the past few years, there has been an increase in the literature
about southern Sudan. Many of Robert Collins's studies are particularly
useful, including Land Beyond the Rivers; Shadows
in the Grass; and The Waters of the Nile. Two sympathetic
assessments of southern Sudan's relationship to Khartoum are Dunstan
M. Wai's, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan and
Abel Alier's, Southern Sudan. For an Arab viewpoint,
Mohamed Omer Beshir's The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict
and The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace are pertinent.
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography).
Data as of June 1991
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