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Syria Background
After independence in 1946, Syrian leaders established a
parliamentary democracy, which failed because politics remained
centered on personalities and because factional, sectarian, and
tribal rivalries persisted. Such a situation was not conducive to
domestic unity, much less to national consensus or political
momentum. The multiparty political system gave way to a series of
military dictatorships, then to Syria's subordination to Egypt in
the short-lived United Arab Republic (UAR) from February 1958 to
September 1961
(see United Arab Republic
, ch. 1). Since 1963,
when the Baath Party came to full power in Syria, political
competition has evolved and shifted within the party. Under the
party, the role of the military has been especially significant.
At independence, power was concentrated in the hands of a
wealthy oligarchy of landlords, industrialists, merchants, and
lawyers. Most of this aristocracy urban
Sunni (see Glossary)
Muslims who derived their influence from inherited wealth and
social position, as well as from their early involvement in the
Arab nationalist movement
(see
World War I and Arab Nationalism,
The French Mardate, ch. 1).
Their political experience, however,
was entirely based on opposition, first to Ottoman Turkey and
then to France and Zionism. They had no precedent for a more
positive platform of national reconciliation and integration,
mass mobilization, and popular welfare.
The most prominent political organization in 1946 was the
National Bloc, a loose alliance originally formed in 1928 by
leading members of landowning families and other well-known
individuals. This group was wealthy and well educated, chiefly at
French and Turkish universities or at French- and American-
operated colleges in Lebanon and Egypt. Their priority was
eliminating the French while maintaining their personal power.
They had little contact with the masses and did not seek to
bridge the traditional gap separating the upper classes from the
rest of society.
Of the various political parties forming Syria, two had risen
to prominence by mid-1947: the National Party and the People's
Party. The National Party, which dominated the government until
1949, represented the industrialists of Damascus, leading
businessmen, and prominent landlords. It was dedicated to
continuing the power of men who had long worked together not only
for independence but against union with Jordan and Iraq.
Until 1949 the People's Party was the principal opposition.
It represented the interests of the merchants and landlords of
Aleppo against domination by Damascus. The party had a strong
interest in agricultural issues--in contrast to the National
Party's focus on industry--and close ties with Iraq, with which
many of the members had strong commercial and trade
relationships. The two parties therefore embodied the major
traditional political divisions within Syria: the rivalry between
Aleppo and Damascus and that between those who favored unity with
the Levant (Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria) as opposed to those
who favored unity with the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Jordan and
Syria).
Along with these parties, a new party was evolving. The Baath
Party can be traced to 1940, when two Damascene secondary
schoolteachers, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad Din al Bitar, were
inspired by the Arab renaissance movement. In 1943 the term
Baath (meaning resurrection) became associated with the
movement, and in 1944 the movement was transformed into a party.
In April 1947, the Baath Party held its first congress, which was
attended by around 250 members. Most were Syrians, but Jordanian,
Lebanese, and Iraqi students in Syrian schools were also present.
Most of the original members were students, teachers,
professionals, and public employees--the kernel of Syria's
emerging new middle class. The congress elected Aflaq, the
party's philosopher and ideologue, as "dean," the equivalent of
secretary general. Bitar became the organizational and
administrative leader.
In 1947 the Baath Party was a marginal political force. It
was organizationally weak and unprepared to assert itself
effectively. Gradually, it broadened its constituency beyond the
narrow circle of students and intellectuals to include the urban
lower middle class, which was attracted to the party's proposed
program of social and economic reform. At the same time, the
party's unflagging emphasis on Arab nationalism evoked
considerable support from the military's officer corps.
The constitution adopted by the Baath founding congress of
1947 extolled the motto of "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism" as an
integrated concept, in which no one element could be attained
without the other two. Of the three, however, Arab unity was
considered first among equals as the primary catalyst of Arab
resurrection. Socialism was not an end in itself but a means to
achieve the higher ends of freedom, unity, and socioeconomic
justice.
Aflaq rejected a doctrinaire definition of socialism. He
maintained that his socialism aimed at more than merely
equalizing wealth and providing food, shelter, and clothing;
instead, it aimed at the higher goal of freeing an individual's
talents and abilities. This higher goal was to be attained not
through evolution but revolution, which he described as a
"violent wrenching away" and an awakening and self-purification.
Baath dogma exalted the individual, who was to be free in action,
thought, and opportunity in a democratic, parliamentary,
constitutional state.
The doctrine of a single, indivisible Arab nation was central
to Baathist ideology, and statehood was regarded as parochial,
negative, and doomed to failure
(see Political Orientations
, this
ch.). Baathist doctrine condemned colonialist imperialism, which
was and is held to include Zionism, negativism, restrictive state
nationalism, sectarianism, and racial and ethnic prejudice. The
Arab superstate envisioned by the Baathists was to be founded on
a secular, rather than Islamic, framework. However, Christians
and other religious minorities were admonished to regard Islam as
a "beloved cultural heritage." Furthermore, religious life and
values were to endure in an atmosphere of religious toleration.
In foreign policy, the party advocated nonalignment with the
superpowers and espoused neutrality. Aflaq and Bitar were
impressed by Marxist visions of a utopian society free of
exploitation but were not won over to communism, which they
regarded as subservient to Soviet interests and therefore
detrimental to Arab national self-determination.
In 1949 popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the
conservative ruling elite reached a peak, giving the Baath Party
an opportunity to play a more prominent role in Syrian politics.
Army officers were angered by what they perceived as civilian
bungling of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This anger paved the way
for Brigadier General Husni az Zaim to stage Syria's first army
coup d'état, an event that presaged the rise of the military as
the controlling force in Syrian politics. The bloodless takeover,
which was widely applauded by the press, opposition politicians,
and much of the public, marked the permanent transfer of
political power from the traditional landowning elite to a new
coalition of young intellectuals, army officers, and the small
but growing middle class. The Baath Party welcomed the coup and
hoped the Zaim regime would stamp out the government's endemic
corruption and usher in parliamentary politics.
However, the Zaim government did not bring stability. Rather,
four more military coups were staged prior to Syria's unification
with Egypt in 1958. Beneath the facade of dictatorial rule,
proliferating Syrian political parties were locked in chaotic
competition with the Baath Party for dominance of Syrian
politics. Partisan rivalry was particularly intense for the
allegiance of the armed forces, which party organizers realized
would control the government. The conservative National Party and
People's Party waned in influence, while the semifascist Syrian
Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), founded in 1933 by a Lebanese
Christian, Antun Saadeh, gained numerous adherents. The SSNP
called for the creation of a "Greater Syria" encompassing
Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Cyprus. The Syrian Communist
Party (SCP), headed by Khalid Bakdash, was small, but its tight
organization and disciplined following gave it far greater
importance than its size alone would have merited. Another party,
the Arab Socialist Party (ASP), was a serious contender for the
allegiance of the middle class. The ASP was founded in 1950 by
Akram Hawrani as an outgrowth of the Youth Party he had
established in 1939. His doctrine followed closely that of Aflaq
and Bitar. Hawrani's followers were drawn mostly from Hamah and
Homs; they included teachers, students, urban workers, and
numerous associates organized by his relatives. In addition, he
cultivated many followers in the armed forces.
In early 1953, the ASP merged with the Baath Party, combining
the well-developed ideological framework of the Baath Party with
Hawrani's grass-roots organizational base. No substantial changes
were required in the merger except the insertion of the word
socialist (ishtiraki) in the new party's name. Hawrani
also found no difficulty in accepting Aflaq's 1947 constitution,
which continued in toto as the scripture of Baathism, and the
founding year of the Baath Party is still considered 1947.
The new Baath Party quickly became a serious challenge to all
existing parties. The intense rivalry between the Baath Party and
the SSNP climaxed in the April 1955 assassination of Colonel
Adnan Malki, the deputy chief of staff and a leading Baathist, by
a sergeant in the SSNP. Following the assassination, the SSNP was
accused of plotting to overthrow the government, and its leaders
either fled the country or were convicted of conspiracy.
Consequently, the SSNP disappeared as an effective political
force in Syria.
In 1957 the Baathists entered into a partnership with their
erstwhile adversaries, the Communists, in order to crush the
residual power of conservative parties. This left-wing alliance
succeeded in eliminating the right wing. However, in the last
months of 1957, the Communists and other radicals came to
dominate the left-wing alliance, while the Baath Party's power
eroded.
Fearing the Communists' growing power, the Baath Party
drafted a bill in December 1957 for union between Syria and
Egypt. Because Arab unity is a sacred aspiration, the Baathists
knew that neither the Communists nor any other politicians could
openly oppose it. In February 1958, Syria joined Egypt to form
the UAR. The Baath Party realized that President Gamal Abdul
Nasser's declared hostility to political parties would mean the
end of its legal existence but gambled that the communist
movement, which was being ruthlessly persecuted in Egypt at the
time, would be damaged disproportionately.
The Baathists were partially correct. Hawrani, titular head
of the Baath Party, was appointed vice president of the new
republic. However, all real power resided in Nasser's hands, and
Syria was governed as a virtual colony of Egypt. On September 28,
1961, a military coup took Syria out of the UAR, and in December
1961, a general election for the constituent assembly was held;
Communists and Nasserites were banned from running for office.
Although a few Baathists were elected, the majority of the new
assembly consisted of members of the conservative People's Party
and National Party. People's Party leader Nazim al Qudsi was
elected president.
From 1961 to 1963, Syria was in a state of near anarchy.
Coups and countercoups, street fighting between Nasserites,
Communists, and Baathists, and battles between rival army
factions plunged the nation into chaos.
Early in 1963, a group of senior officers conspired to stage
yet another coup. To build their alliance within the military,
they joined forces with a group of Baathist majors and lieutenant
colonels, who turned out to be more formidable than they or
anyone else realized. The original group of officers had been
transferred to Egypt during the union as a form of internal exile
because of their suspected opposition to the UAR. Irritated at
Egyptian dominance of the union, they organized the secret
Military Committee, which was dedicated to seizing power. They
deviated from the Baath Party's pan-Arabism in championing Syrian
nationalism. Having grown up for the most part in relatively poor
rural areas of Syria, these men strongly advocated land reform
and other socialist measures. Most of the committee belonged to
minority groups. For example, the original core of conspirators
consisted of three
Alawis (see Glossary) and two
Ismailis (see Glossary). Later, the Military Committee was
enlarged to include
fifteen members. Only six of these members were Sunni Muslims;
the remainder consisted of five Alawis, two
Druzes (see Glossary), and two Ismailis.
The coup, subsequently called the Baath Revolution, occurred
on March 8, 1963. Baath Party cofounder Bitar was installed as
prime minister, and, within several months, the Baathists had
maneuvered their non-Baathist associates out of power. The Baath,
Party, especially its military component and its "Regional
Command as opposed to its National Command, has dominated Syria
since
(see The Baath Party Apparatus
, this ch.).
Although the Baath Revolution was bracketed chronologically
by prior and subsequent coups, countercoups, and power struggles,
it was far more than another convulsion in the body politic.
Rather, it marked a crucial turning point in Syria's
postindependence history. Because of the coup, the focus of
Syrian politics shifted markedly to the left, where it has
remained since. However, just as the Baath Party became
ascendant, the military officers who had commandeered it as a
vehicle for their own rise to power abandoned its original
egalitarian ideology by establishing a military dictatorship. In
1966 the party's cofounders, Aflaq and Bitar, were expelled from
the party and exiled from Syria. Bitar, in an interview conducted
several weeks before he was assassinated in Paris in July 1980,
reportedly at the hands of Syrian intelligence, said "The major
deviation of the Baath is having renounced democracy . . . the
two real bases of the regime are dictatorship and
confessionalism. The Baath Party, as a party, does not exist."
Assad's November 1970 takeover of Syria in a bloodless coup--the
Corrective Movement--cemented Baath Party dominance in Syrian
politics. Yet, as Assad created the political institutions
through which he would rule, he sought to liberalize the
political situation, albeit within carefully circumscribed
limits, to diversify support for his new regime. For example, in
February 1971 he established the People's Council as an appointed
deliberative body; following adoption of the Permanent
Constitution in 1973, it became an elected body.
In 1972 Assad instituted a multiparty system by creating the
National Progressive Front (NPF), a coalition of the Baath Party,
the SCP, and three small left-wing parties--the ASP, the
Nasserite Syrian Arab Socialist Union, and the Socialist Union
Movement. In 1987 this coalition continued to govern Syria with
its seventeen-member Central Command, which coordinated the
activities of the five parties. Although the Baath Party was
unquestionably the dominant party in the coalition, and the other
parties were nearly invisible, Syria remained one of the few Arab
nations with multiple legal political parties.
In 1978 Assad pledged to implement a "new formula" that would
rehabilitate and incorporate some of the old conservative
political parties from the pre-Baath regime under the NPF
umbrella. Although the new formula was never implemented because
Syria was beset with internal security problems, in 1987 the NPF
retained an open-ended framework that could expand to include
diverse elements. Assad appeared committed to broadening his
regime's support, so long as broadening did not diminish his
power.
Data as of April 1987
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