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Syria Concepts of Nationalism, Unity, and the Arab Nation
Because it entails definition of where the national
boundaries should be drawn, nationalism is a controversial
concept for Syrians. Shortly after independence, most Syrians
retained a strong ethnocentrism based on the city or region where
they were born and grew up; they owed their first allegiance to
their tribe, clan, or ethnic group, rather than to the new
nation-state. Over the years, these forces have diminished, but
not disappeared, and now nearly all Syrians manifest an intense
patriotism, coupled with a strong desire for the recovery of what
they feel are integral areas of Syria split off from the nation
by French Mandate authorities. A small minority of Syrians,
however, have not been assimilated into the Syrian identity. For
example, beduin in eastern Syria feel a strong affinity for their
neighbors in Iraq and Jordan, and some Christians and Druzes look
for guidance to their coreligionists in Lebanon.
The Syrian government has never recognized the legality of
Turkey's possession of Hatay Province, which was the Syrian
province of Iskenderun until it was ceded to Turkey by France in
1939. Syrian maps still describe the Syrian-Turkish frontier at
Iskenderun as a "temporary border." The Syrian attitude toward
Lebanon is more ambivalent: Syria officially recognizes Lebanon's
de jure existence but has refused to open formal diplomatic
relations. Syria feels justified in exerting hegemony over
Lebanon and ensuring that it remains a Syrian satellite. In fact,
since 1976 Syria has virtually annexed parts of Lebanon. Finally,
Syria views the recovery of the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights as
a national priority. Syrian citizens support their government's
policy toward these three areas almost unanimously.
Many Syrians advocate the more far-reaching goal of restoring
Greater Syria. Adherents of this concept believe Syria should
encompass the entire Levant, including Lebanon, Jordan, and
Israel or Palestine. The Greater Syria concept was formulated in
response to a centuries-old, and now quiescent, Middle Eastern
dynamic in which Iraq and Egypt traditionally vied for dominance
over the Arab heartland between the Euphrates and the Nile
rivers. The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), which is
banned in Syria but has numerous surreptitious supporters, has
made the quest for a Greater Syria the cornerstone of its
ideology; the SSNP also includes Cyprus as a part of Greater
Syria. Although it bears the word Syrian in its title, the
SSNP was, ironically, actually established in Lebanon and has
become a Syrian proxy force in that country.
At a broader level, Baath Party ideology reflects the
viewpoint of many Syrian citizens in championing pan-Arab
nationalism and proposing unification of all Arab countries into
one Arab nation stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian
Sea, transcending what are regarded as arbitrary and artificial
borders drawn by Ottoman or European colonial rulers. However,
this vision of Arab unity has not been limited to Baathists. Arab
unity was the clarion call of most Arab nationalists during the
struggles against European colonialism after World War I.
Baathist ideology differs from this older sentiment in making
socialism an integral element of pan-Arab nationalism.
Although most Syrians support pan-Arabism, some view it
negatively. In many respects, the notion of pan-Arab nationalism
contradicts Syrian nationalism because Syria would be subsumed in
the larger entity and its identity subordinated to that of the
new superstate. Aware of this paradox, Syrian officials reserve
for Syria a special place in their utopian ideal as the "beating
heart" of the Arab nation. However, Syrian religious minorities
fear that extreme pan-Arab nationalism would entail Islamic
fundamentalism because Islam is an important common denominator
of many Arabs and a potential vehicle for uniting the Arab
countries. Therefore, religious minorities, particularly
Christians, have stridently resisted proposed unification with
other Arab nations, while at the same time supporting the notion
of a Greater Syria, which includes Lebanon and other areas with a
large Christian population. Some minorities oppose unification;
for example, Kurds and Assyrians in northeastern Syria have vivid
memories of persecution in Iraq, from which they sought refuge in
Syria, and naturally oppose being brought again under Iraqi
jurisdiction.
Because using Islam as the defining criterion of Arabism is
prejudicial to minorities, Syrians have instead emphasized the
common cultural heritage of all Arabs. Specifically, the Arabic
language is perceived as the root of Arab nationalism.
Additionally, the nearly universal antipathy toward Zionism is
another factor around which Arabs can rally, regardless of their
ethnicity or religion.
This secular rather than religious emphasis has succeeded to
the extent that religious minorities have often been in the
forefront of Arab nationalist drives. Nevertheless, much of the
appeal of Arab nationalism among uneducated or rural citizens has
a strong Islamic component. Such people look to an Arab nation
that re-creates the Islamic empire, or Dar al Islam prescribed by
the Quran and achieved under the Umayyad dynasty based in
Damascus.
In any case, pan-Arab unity is a moot issue in Syria, an
ideal rather than a practical policy. Syria's unification with
Egypt in the UAR proved unpalatable to Syrian politicians.
Although since 1980 Syria has been officially united with Libya
and has studied merger with Jordan and Iraq, unification in these
cases is simply a euphemism for what would be a regular alliance
between autonomous nations elsewhere in the world. However, Syria
has also been adept at wielding Arab unity as a propaganda
weapon. When other Arab countries pressured Syria to improve
relations with its enemy Iraq in 1986, it acquiesced in
conducting negotiations but demanded complete and total
unification. Iraq, as expected, rejected this proposal, giving
Syria the moral high ground of appearing to favor pan-Arab unity.
Data as of April 1987
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