Syria POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS
Attitudes Toward Politics, Political Parties, and Government
At gatherings in Syria, politics is often the chief topic of
conversation; the Middle Eastern stereotype of fervent political
coffeehouse discussions applies in part to Syria. Politics
absorbs much of the active energy of the Syrian male. Most
Syrians have strong opinions about what is wrong in Damascus or
in their subdistrict centers and about what should be done. Urban
Syrians, whether wealthy or poor, educated or illiterate, talk of
political personalities and the central government. Rural Syrians
talk of local political personalities, agricultural problems, and
local politics. However, public criticism of the regime is muted
and circumspect. Among the tribes and in more isolated villages,
political discussion exists, but primarily on the basis of
relations between villagers or tribes.
Political energy generally has been channeled toward
clandestine opposition to the government in power and
surreptitious criticism of other political forces and even other
members of one's own political group, rather than toward active
party participation. There are two reasons for this. First, few
political parties have attempted to gain broad membership; many
have been mere collections of prominent personalities without
organization below the top central committees. Second, most
citizens have questioned the efficacy of party activity as a
means to political ends and personal advancement. The fortunes of
political parties have been uncertain; some party members have
been exiled or have gone to jail if the party has lost power.
Consequently, persons with political ambitions often preferred to
operate as independents rather than affiliate with a party.
Popular awareness of broader issues has expanded
substantially in recent years as a result of radiobroadcasts and
the expanding press, both of which have remained under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Information. Headed in 1987 by
Yassin Rajjuh, the ministry played a key role in the
dissemination of information and, through editorials, the
formulation of public opinion. The ministry censored the domestic
and foreign press, controlled radio and television networks, and
published newspapers and magazines. It supervised the Syrian Arab
News Agency (SANA), the country's only domestic news service, and
the Al Baath publishing house, which printed Al Baath, the
organ of the ruling Baath Party and the nation's most widely
circulated daily newspaper, and At Talia (The Vanguard),
the fortnightly magazine of the Baath Party. Other major dailies
included Ath Thawrah (The Revolution), and Tishrin
(October, named after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War) in
Damascus; Al Jamahir Al Arabiyya (The Arab Masses) in
Aleppo; and Al Fida' (The Sacrificer) in Hamah. The
Ministry of Defense published the magazine Jaysh ash Shaab
(The People's Army).
In Syria, individuals interested in politics have
historically had limited means of expressing opinion. Often
frustrated, they have seized upon the most direct means available
of registering opposition: strikes, demonstrations, personal
conflicts with politicians, and even, at times, violence and
assassination. The method used most frequently is the
demonstration, which has often led to rioting.
Industrial workers, merchants, farmers, and other groups have
all used demonstrations to demand or protest government actions.
Although demonstrations have not always been successful in
achieving the aims of the instigators, they have served as useful
barometers of public opinion. The skill of the Baath Party in
initiating demonstrations was an important factor in the party's
rise to power. The government has tolerated spontaneous public
demonstrations, but more often it has stage-managed large public
rallies in support of its policies.
Most Syrians have a strong libertarian streak and are wary of
any government. This suspicion has been most pronounced in rural
areas, where authority has been represented in the person of a
tax collector or policeman. Moreover, government officials were
usually townspeople, and members of villages and tribes felt that
urban officials did not understand their problems and were
condescending. Government officials often contributed to this
attitude by posing as patrons or masters of the rural population.
Indeed, urban officials still refer to prosperous peasants as
"kulaks." As a result, any government effort to assist villagers
or tribesmen was apt to be met, at least initially, with an
uncooperative attitude.
Although distrust of the government has been less intense in
urban centers, it has existed there as well. Regional jealousies
have played a part in the lack of trust. People of Aleppo, Homs,
and Hamah have felt that politicians in Damascus were primarily
interested in maintaining the ascendancy of the national capital
over the provincial capitals. Nevertheless, townspeople attach
considerable prestige to holding a government position.
After 1958 the negative attitude of townspeople and villagers
toward government began to diminish as people became increasingly
aware that government could be an instrument for satisfying some
of their needs. Successive governments attempted to bolster this
process with a constant barrage of propaganda aimed at creating
trust and building loyalty, not only to the government as a
social institution but to the particular regime in Damascus. The
regimes appealed to citizens on the basis of economic selfinterest , as well as on the broader and more emotional grounds of
Arab and Syrian nationalism. The appeals found a wide and
enthusiastic response, although the individual citizen incurred
few obligations or duties that would test the sincerity of the
response.
Data as of April 1987
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