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Thailand Potential External Threats
Having controlled the insurgencies within Thailand, in the
early 1980s the government turned to protecting the country from
outside aggression. Although Vietnamese forces in Cambodia were
viewed as the primary external threat, border tensions, caused
partly by ill-defined boundaries, between Thailand and Laos and
between Thailand and Burma also created concern
(see Boundaries
, ch. 2). For the most part, diplomacy enabled the government to
resist external pressures and to keep the use of armed force to a
minimum, but the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia
in December 1978 caused severe tension along the Thai-Cambodian
border. The Vietnamese stationed 140,000 troops along that
frontier, along with 30,000 Cambodian troops, whom they trained,
organized, and directed. The immediate presence of heavily armed
and capable Vietnamese divisions on its border reinforced
Thailand's decision to improve its relations with China. In
January 1979, Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand of Thailand and
senior Chinese policy makers met secretly at Thailand's Utapao
Air Base to forge a Thai-Chinese cooperation policy. That meeting
resulted in China's halting moral and materiel support for the
CPT and establishing Thailand as a conduit for Chinese support to
the
Khmer Rouge (see Glossary) faction of the Khmer resistance
movement.
Thailand deployed elements of several divisions along the
Cambodian border to deal with all aspects of the Vietnamese
threat. There had been a history of strife along this border
resulting from ethnic prejudices, poor demarcation of the
boundary, and profitable cross-border smuggling, but the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia seriously aggravated the
situation. Vietnamese efforts to eliminate Cambodian resistance
forces drove thousands of refugees into areas along the Thai
border
(see The Indochinese Refugee Question
, ch. 2). Admitting
large numbers of the refugees into Thailand posed severe problems
for Thai authorities, not only because providing for the refugees
strained the local economy but also because Khmer troops and some
Vietnamese soldiers disguised as civilian refugees infiltrated
Thailand. Thai security forces attempted to disarm all military
infiltrators and return them to Cambodia.
Thailand supported Khmer resistance efforts as soon as the
magnitude of the Vietnamese invasion became apparent in 1979.
This resistance consisted of three major factions, the largest
and most effective of which were remnants of the ousted communist
Khmer Rouge. The noncommunist resistance groups--the forces loyal
to Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the Khmer Peoples National
Liberation Front (KPNLF)--also maintained their own armed
combatants separate from the Khmer Rouge. All three groups,
loosely aligned in the Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea, had their headquarters and primary bases just inside
Thai territory. This situation allowed Thailand to exercise
considerable control over the forces and their operations inside
Cambodia, but it also provided targets for Vietnamese attack.
Thailand viewed assistance to the resistance movements as
essential to Thai security and, along with fellow Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, waged a highly visible
campaign for international assistance to Cambodian refugees and
resistance forces
(see Foreign Affairs
, ch. 4). Assistance from
China, ASEAN, the United States, and others was essential for
continued viability of the Khmer resistance movement.
Vietnamese operations against the resistance along the Thai
border provoked numerous clashes with Thai security forces,
resulting in some casualties among Thai civilians living near the
border, as well as among Thai forces. Vietnamese troops
concentrated on trying to eliminate the Khmer resistance forces
and to close resistance infiltration routes. They also conducted
artillery attacks and made limited incursions, occupying small
portions of Thai territory, notably in the border area where
Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia meet.
The pattern of conflict along the Thai-Cambodian border
showed little change between 1979 and 1984. Vietnamese forces
conducted offensives against the Cambodian resistance forces
during the dry season each year and then withdrew to consolidated
positions and internal security operations well within the
interior of Cambodia during the rainy season. This pattern
changed with the major dry season campaign in 1984-85. In its
largest and most successful series of operations, Vietnamese
forces eliminated most major resistance bases along the Thai
border and inflicted casualties on both refugees and armed
resistance fighters. Following that offensive, Vietnamese forces
remained deployed along the border during the rainy season and
attempted to seal the border against the resistance forces. These
efforts did not seriously hamper resistance infiltration,
although they made movement into the interior of Cambodia more
difficult. In the late 1980s, sizable Vietnamese forces with the
limited support of units from the Khmer People's Revolutionary
Armed Forces continued to be deployed along the border.
Vietnam repeatedly assured Thailand and other ASEAN countries
that it had no intention of invading Thailand, and contacts among
these parties continued sporadically for several years as they
explored the possibility of a political solution to the Cambodian
conflict. Vietnam stated that it intended to withdraw the bulk of
its forces by 1990, when it would have armed and trained the
KPRAF into a credible national army. However, in mid-1987
observers doubted that the Vietnamese-supported Cambodian
government would be able to assume the burden of its own defense
by 1990. Even if Vietnam met its self-imposed 1990 deadline,
observers expected that, as in Laos, a number of Vietnamese
troops would remain in Cambodia to "advise" the KPRAF and secure
Vietnamese interests in the country.
In mid-1987 the 800-kilometer Thai-Cambodian border was fully
garrisoned by Vietnamese and Cambodian forces. An estimated three
Vietnamese divisions and two Cambodian regiments were deployed
along the northern Cambodian border adjacent to Ubon Ratchathani,
Surin, Buriram, and Sisaket provinces. In the tightly contested
region between Poipet in Cambodia and Aranyaprathet in Thailand's
Prachin Buri Province, there were parts of two Vietnamese
divisions and three Cambodian regiments. In the former Khmer
Rouge stronghold of the Phnom Milai Mountains south of Poipet,
two Vietnamese divisions and one Cambodian regiment were
deployed. From this region southward to the Gulf of Thailand,
there were two Vietnamese divisions and three independent
Vietnamese regiments. (A Vietnamese infantry division usually
consists of about 10,500 officers and men; an independent
regiment has a strength of about 3,000.)
Although the situation along the Cambodian border posed the
greatest external threat to Thai security, other areas presented
problems as well
(see
fig. 14). Thailand faced security
challenges of varying intensity in each sector of its 2,800-
kilometer border with Burma, Laos, and Malaysia. Sporadic clashes
with Laos received publicity but did not pose major security
threats. Armed clashes in the mountains of Nan and Uttaradit
provinces were more serious but were contained by Thai security
forces. This mountainous area suffered from a poorly demarcated
border and was host to migrations of nomadic hill tribes and
pockets of CPT resistance.
Thai security concerns along the lengthy border with Burma
were complex and vexing. The numerous Burmese separatist
movements posed a touchy diplomatic problem for Thailand. Annual
Burmese government military operations against Mon, Karen, and
Kayah separatist groups resulted in wholesale border crossings by
fleeing insurgents and refugees. Thailand, however, was able to
disarm and control these annual migrations. More serious were the
activities of narcotics traffickers and the private armies that
provided security for the narcotics trade. These elements
operated along the northwestern Thai border and until the early
1980s encountered only weak response from Thai security forces.
Thereafter, pressure from the United States, world opinion in
general, and a new spirit of cooperation between the Thai and
Burmese governments on the narcotics issue began to change the
situation
(see Criminal Activity and the Narcotics Trade
, this
ch.).
Faced with various threats along its borders, the Thai
government attempted to apply the principles of its highly
successful counterinsurgency program to the country's external
security problems. Encouraged by the success that road building
had had in destroying the Khao Khor insurgent base, Thailand
developed an extensive network of new roads along the Laotian
border in Nan and Uttaradit provinces and along much of the
length of the Burmese border. These roads provided easier access
for security forces to remote border regions and served as a base
for developing the local political, social, and economic
infrastructure. Volunteer local security organizations
established throughout the country in the 1980s played an
important role both in containing insurgency and in enhancing
security in border regions. Village security units were organized
and trained by the army. Civilian agencies taught development
techniques, safety measures, and village administration and
provided improved health, agricultural, and educational
facilities. The Rangers were locally recruited contract
paramilitary forces trained in counterinsurgency and border
security operations. They often joined with the army and the
Border Patrol Police (BPP) to form units of forty to fifty called
Santi Nimitr (Dream of Peace) teams, which carried out community
development projects in remote villages where CPT front
activities were reported or external threats detected. In 1987
there were more than 200 such teams operating throughout the
country.
During the mid-1980s, the government continued to consolidate
its political and military gains against insurgencies while
turning its attention to the external threat. The government
directed major efforts toward securing its borders, improving
access to remote mountain regions, and strengthening domestic
perceptions of the Vietnamese threat. The combination of army and
BPP operations, road building and associated economic
development, and resettlement resulted in a closer integration of
formerly isolated areas with the rest of the country.
Data as of September 1987
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