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Thailand Manpower: Sources and Quality
Thai law required that all male citizens serve in the
military. The 1978 Constitution, in a section entitled "Duties of
the Thai People," states, "every person shall have a duty to
defend the country [and] . . . to serve in the armed forces as
provided by law." Similar requirements appear in the 1978
document's numerous predecessors. The Military Service Act,
administered by the army, implemented these requirements. The
act--a national conscription law--required two years of active
military duty.
All Thai males were required to register when they became
eighteen years of age but were not liable for compulsory service
until they reached twenty-one. At that time they were notified to
report for a physical examination, on the basis of which they
were assigned to one of four categories: those who were fully
qualified to serve in combat units; those who were partially
disabled and only eligible for duty in support units; those with
minor physical disqualifications that could be corrected before
the next call-up; and those who were physically disqualified and
exempt.
In addition to those exempted for physical reasons, Buddhist
monks, career teachers, cadets attending the military academies,
students in certain technical courses, naturalized citizens, and
persons convicted of a crime subject to a penalty of ten years'
imprisonment were not drafted. Waivers were granted in cases of
personal hardship, for example, when an individual was the sole
support of parents or minor children. Students in the later
stages of their education also found it easy to obtain deferment.
The exemption granted to naturalized citizens was designed to
exclude the country's Chinese from the armed forces, but
selective application of the law to other ethnic minorities as
well resulted in a military establishment composed largely of
members of the Thai Buddhist majority.
Thailand has always had an ample source of manpower for its
military needs. In 1987 population estimates indicated that the
country had nearly 13.6 million males aged 15 to 49, of whom an
estimated 8.4 million were considered physically fit for military
service. Roughly 520,000 young men reached the age of 18 each
year, but the total annual induction averaged only about 30,000
men. Because the supply exceeded the demand, only those in the
best physical condition were selected for service. Many inductees
came from rural areas and were reliable, hardy, physically fit,
adaptable, and accustomed to working outdoors in tropical heat,
humid climate, and monsoon rains; many possessed a keen interest
in learning and developing new skills. The average conscript
accepted his military obligation as a necessary duty.
Inductees were usually sent to the nearest army, navy, or air
force installation where the need was greatest. There the
conscripts were assigned to units for training and then to
appropriate service elements for duty. After a two-year
commitment, conscripts who did not choose to reenlist (or were
not permitted to do so) were released and placed on unassigned
reserve status for an additional twenty-three years. During this
period of reserve service they were subject to recall whenever a
need arose. The priority of recall was based on age, the youngest
reserves being reinducted first. In mid-1987 observers estimated
that the system had produced more than 500,000 reserves whose
military training and physical fitness made them reasonably
available for emergency use in the army.
Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were, in most cases, former
conscripts who had reenlisted to make a career of the military
service. On the basis of past performance, they were selected to
attend an NCO school and upon graduation returned to their units
in their new status. A limited number of NCOs were procured by
placing on active duty graduates of reserve training programs
conducted by the Ministry of Defense.
The officer corps of the armed forces was composed mainly of
graduates of the service academies and officer candidate schools.
It also included a small number of reserve officers who had
completed training courses while in college and subsequently
assumed military careers. A few officers with special
qualifications were commissioned directly from civilian life.
In the past the practice of appointing civilians to military
positions was fairly widespread and had important political
effects. Under the Civil Service Act of 1928 (amended in 1954), a
number of high-ranking officials once prominent in the political
bureaucracy became generals and acceded to prominent positions
within the military hierarchy without undergoing military
training or rising through the ranks. Although most of these
senior officers worked as administrators on headquarters staffs,
they had political clout and were important members of the
contending military cliques that figured prominently in the coups
and countercoups after 1932. Thailand's laws governing mandatory
military retirement eventually eliminated these old guard
generals and admirals, but the established pattern of rival
cliques within the armed forces--particularly the army--persisted
in the late 1980s.
Within the army, in particular, military academy classmate
groupings were important. Officers identified with their
classmates, and detailed records were kept of each academy class.
Most Thai officers knew with which class any other officer had
graduated. In the mid-1980s, officers from Class Five, led by
Lieutenant General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the army deputy chief of
staff, commanded seven of the army's thirteen divisions and
formed a crucial base of political support for Prime Minister
Prem.
Little information was publicly available on promotion
criteria and the rate of upward mobility within the officer
corps. It was known, however, that the pay--even for senior
officers--was low by Western standards. This fact of military
life encouraged officers of every rank to engage in outside
commercial activities--a practice that not only supplemented
their service income but also enhanced their influence within the
society. Many in important military positions served simultaneously on corporate directorates, family real estate companies,
and other business ventures. For the most part, the Thai
citizenry had come to accept their leaders' threefold roles as
soldiers, businessmen, and politicians.
Following the coups of the 1950s and 1960s, officers in the
losing factions were either purged or relegated to positions of
little importance or potential threat. Falls from grace, however,
were less permanent or violent in the Thai system than in some
other countries. At the same time, officers who backed the
winning group were usually promoted and given assignments
supporting the new leaders. Other officers played important roles
in expanding the power of governing regimes by transferring from
the army to the police and from the military to the bureaucracy.
After the coup of October 1977, which brought Kriangsak, the
supreme commander of the armed forces, into national power as
prime minister, much publicity was given to the role played by a
faction within the officer corps commonly referred to as the
Young Turks. Composed largely of Class Seven academy graduates,
many of whom were key battalion commanders, the group was
depicted as symbolic of the growing disparity between the conservative old guard of the politico-military establishment and the
foreign-trained younger officers who were seeking to modernize
society. The reformist Young Turks were critical of the
extravagant life- style of the military leadership, especially
when contrasted with the living conditions of ordinary soldiers
fighting the insurgents. The young reformist officers aided
Kriangsak's takeover and helped nullify the power of the old
guard officers' faction.
However, the coup attempt of April 1981, in which many Young
Turk officers had major roles, tarnished the reputation of the
group, and those involved were expelled from military service.
When a few Young Turks led a second unsuccessful coup attempt in
September 1985, their credibility declined further. Nonetheless,
in a spirit of reconciliation typical of the Thai system, most
Young Turk officers were permitted by the army chief of staff,
General Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, to return to active duty in 1986.
Although they were assigned to less important staff positions,
the move to heal rifts and establish unity enhanced the political
credentials of General Chaovalit.
By the late 1980s, the Thai army had a large group of welltrained , forward-looking officers, many of whom occupied
influential command and staff posts. This group of younger
officers was described as increasingly outraged at the
inefficient, expensive Thai-style democracy. Their growing
influence was reflected in the increased attention given to their
views by the government.
Data as of September 1987
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