Thailand Foreign Security Assistance
Although other Western nations--notably Britain, West
Germany, and Italy--have provided Thailand with moderate amounts
of military aid, the chief source of armament and training assistance since 1950 has been the United States. From 1950 through
early 1976, the substantial majority of United States aid was in
the form of grants under the Military Assistance Program (MAP).
Additional aid was offered in the form of Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) credits, part of which carried United States guarantees of
payment to American commercial suppliers if necessary.
The goal of United States assistance was to strengthen
Thailand's military capability through buildup and modernization
of its equipment, improvement of its operational tactics, and
increased training for its personnel. As the communist-supported
insurgency became a potential threat to the kingdom's political
stability in the 1960s, increased military aid was channeled to
support the Thai internal security forces in their
counterinsurgency actions. To assist the Thai in meeting
requirements for military aid and to supervise the United States
program in the field, increasing numbers of American military
specialists were assigned to the Joint United States Military
Assistance Group (JUSMAG) in Bangkok.
During the Second Indochina War (1954-75), the United States
and Thailand negotiated an unsigned agreement to permit American
naval and air units to use Thai territory. Although units of the
United States Navy operated from modern facilities established at
Sattahip on the Gulf of Thailand, the vast majority of
American-occupied bases in the country were used by combat
squadrons and supporting units of the United States Air Force. In
addition to a number of intelligence outposts scattered about the
North and Northeast, there were seven air bases from which United
States aircraft flew combat missions against targets throughout
Indochina.
These bases were at Udon Thani, Nakhon Phanom, Nam Phong,
Nakhon Ratchasima, Ubon Ratchathani, Ta Khli, and Ban U Taphao.
Constructed at a cost to the United States of several hundred
million dollars, most of the facilities were former Thai
installations that were modernized to accommodate the American
squadrons. After completion of the renovation and expansion work
by Thai civilian contractors, the bases had permanent buildings,
sophisticated ground support equipment, and runways capable of
accommodating modern combat aircraft. During the height of the
war the bases were used by more than 500 American airplanes,
including several squadrons of B-52 heavy bombers of the
Strategic Air Command. At some of the bases, facilities were
shared with training units of the Royal Thai Air Force.
Thai reaction to the United States military presence was
mixed. Senior Thai officers tended to believe that the presence
of the United States combat squadrons provided assurance against
potentially aggressive designs of communist countries in the
region. Some in the government, however, were concerned that the
installations would invite hostile political or military action
against Thailand. The presence of roughly 45,000 United States
servicemen also had a pronounced socioeconomic effect--one that
was increased by the large number of American personnel who came
to Bangkok on rest and recreation leaves from the Vietnam combat
zone.
A phased withdrawal of the American presence began in 1969,
when United States participation in the war in Indochina
decreased, and it proceeded through the early 1970s as internal
political tensions rose in the Thai kingdom
(see Thailand in Transition
, ch. 1). By late July 1976, at the request of the Thai
government, the last of the United States air and naval units had
departed. The facilities at Sattahip and the seven air bases were
turned over to the Thai government, with much of the
sophisticated ground support equipment removed. Considerable
controversy ensued between Thai military and government officials
over the future of the abandoned network of airfields. Ultimately
the military retained control over the bases, even though most
were in excess of their needs and of the government's ability to
pay for upkeep. Nakhon Ratchasima alone had cost the United
States approximately US$2.5 million a year to maintain.
Consolidating the equipment left by departing United States units
in accordance with government-to-government agreements, the Thai
air force assumed use of some of the installations.
After 1976 MAP aid to Thailand declined, and FMS credits
increased. By 1979 Thailand had been dropped from the United
States shrinking list of grant aid recipients. But later that
year, after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, President Jimmy Carter
expedited delivery of approximately US$400 million in arms and
military supplies that the Thai government had under contract
from American companies. This action set a precedent for
expedited equipment deliveries on a periodic basis to demonstrate
American support for Thailand in the face of the Vietnamese
threat in Cambodia. In the mid-1980s, as the country was
increasingly caught between economic retrenchment and the need to
upgrade its defense capabilities, the United States Congress
approved resumption of a limited military grant aid program for
Thailand.
Beginning in the early 1980s, the country hosted a series of
joint Thai-United States military exercises. A major annual
combined exercise called Cobra Gold, as well as many smaller
exercises, served to enhance relations between the two countries'
armed forces. All four United States services sent troops to take
part in the exercises, which were designed as training vehicles
for both countries.
In 1986 the United States and Thailand agreed to establish a
war reserve weapons pool in Thailand. This concept was first
raised by a former Thai supreme commander of the armed forces,
General Saiyud Kerdphon in 1982, and the proposal received
bilateral support during a meeting between Prime Minister Prem
and Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger in April 1986. As
the plan was formulated, these war reserve stocks were designed
to improve Thailand's ability to withstand aggression and were to
be used only in the event of a "nation-threatening emergency."
According to United States government statistics, between
1950 and 1987 the United States provided Thailand with more than
US$2 billion in military assistance. Approximately US$1.2 billion
was in the form of grant aid and covered arms purchases, training
of military personnel, and transfer of excess items from the
United States military equipment inventory. The remainder--almost
US$1 billion--was made available in the form of FMS credits to be
applied against commercial sales of military items from American
manufacturers. The FMS credit program was expected to continue
into the 1990s.
Data as of September 1987
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