Uganda Introduction
Figure 1. Internationally Recognized Administrative Divisions, 1990
Figure 2. Locally Recognized Administrative Divisions, 1990
IN MID-1992 UGANDA WAS still trying to recover from two
decades
of instability and civil war. For the majority of the
population
born after Idi Amin Dada seized power in 1971, a peaceful
and
prosperous Uganda was difficult to imagine. But many
Ugandans saw
promising signs of economic and political reform in the
nation's
fledgling grass-roots democracy, new economic development
projects and export initiatives, and the renewed
commitment to
education and social services. Serious problems remained
unresolved, however, and it was clear that efforts to
rehabilitate Uganda's devastated economy and return the
country
to civilian rule would take most of the decade.
Uganda in earlier times had known periods of relative
peace,
but not quiet isolation. Its early history, told through
the
archaeological record and accounts of travelers, included
centuries of political change, population migration, and
the
development of cultural diversity. The earliest occupants
of the
low-lying plateau that stretches north from the shores of
Lake
Victoria had been joined by new migrants from the north
and west
by about the fourth century A.D. These new arrivals,
ancestors of
today's Bantu-speaking societies, came under pressure from
the
expansion of non-Bantu speaking warriors and herders from
the
northeast by about the tenth century A.D. The gradual
population
movement to the southwest was slowed by the formation of
new
societies comprising farmers and herders. Several of them
competed for regional control, assimilating and dominating
their
neighbors to varying degrees, and several evolved into
complex
centralized societies marked by economic and social
stratification. During the nineteenth century, the
strongest
among them, Bunyoro, began to lose power to its breakaway
neighbor, Buganda. By the end of the nineteenth century,
Buganda
dominated the region, but the rivalry between Buganda and
Bunyoro
remained strong enough to be exploited by colonial agents
who
established the Uganda Protectorate in 1894.
Representatives of Islam and Christianity, who had also
competed for social, spiritual, and economic advantage
over one
another, also left a lasting imprint on Ugandan society.
Political developments throughout the twentieth century
have
reflected the divisions between Uganda's centralized and
noncentralized societies, and among the diverse ethnic
groups in
each of these categories, their different responses to the
colonial experience, and the impact of world religions.
Uganda had been brought into the world economic system
gradually over the centuries, first through trade in
ivory, and
later through trade in slaves and agricultural products.
In the
early twentieth century, colonial officials, with the help
of
Baganda (people of Buganda; sing., Muganda) agents,
established
cash crops, especially cotton, and later coffee, to help
finance
economic development according to world market demands.
Buganda
prospered and drew farm workers from other areas of the
protectorate. Buganda's schools also developed ahead of
those in
other regions, helping fuel existing rivalries between the
Baganda and their neighbors.
Agricultural production increased dramatically during
World
War I, and during the 1920s and 1930s, farmers were able
to
weather the fluctuations in world market prices by cutting
cash-
crop production and reverting to subsistence agriculture.
Protectorate laws carefully regulated the use of land and
other
resources, often allocating economic rights according to
racial
categories. Protests against such restrictions increased
after
World War II, but unlike much of Africa, Uganda was
preparing
peacefully for independence well before it arrived.
At independence in October 1962, ethnic and regional
rivalries were crystallized in several newly formed
political
parties and in the federal system that gave substantial
autonomy
to the four large kingdoms in the south, plus the highly
centralized society of Busoga. The central government
maintained
control over the northern region. The army flourished
under the
first independent government led by Milton Obote and
pressed its
demands for higher pay and improved conditions of service.
A
military coup in 1971, however, plunged Uganda into eight
years
of terror and disintegration under the government of Idi
Amin.
Uganda's once-developing economy disintegrated, and its
once-
thriving education system suffered lasting damage.
Government-
sanctioned brutality became commonplace. Many of Uganda's
intellectuals and entrepreneurs were forced to flee. A
brief but
tumultuous political transition followed the nightmare of
the
Amin years, and the early 1980s became a time of
revenge-seeking
and despair under the second government led by Milton
Obote.
Growing rebellions finally forced Obote from office in
1985, but
Ugandans had little cause for confidence in their
political
future.
The government led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni that
seized
power in January 1986 had not inspired overwhelming public
confidence in its ability to rule. Museveni's National
Resistance
Army (NRA), however, had shown greater military discipline
than
other armed forces in recent years, and Museveni declared
that
establishing a peaceful and secure environment was his
highest
priority as president. For this goal, Museveni had strong
popular
backing.
The NRA's hastily formed political arm, the National
Resistance Movement (NRM), set out its political program
in the
Ten-Point Program, which advocated a broad-based democracy
and a
hierarchy of popular assemblies, or resistance councils
(RCs),
from the village through district levels to mediate
between the
national government and the village. After initial doubts
about
embracing Western economic reforms, the NRM also embarked
on
ambitious structural adjustment and export diversification
programs. Museveni took seriously the notion of
accountability in
government service and set about improving standards of
behavior
among public sector employees.
But the NRM had few politically educated people in its
ranks,
and Museveni's policy of appointing members of previous
governments to high office cost him political support. In
addition, the NRM's political ideas were new and lacked
support
in the northern and eastern regions, where popular
insurgencies
continued to plague his rule even after six years in
power. And
the army, with its intense recruitment drives and policy
of
incorporating former rebel opponents into its ranks, was
unable
to eliminate the human rights abuses for which it had
become
infamous. Campaigns to pacify and stabilize rebel-occupied
areas
turned into army assaults on peaceful residents of the
north and
east, and the judicial system was slow to deal with those
accused
of serious atrocities. At the same time, the cost of
maintaining
the military escalated rapidly, and pressures to reduce
the size
of the army posed the dilemma of escalating unemployment
among
former members of the military.
Since research on this volume was completed in 1990,
the
government has continued its program of political reform
in an
effort to meet its own deadline for returning to civilian
rule by
1995. Progress, however, has been slow. The central
institutions
of grass-roots democracy, the RCs, improved their ability
to
function as part of the government, but in some areas the
RCs'
exact responsibilities were not well understood. In a few
cases,
their efforts to maintain order degenerated into
vigilantism.
A twenty-one member constitutional commission appointed
in
1988 completed its nationwide consultations in late 1991,
but it
postponed submitting a draft constitution to the
government until
November 1992. The government also planned a nationwide
referendum on the draft constitution in mid-1993.
Nationwide RC elections, held from February 29 to March
9,
1992, were generally considered a success. Voters in more
than
30,000 villages elected RCs for their villages, and
indirect
elections were held for RC members at the parish,
subcounty,
county, and district levels. Partisan campaigning and
explicitly
soliciting votes were legally prohibited; candidates who
violated
this prohibition were disqualified, although candidates
were able
to use other avenues to make their views known. In several
areas,
staunch critics of the government were elected to the RCs,
confirming the widespread belief that the elections were
generally free and fair. About half of the incumbent RC
members
were removed from office, and several members of the
national
legislature lost in elections for village RCs.
In a few areas, such as Bushenyi, elections were
delayed
because of conditions caused by religious feuding,
political
violence, or the spreading drought. In a few localities,
election
irregularities led to the annulment and rescheduling of
the
balloting. But when the votes were counted, more than
400,000
Ugandans had been elected to various levels of political
office,
and the new office-holders represented nearly every
ethnic,
religious, and political identity in the country. The next
elections were planned for late 1994, when the government
pledged
it would provide secret ballots and the direct election of
legislators at all levels.
Despite well-publicized human rights abuses by the
military
that continued through early 1991, President Museveni's
New
Year's message for 1992 emphasized his commitment to
improving
this record. By mid-1992, the courts had begun to hear the
cases
of eighteen prominent northern politicians who had been
accused
of treason in April 1991, and charges against several of
the
accused had been dropped. The government had disciplined
soldiers
for human rights abuses in unsettled areas of the north
and east,
and the army response to the unrest was more restrained in
1992.
An inspector general of government (IGG) was appointed to
serve
as a "watchdog" on government but the incumbent's
effectiveness
was undermined by the IGG's large caseload and the fact
that the
inspector general served at the president's pleasure.
The government declared northern Uganda "pacified" in
late
1991, following a three-month-long army sweep that
included
house-to-house searches in Gulu, Lira, Kitgum, and Apac
districts. Residents were asked to produce poll tax
receipts and
other documents to prove their identity. In some cases,
civilians
were assaulted, and a few were executed for failing to
comply.
Museveni also attempted to bring order to Uganda's
foreign
relations. He met in Nairobi with Kenyan president Daniel
T. arap
Moi and Tanzanian president Ali Hassan Mwinyi in late
1991, and
they agreed to develop closer ties among the three
countries.
Relations with Kenya had been strained, primarily because
of
continuing clashes along their common border. Most of the
attacks
were provoked by banditry and cross-border skirmishes
among
isolated groups of soldiers or herders, but the two
leaders
harbored mutual suspicions of one another. Moi feared
Museveni's
close ties with Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi could
contribute to
destabilization in Kenya, where ethnic and political
tensions
were already high. (This fear probably diminished,
however,
following Libya's June 1992 termination of its military
relationship with Uganda.) The three leaders agreed to
coordinate
policies in security, trade, transportation, agriculture,
and
industry, and to pursue other avenues for regional
cooperation.
Relations with Rwanda remained strained as of mid-1992.
Fighting continued along the Uganda-Rwanda border
following the
October 1990 invasion of Rwanda by Rwandan exiles in
Uganda. Many
members of the invading rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic
Front
(RPF), had been members of the Ugandan Army. Rwandan
president
Juvénal Habyarimana continued to accuse Museveni of
allowing, and
even supporting, RPF operations from Ugandan territory,
and
Rwandan forces struck back across the border several times
in
1991 and early 1992. Ugandan officials estimated that
several
thousand Ugandans had been killed, and more than 30,000
displaced, by the conflict. Representatives of the
Organization
of African Unity (OAU), along with officials from Rwanda,
Burundi, Tanzania, and Zaire, met several times in 1991
and 1992
and urged the warring parties to observe the ceasefire
agreed to
in March 1991, but fighting continued as of mid-1992.
Unrest in Zaire arising out of economic deterioration
and a
stalemate over political reform also contributed to the
security
crisis in southwestern Uganda in 1992. Ugandan officials
claimed
more than 20,000 Zairian refugees had entered Uganda,
seeking
refuge from marauding Zairian troops and antigovernment
rebel
banditry.
In northern Uganda, similar problems arose out of civil
war
and drought conditions in Sudan. In 1991 and 1992,
Sudanese army
assaults on antigovernment rebel units near the Ugandan
border
were forcing southern Sudanese to seek refuge in the
increasingly
drought-stricken area of northern Uganda, and in a few
cases
Sudanese attacks extended into Ugandan territory.
The influx of refugees strained an already struggling
Ugandan
economy. Uganda's overall economic growth continued in
1992, but
fell from the impressive rate of nearly 6 percent in 1990
and
almost 5 percent in 1991 to a projected 4.5 percent in
1992. The
government attributed the positive performance to the
nation's
returning political stability and an increasingly
favorable
investment environment. Foreign assistance also continued
to play
a significant role in economic growth. Inflation fell from
triple-digit levels to about 25 percent in 1990 but rose
to 38
percent in 1991. Targeted inflation for 1992 was 15
percent.
The fiscal year
(
FY--see Glossary) 1992 budget included total
government spending of 674.35 billion Uganda shillings
(USh; for
value of the
Uganda shilling--see Glossary), or about US$911.3
million, of which the government claimed defense spending
would
constitute about 20 percent. Educational expenditures
would
constitute 12 percent; health care, 6.5 percent; 3 percent
was
earmarked for providing safe drinking water. Roughly
one-third of
expenditures were to be financed by government revenues;
one-
third by foreign grants; and one-third by borrowing, debt
rescheduling, and the sale of treasury bills.
Agricultural growth reached 2.8 percent in 1991 and was
expected to exceed that in 1992. Cotton production doubled
in
1991 over 1990 levels; production of tea and tobacco also
increased. Coffee earnings fell to about US$140 million in
1991--
largely the result of the collapse of the International
Coffee
Agreement, which had regulated world market prices--but
coffee
still accounted for about 70 percent of merchandise export
earnings. Nontraditional export earnings, although small
in
comparison with traditional exports, doubled between 1990
and
1992 to more than US$50 million, largely because of
government
support programs that included low-interest loans and
expanded
credit opportunities to encourage the production of a
wider
variety of agricultural products.
Nevertheless, Uganda's trade deficit remained high in
1991,
with imports roughly three times the value of exports.
Combined
with high interest payments, the unfavorable trade deficit
produced a current account deficit of almost US$500
million. Debt
service requirements reached roughly 75 percent of export
earnings, with arrears mounting steadily. Most of Uganda's
external debt was owed to multilateral creditors and
therefore
could not be rescheduled.
The government continued to implement features of the
1987-91
economic rehabilitation program, such as liberalizing the
marketing of agricultural produce. In 1992 a few coffee
producers' groups were handling coffee marketing, although
the
government's Coffee Marketing Board remained active. In
early
1992, the government introduced an auction system for
allocating
foreign exchange on the basis of market dictates rather
than
government selection among importers. To help improve
Uganda's
investment climate, the government also began restoring to
its
original owners the property that had been expropriated
during
the 1970s, and negotiating compensation in a few other
cases.
The government announced that it would privatize, at
least in
part, 100 of the country's 116 public enterprises and
eliminate
16 parastatals. It would retain majority shares in
commercial
banking; copper mining; housing; airlines; breweries;
grain
milling; pharmaceutical distribution; steel and cement
production; textile and sugar manufacturing; and the
marketing of
coffee, cotton, and most agricultural produce. Private
investors,
including foreigners, would be able to purchase shares in
companies in which the government was a major shareholder.
The
government planned to retain full ownership of electric
utilities, railroads, air cargo services, development
finance
banking, posts and telecommunications, insurance agencies,
tourist agencies, and newspaper publishing. To improve
accountability among these enterprises, it intended to
reduce the
number of political appointments and increase its
oversight of
recordkeeping practices.
Civil service reform was also an important goal for the
early
1990s. With the elimination of "ghost" employees from
government
rolls in mid-1991, the number of public employees outside
the
education sector was reduced from 90,000 to roughly
64,000, and
teachers' rolls were reduced to roughly 80,000. The
salaries of
remaining government employees were increased, some by as
much as
40 percent, after these payroll cuts were announced.
Despite significant progress and ambitious planning,
Uganda
faced serious economic and political problems in 1992.
Lingering
insurgency campaigns in the north and east, increased
defense
spending, and serious military abuses reinforced one
another to
erode public confidence. The government's commitment to
economic
development provided hope of improved living standards,
but the
combined economic and security problems, along with the
effects
of two decades of neglect of education and social
services, led
many people to question whether Museveni could deliver on
his
pledge to restore broad-based democracy to Uganda.
June 15, 1992
Rita M. Byrnes
Data as of December 1990
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