|
Uganda INDEPENDENCE: THE EARLY YEARS
Uganda's approach to independence was unlike that of
most
other colonial territories where political parties had
been
organized to force self-rule or independence from a
reluctant
colonial regime. Whereas these conditions would have
required
local and regional differences to be subordinated to the
greater
goal of winning independence, in Uganda parties were
forced to
cooperate with one another, with the prospect of
independence
already assured. One of the major parties, KY, was even
opposed
to independence unless its particular separatist desires
were
met. The UPC-KY partnership represented a fragile alliance
of two
fragile parties.
In the UPC, leadership was factionalized. Each party
functionary represented a local constituency, and most of
the
constituencies were ethnically distinct. For example,
Obote's
strength lay among his Langi kin in eastern Uganda; George
Magezi
represented the local interests of his Banyoro
compatriots; Grace
S.K. Ibingira's strength was in the Ankole kingdom; and
Felix
Onama was the northern leader of the largely neglected
West Nile
District in the northwest corner of Uganda. Each of these
regional political bosses and those from the other Uganda
regions
expected to receive a ministerial post in the new Uganda
government, to exercise patronage, and to bring the
material
fruits of independence to local supporters. Failing these
objectives, each was likely either to withdraw from the
UPC
coalition or realign within it.
Moreover, the UPC had had no effective urban
organization
before independence, although it was able to mobilize the
trade
unions, most of which were led by non-Ugandan immigrant
workers
from Kenya (a situation which contributed to the
independent
Uganda government's almost immediate hostility toward the
trade
unions). No common ideology united the UPC, the
composition of
which ranged from the near reactionary Onama to the
radical John
Kakonge, leader of the UPC Youth League. As prime
minister, Obote
was responsible for keeping this loose coalition of
divergent
interest groups intact.
Obote also faced the task of maintaining the UPC's
external
alliances, primarily the coalition between the UPC and the
kabaka, who led Buganda's KY. Obote proved adept at
meeting the diverse demands of his many partners in
government.
He even temporarily acceded to some demands which he found
repugnant, such as Buganda's claim for special treatment.
This
accession led to demands by other kingdoms for similar
recognition. The Busoga chiefdoms banded together to claim
that
they, too, deserved recognition under the rule of their
newly
defined monarch, the kyabasinga. Not to be outdone,
the
Iteso people, who had never recognized a precolonial king,
claimed the title kingoo for Teso District's
political
boss, Cuthbert Obwangor. Despite these separatist
pressures,
Obote's long-term goal was to build a strong central
government
at the expense of entrenched local interests, especially
those of
Buganda.
The first major challenge to the Obote government came
not
from the kingdoms, nor the regional interests, but from
the
military. In January 1964, units of the Ugandan Army
mutinied,
demanding higher pay and more rapid promotions
(see The First Obote Regime: The Growth of the Military
, ch. 5). Minister
of
Defense Onama, who courageously went to speak to the
mutineers,
was seized and held hostage. Obote was forced to call in
British
troops to restore order, a humiliating blow to the new
regime. In
the aftermath, Obote's government acceded to all the
mutineers'
demands, unlike the governments of Kenya and Tanganyika,
which
responded to similar demands with increased discipline and
tighter control over their small military forces.
The military then began to assume a more prominent role
in
Ugandan life. Obote selected a popular junior officer with
minimal education, Idi Amin Dada, and promoted him rapidly
through the ranks as a personal protégé. As the army
expanded, it
became a source of political patronage and of potential
political
power.
Later in 1964, Obote felt strong enough to address the
critical issue of the "lost counties," which the British
had
conveniently postponed until after independence. The
combination
of patronage offers and the promise of future rewards
within the
ruling coalition gradually thinned opposition party ranks,
as
members of parliament "crossed the floor" to join the
government
benches. After two years of independence, Obote finally
acquired
enough votes to give the UPC a majority and free himself
of the
KY coalition. The turning point came when several DP
members of
parliament (MPs) from Bunyoro agreed to join the
government side
if Obote would undertake a popular referendum to restore
the
"lost counties" to Bunyoro. The kabaka, naturally,
opposed
the plebiscite. Unable to prevent it, he sent 300 armed
Baganda
veterans to the area to intimidate Banyoro voters. In
turn, 2,000
veterans from Bunyoro massed on the frontier. Civil
war was averted, and the referendum was held. The vote
demonstrated an overwhelming desire by residents in the
counties
annexed to Buganda in 1900 to be restored to their
historic
Bunyoro allegiance, which was duly enacted by the new UPC
majority despite KY opposition.
This triumph for Obote and the UPC strengthened the
central
government and threw Buganda into disarray. KY unity was
weakened
by internal recriminations, after which some KY stalwarts,
too,
began to "cross the floor" to join Obote's victorious
government.
By early 1966, the result was a parliament composed of
seventy-
four UPC, nine DP, eight KY, and one independent MP.
Obote's
efforts to produce a one-party state with a powerful
executive
prime minister appeared to be on the verge of success.
Paradoxically, however, as the perceived threat from
Buganda
diminished, many non-Baganda alliances weakened. And as
the
possibility of an opposition DP victory faded, the UPC
coalition
itself began to come apart. The one-party state did not
signal
the end of political conflict, however; it merely
relocated and
intensified that conflict within the party. The issue that
brought the UPC disharmony to a crisis involved Obote's
military
protégé, Idi Amin.
In 1966 Amin caused a commotion when he walked into a
Kampala
bank with a gold bar (bearing the stamp of the government
of the
Belgian Congo) and asked the bank manager to exchange it
for
cash. Amin's account was ultimately credited with a
deposit of
£17,000. Obote rivals questioned the incident, and it
emerged
that the prime minister and a handful of close associates
had
used Colonel Amin and units of the Uganda Army to
intervene in
the neighboring Congo crisis. Former supporters of
Congolese
leader Patrice Lumumba, led by a "General Olenga," opposed
the
American-backed government and were attempting to lead the
Eastern Province into secession. These troops were
reported to be
trading looted ivory and gold for arms supplies secretly
smuggled
to them by Amin. The arrangement became public when Olenga
later
claimed that he failed to receive the promised munitions.
This
claim appeared to be supported by the fact that in
mid-1965, a
seventy-five-ton shipment of Chinese weapons was
intercepted by
the Kenyan government as it was being moved from Tanzania
to
Uganda.
Obote's rivals for leadership within the UPC, supported
by
some Baganda politicians and others who were hostile to
Obote,
used the evidence revealed by Amin's casual bank deposit
to claim
that the prime minister and his closest associates were
corrupt
and had conducted secret foreign policy for personal gain,
in the
amount of £25,000 each. Obote denied the charge and said
the
money had been spent to buy the munitions for Olenga's
Congolese
troops. On February 4, 1966, while Obote was away on a
trip to
the north of the country, an effective "no confidence"
vote
against Obote was passed by the UPC Mps. This attempt to
remove
Obote appeared to be organized by UPC Secretary General
Grace
S.K. Ibingira, closely supported by the UPC leader from
Bunyoro,
George Magezi, and a number of other southern UPC
notables. Only
the radical UPC member, John Kakonge, voted against the
motion.
Because he was faced with a nearly unanimous disavowal
by his
governing party and national parliament, many people
expected
Obote to resign. Instead, Obote turned to Idi Amin and the
army,
and, in effect, carried out a coup d'état against his own
government in order to stay in power. Obote suspended the
constitution, arrested the offending UPC ministers, and
assumed
control of the state. He forced a new constitution through
parliament without a reading and without the necessary
quorum.
That constitution abolished the federal powers of the
kingdoms,
most notably the internal autonomy enjoyed by Buganda, and
concentrated presidential powers in the prime minister's
office.
The kabaka objected, and Buganda prepared to wage a
legal
battle. Baganda leaders rhetorically demanded that Obote's
"illegal" government remove itself from Buganda soil.
Buganda, however, once again miscalculated, for Obote
was not
interested in negotiating. Instead, he sent Idi Amin and
loyal
troops to attack the kabaka's palace on nearby
Mengo Hill.
The palace was defended by a small group of bodyguards
armed with
rifles and shotguns. Amin's troops had heavy weapons but
were
reluctant to press the attack until Obote became impatient
and
demanded results. By the time the palace was overrun, the
kabaka had taken advantage of a cloudburst to exit
over
the rear wall. He hailed a passing taxi and was driven off
to
exile. After the assault, Obote was reasonably secure from
open
opposition. The new republican 1967 constitution abolished
the
kingdoms altogether. Buganda was divided into four
districts and
ruled through martial law, a forerunner of the military
domination over the civilian population that all of Uganda
would
experience after 1971.
Obote's success in the face of adversity reclaimed for
him
the support of most members of the UPC, which then became
the
only legal political party. The original independence
election of
1962, therefore, was the last one held in Uganda until
December
1980. On the homefront, Obote issued the "Common Man's
Charter,"
echoed the call for African Socialism by Tanzanian
President
Julius Nyerere, and proclaimed a "move to the left" to
signal new
efforts to consolidate power. His critics noted, however,
that he
placed most control over economic nationalization in the
hands of
an Asian millionaire who was also a financial backer of
the UPC.
Obote created a system of secret police, the General
Service Unit
(GSU). Headed by a relative, Akena Adoko, the GSU reported
on
suspected subversives
(see Internal Security Services
, ch.
5).
The Special Force Units of paramilitary police, heavily
recruited
from Obote's own region and ethnic group, supplemented the
security forces within the army and police.
Although Buganda had been defeated and occupied by the
military, Obote was still concerned about security there.
His
concerns were well founded; in December 1969 he was
wounded in an
assassination attempt and narrowly escaped more serious
injury
when a grenade thrown near him failed to explode. He had
retained
power by relying on Idi Amin and the army, but it was not
clear
that he could continue to count on their loyalty.
Obote appeared particularly uncertain of the army after
Amin's sole rival among senior army officers, Brigadier
Acap
Okoya, was murdered early in 1970. (Amin later promoted
the man
rumored to have recruited Okoya's killers.) A second
attempt was
made on Obote's life when his motorcade was ambushed later
that
year, but the vice-president's car was mistakenly riddled
with
bullets. Obote began to recruit more Acholi and Langi
troops, and
he accelerated their promotions to counter the large
numbers of
soldiers from Amin's home, which was then known as West
Nile
District. Obote also enlarged the paramilitary Special
Force as a
counterweight to the army.
Amin, who at times inspected his troops wearing an
outsized
sport shirt with Obote's face across the front and back,
protested his loyalty. But in October 1970, Amin was
placed under
temporary house arrest while investigators looked into his
army
expenditures, reportedly several million dollars over
budget.
Another charge against Amin was that he had continued to
aid
southern Sudan's Anya Nya rebels in opposing the regime of
Jafaar
Numayri even after Obote had shifted his support away from
the
Anyanya to Numayri. This foreign policy shift provoked an
outcry
from Israel, which had been supplying the Anyanya rebels.
Amin
was close friends with several Israeli military advisers
who were
in Uganda to help train the Ugandan Army, and their
eventual role
in Amin's efforts to oust Obote remained the subject of
continuing controversy.
Data as of December 1990
|
