Uganda Historical Setting
The baobab tree, ancient symbol of the African plains
UGANDA WAS ONE of the lesser-known African countries
until the
1970s when Idi Amin Dada rose to the presidency. His
bizarre
public pronouncements--ranging from gratuitous advice for
Richard
Nixon to his proclaimed intent to raise a monument to
Adolf
Hitler--fascinated the popular news media. Beneath the
facade of
buffoonery, however, the darker reality of massacres and
disappearances was considered equally newsworthy. Uganda
became
known as an African horror story, fully identified with
its field
marshal president. Even a decade after Amin's flight from
Uganda
in 1979, popular imagination still insisted on linking the
country and its exiled former ruler.
But Amin's well-publicized excesses at the expense of
Uganda
and its citizens were not unique, nor were they the
earliest
assaults on the rule of law. They were foreshadowed by
Amin's
predecessor, Apolo Milton Obote, who suspended the 1962
constitution and ruled part of Uganda by martial law for
five
years before a military coup in 1971 brought Amin into
power.
Amin's bloody regime was followed by an even bloodier
one--
Obote's second term as president during the civil war from
1981
to 1985, when government troops carried out genocidal
sweeps of
the rural populace in a region that became known as the
Luwero
Triangle. The dramatic collapse of coherent government
under Amin
and his plunder of his nation's economy, followed by the
even
greater failure of the second Obote government in the
1980s,
raised the essential question--"what went wrong?"
At Uganda's independence in October 1962 there was
little
indication that the country was headed for disaster. On
the
contrary, it appeared a model of stability and potential
progress. Unlike neighboring Kenya, Uganda had no alien
white
settler class attempting to monopolize the rewards of the
cashcrop economy. Nor was there any recent legacy of bitter
and
violent conflict in Uganda to compare with the 1950s Mau
Mau
rebellion in Kenya. In Uganda it was African producers who
grew
the cotton and coffee that brought a higher standard of
living,
financed the education of their children, and led to
increased
expectations for the future.
Unlike neighboring Tanzania, Uganda enjoyed rich
natural
resources, a flourishing economy, and an impressive number
of
educated and prosperous middle-class African
professionals,
including business people, doctors, lawyers, and
scientists. And
unlike neighboring Zaire (the former Belgian Congo), which
experienced only a brief period of independence before
descending
into chaos and misrule, Uganda's first few years of
self-rule saw
a series of successful development projects. The new
government
built many new schools, modernized the transportation
network,
and increased manufacturing output as well as national
income.
With its prestigious national Makerere University, its
gleaming
new teaching hospital at Mulago, its Owen Falls
hydroelectric
project at Jinja--all gifts of the departing
British--Uganda at
independence looked optimistically to the future.
Independence, too, was in a sense a gift of the British
because it came without a struggle. The British determined
a
timetable for withdrawal before local groups had organized
an
effective nationalist movement. Uganda's political parties
emerged in response to impending independence rather than
as a
means of winning it.
In part the result of its fairly smooth transition to
independence, the near absence of nationalism among
Uganda's
diverse ethnic groups led to a series of political
compromises.
The first was a government made up of coalitions of local
and
regional interest groups loosely organized into political
parties. The national government was presided over by a
prime
minister whose principal role appeared to be that of a
broker,
trading patronage and development projects--such as roads,
schools, and dispensaries--to local or regional interest
groups
in return for political support. It was not the strong,
directive, ideologically clothed central government
desired by
most African political leaders, but it worked. And it
might
reasonably have been expected to continue to work, because
there
were exchanges and payoffs at all levels and to all
regions.
Data as of December 1990
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