Uganda Power Politics in Buganda
The prospect of elections caused a sudden proliferation
of
new political parties. This development alarmed the
old-guard
leaders within the Uganda kingdoms, because they realized
that
the center of power would be at the national level. The
spark
that ignited wider opposition to Governor Cohen's reforms
was a
1953 speech in London in which the secretary of state for
colonies referred to the possibility of a federation of
the three
East African territories (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika),
similar
to that established in central Africa. Many Ugandans were
aware
of the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland
(later Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi) and its domination by
white
settler interests. Ugandans deeply feared the prospect of
an East
African federation dominated by the racist settlers of
Kenya,
which was then in the midst of the bitter Mau Mau
uprising. They
had vigorously resisted a similar suggestion by the 1930
Hilton
Young Commission. Confidence in Cohen vanished just as the
governor was preparing to urge Buganda to recognize that
its
special status would have to be sacrificed in the
interests of a
new and larger nation-state.
Kabaka Freddie, who had been regarded by his subjects
as
uninterested in their welfare, now refused to cooperate
with
Cohen's plan for an integrated Buganda. Instead, he
demanded that
Buganda be separated from the rest of the protectorate and
transferred to Foreign Office jurisdiction. Cohen's
response to
this crisis was to deport the kabaka to a
comfortable
exile in London. His forced departure made the
kabaka an
instant martyr in the eyes of the Baganda, whose latent
separatism and anticolonial sentiments set off a storm of
protest. Cohen's action had backfired, and he could find
no one
among the Baganda prepared or able to mobilize support for
his
schemes. After two frustrating years of unrelenting Ganda
hostility and obstruction, Cohen was forced to reinstate
Kabaka
Freddie.
The negotiations leading to the kabaka's return
had an
outcome similar to the negotiations of Commissioner
Johnston in
1900; although appearing to satisfy the British, they were
a
resounding victory for the Baganda. Cohen secured the
kabaka's agreement not to oppose independence
within the
larger Uganda framework. Not only was the kabaka
reinstated in return, but for the first time since 1889,
the
monarch was given the power to appoint and dismiss his
chiefs
(Buganda government officials) instead of acting as a mere
figurehead while they conducted the affairs of government.
The
kabaka's new power was cloaked in the misleading
claim
that he would be only a "constitutional monarch," while in
fact
he was a leading player in deciding how Uganda would be
governed.
A new grouping of Baganda calling themselves "the King's
Friends"
rallied to the kabaka's defense. They were
conservative,
fiercely loyal to Buganda as a kingdom, and willing to
entertain
the prospect of participation in an independent Uganda
only if it
were headed by the kabaka. Baganda politicians who
did not
share this vision or who were opposed to the "King's
Friends"
found themselves branded as the "King's Enemies," which
meant
political and social ostracism.
The major exception to this rule were the Roman
Catholic
Baganda who had formed their own party, the Democratic
Party
(DP), led by Benedicto Kiwanuka. Many Catholics had felt
excluded
from the Protestant-dominated establishment in Buganda
ever since
Lugard's Maxim had turned the tide in 1892. The
kabaka had
to be Protestant, and he was invested in a coronation
ceremony
modeled on that of British monarchs (who are invested by
the
Church of England's Archbishop of Canterbury) that took
place at
the main Protestant church. Religion and politics were
equally
inseparable in the other kingdoms throughout Uganda. The
DP had
Catholic as well as other adherents and was probably the
best
organized of all the parties preparing for elections. It
had
printing presses and the backing of the popular newspaper,
Munno, which was published at the St. Mary's Kisubi
mission.
Elsewhere in Uganda, the emergence of the kabaka
as a
political force provoked immediate hostility. Political
parties
and local interest groups were riddled with divisions and
rivalries, but they shared one concern: they were
determined not
to be dominated by Buganda. In 1960 a political organizer
from
Lango, Milton Obote, seized the initiative and formed a
new
party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), as a coalition
of all
those outside the Roman Catholic-dominated DP who opposed
Buganda
hegemony.
The steps Cohen had initiated to bring about the
independence
of a unified Uganda state had led to a polarization
between
factions from Buganda and those opposed to its domination.
Buganda's population in 1959 was 2 million, out of
Uganda's total
of 6 million. Even discounting the many non-Baganda
resident in
Buganda, there were at least 1 million people who owed
allegiance
to the kabaka--too many to be overlooked or shunted
aside,
but too few to dominate the country as a whole. At the
London
Conference of 1960, it was obvious that Buganda autonomy
and a
strong unitary government were incompatible, but no
compromise
emerged, and the decision on the form of government was
postponed. The British announced that elections would be
held in
March 1961 for "responsible government," the next-to-last
stage
of preparation before the formal granting of independence.
It was
assumed that those winning the election would gain
valuable
experience in office, preparing them for the probable
responsibility of governing after independence.
In Buganda the "King's Friends" urged a total boycott
of the
election because their attempts to secure promises of
future
autonomy had been rebuffed. Consequently, when the voters
went to
the polls throughout Uganda to elect eighty-two National
Assembly
members, in Buganda only the Roman Catholic supporters of
the DP
braved severe public pressure and voted, capturing twenty
of
Buganda's twenty-one allotted seats. This artificial
situation
gave the DP a majority of seats, although they had a
minority of
416,000 votes nationwide versus 495,000 for the UPC.
Benedicto
Kiwanuka became the new chief minister of Uganda.
Shocked by the results, the Baganda separatists, who
formed a
political party called Kabaka Yekka (KY--The King Only),
had
second thoughts about the wisdom of their election
boycott. They
quickly welcomed the recommendations of a British
commission that
proposed a future federal form of government. According to
these
recommendations, Buganda would enjoy a measure of internal
autonomy if it participated fully in the national
government. For
its part, the UPC was equally anxious to eject its DP
rivals from
government before they became entrenched. Obote reached an
understanding with Kabaka Freddie and the KY, accepting
Buganda's
special federal relationship and even a provision by which
the
kabaka could appoint Buganda's representatives to
the
National Assembly, in return for a strategic alliance to
defeat
the DP. The kabaka was also promised the largely
ceremonial position of head of state of Uganda, which was
of
great symbolic importance to the Baganda.
This marriage of convenience between the UPC and the KY
made
inevitable the defeat of the DP interim administration. In
the
aftermath of the April 1962 final election leading up to
independence, Uganda's national parliament consisted of
fortythree UPC delegates, twenty-four KY delegates, and
twenty-four DP
delegates. The new UPC-KY coalition led Uganda into
independence
in October 1962, with Obote as prime minister and the
kabaka as head of state.
Data as of December 1990
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