Uganda Government and Politics
Parliament building in Kampala
THE CENTRAL QUESTION facing Uganda after the National
Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
came to
power in January 1986 was whether or not this new
government
could break the cycle of insecurity and decay that had
afflicted
the country since independence in 1962. Each new
government had
made that goal more difficult to achieve. Despite
Ugandans' hopes
for improvement after the war that ended President Idi
Amin
Dada's rule in April 1979, national political and economic
difficulties worsened in the seven years that followed. A
new
guerrilla war began in 1981. The National Resistance Army
(NRA),
military wing of the NRM, seized Kampala and control of
the
national government in January 1986. The NRM pledged it
would
establish legitimate and effective political institutions
within
the next four years. It failed to achieve this goal,
however,
partly because new civil wars broke out in the north and
the
east, and in October 1989 the NRM extended its interim
rule until
1995.
Few of the basic political questions that confronted
Uganda
at independence had been settled when the NRM seized power
in
1986. Under protectorate rule after 1894, Uganda's various
regions had developed along different paths and at
different
rates. As a result, at independence the most politically
divisive
issue was the difference in accumulated wealth among these
regions. Political tensions centered around the relatively
wealthy region of Buganda, which also formed the most
cohesive
political unit in Uganda, and its relationship to the rest
of the
country. Adding to these tensions by the late 1960s,
northern
military domination had been abruptly translated into
political
domination. Moreover, some political leaders represented
the
interests of Protestant church organizations in a country
that
had a Catholic majority and a small but growing Islamic
minority.
Ugandan officials increasingly harassed citizens, often
for their
own economic gain, while imprisonment, torture, and
violence,
although universally deplored as a means of settling
political
disputes, had become commonplace. All of these factors
contributed to political fragmentation.
The NRM government promised fundamental change to
establish
peace and democracy, to rebuild the economy, and, above
all, to
end military indiscipline. The new government's political
manifesto, the Ten-Point Program, written during the
guerrilla
war of the 1980s, traced Uganda's problems to the fact
that
previous political leaders had relied on ethnicity and
religion
in decision making at the expense of development concerns.
The
Ten-Point Program argued that resolving these problems
required
the creation of grass-roots democracy, a politically
educated
army and police force, and greater national economic
independence. It also insisted that the success of
Uganda's new
political institutions would depend on public servants who
would
forego self-enrichment at the nation's expense. Political
education would be provided to explain the reasons for
altering
institutions and policies Uganda had used since
independence. The
new institutions and policies which the NRM announced it
intended
to put in their place involved drastic changes from the
practices
of earlier regimes.
At the time that the NRA seized power, however, its
organizational life had been brief, its personnel were
few, and
its political base was narrow. It had few resources to
achieve
its ambitious proposals for reform. The NRA had been
formed in
1981, but its political wing, the NRM, had not been
organized as
a government until 1985. And because the NRA had been
confined
primarily to Buganda and western Uganda when it ousted the
northern-based Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA),
many
Ugandans believed it had simply substituted southern
political
control for northern domination. Separate civil wars
resumed in
the north and east only a few months later, and many
people in
those areas remained deeply skeptical about NRM promises.
In addition, as soon as it came to power, the NRM
implemented
the policy of broad-based government that Museveni had
adopted
during the guerrilla war. He appointed leaders of rival
political
parties and armies to high-level military and cabinet
offices.
These new leaders generally did not share the NRM's
approach to
reforms, however. Furthermore, as a government, the NRM
had to
rely on existing state institutions, particularly
government
ministries, local administrative offices, and the court
system.
Government procedures had enjoined public servants working
within
these institutions from any political activity. Many
officials
were neither sympathetic to the objectives of the NRM nor
convinced that political education for public servants was
a
legitimate means to accomplish those goals. As a result,
Museveni's government was partly led and predominantly
staffed by
officials who preferred to restore the policies pursued by
the
Ugandan government in the 1960s. They shared power with a
few NRM
officials who were committed to radical changes.
Nonetheless, NRM leaders made the most important policy
decisions in the regime's first four years, relying on the
wave
of popular support that accompanied their rise to power
and their
control over the national army. They introduced several
new
political bodies, including an inner circle of NRM and NRA
officials who had risen to leadership positions during the
guerrilla war, a hierarchy of popular assemblies known as
resistance councils (RCs), the NRM secretariat, and
schools for
political education. But the NRM had too few trained
cadres or
detailed plans to implement the Ten-Point Program during
this
period. As Museveni himself conceded, the NRM came to
power
before it was ready to govern.
For these reasons--lack of a nationwide political base,
creation of a broad-based government, the absence of
sufficient
trained cadres of its own, and the necessity of relying on
existing government ministries--the new government's
leaders
chose a path of compromise, blending ideas they had
developed
during the guerrilla war with existing government
institutions on
a pragmatic, ad-hoc, day-to-day basis. As a result, during
its
first four years, the government maintained an uneasy and
ambiguous reliance on both old and new procedures and
policies.
And it was often difficult to determine which official in
the
government, the NRM, or the NRA possessed either formal or
actual
responsibility for a particular policy decision.
New civil wars and ill-chosen economic policies
diverted the
government's energies from many of its ambitious political
and
economic reforms, but others were begun. In frequent
public
statements, Museveni returned to the basic themes of the
TenPoint Program, indicating that they had not been
abandoned.
Data as of December 1990
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