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Uganda THE TEN-POINT PROGRAM
The context in which the NRM's political program was
written
helps to explain the importance that Museveni and other
government leaders who were involved in the guerrilla
struggle
attached to it. During the interim period after the fall
of Amin
in April 1979, several small political groups maneuvered
to shape
the rules for the national parliamentary elections that
were held
in December 1980
(see Uganda after Amin
, ch. 1). Only a
few
months before the elections, the decision was made to
require
candidates to run as representatives of parties rather
than as
individuals. In response, Museveni and other progressives
formed
a new party, the Uganda People's Movement (UPM), which
chose
Museveni as its leader. The party nominated candidates in
most
constituencies, but won only one seat. Museveni ran a
close third
in Mbarara North constituency.
Following widespread allegations that Milton Obote's
Uganda
People's Congress (UPC) had manipulated the electoral
results to
deprive the Democratic Party (DP) of victory, Museveni and
a few
followers went underground in Luwero District in February
1981,
organized the Popular Resistance Army (PRA), and, along
with
other small bands of fighters, started a guerrilla war. A
year
later, the PRA broadened its base by negotiating a merger
with
Yusuf Lule, the first president of Uganda after the fall
of Amin,
and incorporating the guerrillas Lule had recruited. The
new
organization was named the NRA; Lule became chair and
Museveni
became deputy chair and army commander. This arrangement
enabled
Museveni to recruit and train Baganda men and women to
fight for
the NRA, even though he was a Muhima from Mbarara
District. When
Lule died in 1985, Museveni became chair of the NRA.
Until April 1985, the war was fought exclusively in
Buganda,
primarily in the Luwero Triangle (named for the area
included
within the roads between Kampala, Hoima, and Masindi) to
oust the
UPC government headed by Milton Obote
(see The Second Obote Regime: 1981-85
, ch. 1). The NRA then left Buganda to open
a
second front in the west and occupied the entire region
following
the July 1985 coup d'état in which General Tito Lutwa
Okello
replaced Milton Obote as head of state. Museveni's NRA
undertook
a program of political education following classic
guerrilla
tactics Museveni had learned fifteen years earlier from
the
liberation movement in Mozambique. NRA soldiers were
taught the
reasons for their struggle, to respect the villagers among
whom
they lived, and to pay for food and goods they needed. A
political infrastructure to support the NRA was organized
through
secret, although democratically elected, RCs in villages
in
Luwero District. The Ten-Point Program, written during the
guerrilla campaign, reflects the principles with which the
NRA
created a disciplined army, organized popular support
through
RCs, and, in particular, developed a coherent political
and
economic explanation of why the NRA was fighting against
the
Ugandan government.
The Ten-Point Program argued that postindependence
Ugandan
political rulers had greatly exacerbated the problems of
economic
distortion introduced by British colonial rule. The
solution to
these problems required a new political and economic
strategy
that contained ten points. First, real democracy had to be
organized at all levels from the village up by elections
to
"people's committees," by elections to parliament, and on
the
basis of a decent standard of living so that ordinary
people
could resist the blandishments of unprincipled
politicians.
Second, because insecurity in Uganda had been largely the
result
of "state-inspired violence," it could be eliminated
through
local democracy, "a politicized army and police, and
absence of
corruption at the top." Third, national unity could be
consolidated by eliminating sectarianism--that is, through
the
removal of politics based on religious, linguistic, and
ethnic
factional issues. Fourth, it was possible to stop the
interference of foreign interests in Uganda's domestic
concerns
since independence, but only if the Ugandan leadership
developed
independent priorities based on Ugandan interests. Fifth,
the
most important protection for these interests was to
construct an
independent, integrated, and self-sustaining national
economy
that would stop the leakage of Uganda's wealth abroad.
Beyond these goals of the new political strategy were
practical steps for achieving these goals. The sixth of
the ten
points was that basic social services--clean water, health
dispensaries, literacy, and housing--had to be restored,
particularly in the areas ravaged by the wars that ended
the
regimes of Amin and Obote. Seventh, because corruption,
particularly in the public service, reinforced basic
economic
distortions, the government had to eliminate it in order
to
attack economic distortions effectively. Eighth, the
problems of
victims of past governments should be resolved: land
should be
returned to thousands of people displaced by mistaken
development
projects and land seizures; the Karamojong
(see Ethnic Diversity and Language
, ch. 2) should be settled by providing
adequate
water; and workers and public servants should receive
salaries
that would allow them to meet the cost of living. Ninth,
Uganda
should seek cooperation with other African countries,
particularly its neighbors, in order to create larger
markets and
a more rational use of resources. Nevertheless, Uganda
should
also defend democratic and human rights of African people
against
dictators who suppressed them. Finally, Uganda should
maintain a
mixed economy--combining both capitalist and socialist
methods--
with small businesses in the hands of private
entrepreneurs, and
with import-export licensing, monetary policy, ownership
of heavy
industry, and construction of schools and hospitals under
the
control of the state.
This analysis of Uganda's problems differed
substantially
from the general approach taken by previous Ugandan
governments.
It called for new patterns of organization of Uganda's
political
economy instead of rehabilitation and restoration of
political
and economic life as it had existed in the 1960s. Whereas
politicians and civil servants from the former regimes had
believed the problem was to remove corrupt and ineffectual
personnel, the Ten-Point Program called for new structures
based
on popular control and political education. It claimed
that if
ordinary citizens understood the basic causes for Uganda's
political and economic decay, they would support these
basic
reforms.
NRM and NRA officials chose to emphasize political
education
through mass meetings during the latter half of 1985,
when, for
the first time, they were in open and unchallenged control
of
part of Uganda. Special district administrators (DAs) were
appointed as the most authoritative representatives of the
NRM in
each district
(see Local Administration
, this ch.). The
largest
proportion of their time was spent traveling to villages
to
explain why ordinary people should become directly
involved in
politics on the basis of their own economic problems,
rather than
through the sectarian attachments on which the established
political parties were based. Discipline for soldiers who
violated the rights of citizens was carried out in front
of
people in soccer stadiums. A strong change-oriented and
populist
flavor marked this first effort of the NRM to introduce
the TenPoint Program. But the situation changed significantly
when the
NRM administration was established in Kampala and became
responsible for the government.
Data as of December 1990
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