Uganda The Executive
Under the 1986 proclamation, the president became head
of the
executive branch (head of state) with the power to appoint
a
cabinet of ministers with NRC approval. He was also
empowered,
again with the approval of the NRC, to appoint a prime
minister
to conduct the business of government. Provisions of the
1967
constitution continuing in force authorized the president
to
organize the ministries of the public service. Ministers
took
responsibility for the implementation of government
policy. A
permanent secretary took responsibility for the
organization and
operation of each ministry. In addition, the president
appointed
an inspector general of police, an auditor general, and a
director of public prosecutions. The president, or a
person he
authorized, made treaties and agreements between Uganda
and other
countries and international organizations. Among the
chapters of
the 1967 constitution that were suspended was the
provision
specifying a five-year term for the president, but the
1986
proclamation did not clearly spell out a new term.
Presumably,
the president served until dismissed by the NRC (the NRC
made
this appointment) or until the end of the interim period
of the
NRM government. The power of the NRC, acting in concert
with the
NRAC, to dismiss the president was made explicit in the
February
1989 amendments to the original proclamation.
The NRM consistently followed the principle of
broad-based
government from its days of guerrilla warfare through its
first
four years in power. NRM leaders viewed this principle as
an NRM
reform intended to reverse political disorder by inviting
opponents of the government to share power, instead of
following
the previous practice of monopolizing power in the hands
of the
victors. The NRM's commitment to broad-based government
was most
clearly demonstrated in its first cabinet appointments. By
reaching outside its own ranks for appointments at the
highest
levels, the NRM acknowledged the importance of this
principle for
national reconciliation. Because the leadership of the NRM
consisted predominantly of new and untested political
figures who
originated primarily from the southern part of the
country, these
appointments reassured many Ugandans that the NRM did not
intend
to monopolize high government positions. Dr. Samson
Kisekka, a
senior associate of former President Yusuf Lule who had
joined
the NRM when Museveni and Lule merged their movements,
became
prime minister. An older Muganda politician and medical
doctor,
Kisekka held more conservative views than Museveni and
thus
reassured many Baganda that the NRM would not make too
many
radical changes.
The number of members of the DP in Museveni's first
cabinet
surprised many observers because the DP had participated
in the
Okello government, which the NRA had overthrown. The DP
had been
formed in 1954 and had briefly formed the national
government
just before independence. The DP had also become the
official
opposition when the UPC claimed victory following the 1980
elections, although most observers believed the DP had
actually
won the elections. DP leaders did not serve in government
until
the party president, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, became
minister of
internal affairs following the July 1985 coup d'état that
removed
the UPC government. Under the first NRM government, not
only did
Ssemogerere continue at internal affairs, but the
significant
portfolios of finance; agriculture, animal husbandry, and
fisheries; commerce; and justice were given to DP
politicians as
well. The leader of the Conservative Party, Joshua
MayangaNkangi , who had been the last prime minister of Buganda
(in 1966)
and whose party stood for the return of the Buganda
monarchy, was
appointed minister of education. The president took the
defense
portfolio and appointed an NRM official as minister of
foreign
affairs, but in general, NRM leaders were given
responsibility
for less important ministries or became deputy ministers
in more
critical ministries.
Additional cabinet members were recruited through
negotiations with other guerrilla groups, after the
president
stated that he was willing to promote peace by merging
rivals
into his government through negotiation, instead of
fighting with
them. Museveni's first cabinet contained several such
leaders who
had switched sides shortly before the NRA took power. Dr.
Andrew
Kayiira and Dr. David Lwanga, leaders of other guerrilla
groups
who had opposed Obote, were appointed to the energy and
environmental protection ministries, respectively. In July
1986,
Moses Ali, leader of a faction of the Uganda National
Rescue
Front (UNRF) made up of soldiers originally from Amin's
army,
became minister of tourism and wildlife. Ali had been
Amin's
minister of finance, so this was a significant expansion
of the
principle of broad-based government. By narrowing the
government's definition of "political criminals" it
intended to
prosecute, the appointment was a further step toward
national
reconciliation. The principle of broad-based government
also led
Museveni to expand the size of his cabinet. Between 1986
and
1990, the number of ministers, ministers of state, and
deputy
ministers grew from thirty-three to seventy-two, including
three
deputy prime ministers added to the cabinet in April 1989.
By
this time, a greater proportion of appointments to key
ministries
came from NRM and NRA ranks.
The commitment to broad-based government in the cabinet
had
two important consequences for policy making. First,
bringing
opponents of the NRM into the highest levels of government
diluted the policy approach provided in the Ten-Point
Program.
Second, introducing different perspectives into the
cabinet led
to sudden and unexpected reversals in policy. The most
dramatic
example of both points was the change in the government's
position regarding the conditions of structural adjustment
required by the International Monetary Fund
(
IMF--see Glossary)
in return for foreign loans. At first, Museveni and his
advisers
who had engaged in the guerrilla struggle rejected the IMF
as a
source of funds because they believed it would force
Uganda to
become more dependent on foreign capitalist institutions,
while
the Ten-Point Program called for the creation of an
independent
economy. Nevertheless, the government's first budget in
May 1986
resembled orthodox IMF strategy, particularly by sharply
devaluing the Uganda shilling
(
USh; for value--see Glossary) and
restricting spending. In response, opponents of structural
adjustment were able to persuade the cabinet to approve an
antiIMF budget only three months later. This version revalued
the
shilling and greatly expanded spending beyond the revenue
base.
Then in May 1987, the government, faced with dizzying
inflation,
reversed itself again and signed an agreement with the
IMF. Once
again the shilling was greatly devalued and government
spending
was cut
(see Currency and Inflation
, ch. 3).
Data as of December 1990
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