Uganda SOCIAL CHANGE
Marketing farm produce in Kampala
Courtesy Carl Fleischhauer
Uganda in the 1980s bore the imprint of complex
stratification systems that had evolved well before
colonial
agents arrived in the area. These, in turn, were shaped in
part
by the Arab slave trade that flourished in the
mid-nineteenth
century, providing laborers for French sugar and tobacco
plantations on several Indian Ocean islands. Tens of
thousands of
slave captives were taken from northern Uganda, where
societies
had been organized primarily around descent rules, ritual
needs,
and cattle. British imperial agents arriving in the north
in the
late nineteenth century encountered many small villageand
lineage-based social units specialized for mobility and
warfare.
Karamojong societies in the northeast were highly
segmented,
allowing people to move away and rejoin a group without
disrupting social relations or their pastoral life-style.
West of
the Karamojong, Acholi and Langi peoples developed a more
sedentary economy relying largely on crop cultivation. In
most
northern societies, status distinctions were based on age,
gender, and, in some cases, spiritual prowess. Men with
military
expertise were also important, but these societies did not
develop powerful kingdoms as did those that would dominate
southern Uganda. In the south, a more favorable climate
contributed to the formation of highly stratified
kingdoms,
relying in part on labor from the north. Patron-client
relationships bound individuals of different strata to one
another, and military elites sometimes dominated society,
especially in times of war. By the late nineteenth
century,
British imperial agents saw Buganda as an orderly kingdom
with
extensive commercial ties throughout the region, ruled by
a king
who welcomed those who proselytized on behalf of world
religions-
-an ideal environment for establishing a colonial
presence.
In 1900 Baganda chiefs agreed to protectorate status
for the
region in return for title to freehold land, and even in
the
1980s, many of Uganda's wealthiest landowners were Baganda
who
had inherited or purchased that land (still known as
mailo
land because it was measured in square miles) from these
early
landowners. Similar landowning classes were created in
Toro and
Ankole, where the British granted freehold tenure to a
small
group of chiefs, and to a lesser extent in Bunyoro, where
the
omukama followed suit to appease his most important
clients. These agreements displaced lineage and clan
heads, who
became trespassers on ancestral land they had formerly
controlled, and the shift from dispersed, temporary power
centers
to a petite bourgeoisie of African landowners began.
Asians, who
came to dominate retail and wholesale trade, and a few
highranking civil servants were also among the new elites.
Tenant farmers began to exercise their political power
as the
triangular relationship among landlords, tenant farmers,
and the
state achieved a sort of balance. The state demanded taxes
from
both landowners and tenant farmers; landlords demanded
rent (and
a portion of the produce) from their tenants; and farmers
threatened to reduce their crop yields if the demands of
the
other two became too onerous. At times, disgruntled
farmers were
so successful in withholding production that the state
stepped in
to impose limits on demands by landlords, thereby
protecting the
state's ability to tax both landlord and tenant farmer.
Successful landowners received government loans at low
interest
rates, and some of them used the money to purchase
facilities for
processing cash crops, which would become especially
lucrative
after independence. Wealthy farmers organized agricultural
cooperatives--and eventually, political parties--to
implement
their demands during the pre-independence years. They
recruited
members among their own ethnic or religious groups,
however, and
therefore most peasant farmers remained poor.
During the years surrounding independence, land
ownership was
an important factor in the new nation's social
organization, but
colonial policies also entrenched racial and ethnic
differences
that hampered the accumulation of wealth by most people.
African
business people were unable to compete with Asians in many
areas
of commerce because of discriminatory government licensing
regulations and red tape. Urban unskilled workers, lacking
both
land and political organization, were hampered from
organizing
nationwide labor actions, and in general the poor found
their
avenues to middle-class status blocked. Most northerners
remained
peasants or laborers because agribusiness, commerce,
transportation, and educational centers were centered in
the
south.
Each government after independence altered the identity
of
the major participants in the national economy without
changing
the basic nature of that participation. The 1960s
government of
Milton Obote reduced the privileged status of the southern
kingdoms, especially Buganda, and brought northerners into
business and politics in increasing numbers. During the
1970s,
Amin expelled the Asian commercial bourgeoisie and
eliminated
many others from the entrenched elite. By expropriating
their
wealth and nationalizing foreign businesses, Amin's
followers
acquired substantial resources for patronage purposes, and
as a
result, former peripheral groups, such as the Nubian
military
community, assumed new power and wealth. Many uneducated,
untrained military recruits also received important
military and
political appointments, but by the end of Amin's term in
office
in 1979, the state's resources for rewarding political
clients
had begun to dwindle.
Under these conditions of political and economic
uncertainty,
many skilled workers, even from urban areas, reverted to
subsistence cultivation in order to survive. Urban and
rural
elites fled from state terror tactics and economic
destruction,
and many who could afford to travel went to other African
countries or Britain. Cities and towns stagnated. At the
same
time, shortages of basic commodities and foodstuffs
provided new
avenues to wealth through black-market operations and
smuggling.
For many citizens, the institutions of government became
almost
irrelevant to social progress.
As the government lost its ability to impose economic
and
political order, a few people were able to accumulate
impressive
wealth through open manipulation of illegal economic
networks. A
specialized vocabulary for black-market activities, termed
magendo, and its most successful participants,
mafuta
mingi ("dripping in oil"), came to symbolize the
importance
of this thriving sector of the economy. Local economists
estimated that during the early 1980s, magendo
activities
generated as much as one-third of the national output of
goods
and services, and mafuta mingi, both those in
government
office and "private-sector magendoists,"
constituted the
wealthiest class of Ugandans. Together with its
lower-class
beneficiaries--including those who carried out risky
smuggling
ventures, ran errands, and stored goods for their
superiors, as
well as those who were simply thieves (bayaye)--
magendo was thought to provide a living for about 7
percent of the population.
President Amin also embarrassed many Ugandans with his
uneducated style as president; his example and tolerance
of
brutality were viewed with revulsion. Government agents
committed
much of the violence, provoking violent revenge, and
ethnic
identity became the basis for much of this revenge.
Pervasive
violence heightened the destructive impact of widespread
corruption. When Museveni seized power in 1986, none of
the four
administrations that had succeeded Amin had been able to
restore
order or public confidence in government. The restoration
of a
viable middle class began, and some urban activity
revived, but
continuing warfare delayed nationwide social programs.
Economic
disaster loomed again when international coffee prices
plummeted
in 1989, and the policy of coopting former rebel opponents
produced a burgeoning, expensive military establishment.
Museveni's fledgling democratic institutions provided some
hope
of peace and economic recovery in the 1990s; many members
of the
small but very wealthy Ugandan elite, however, had
accumulated
wealth under earlier regimes. Middle-class workers and
farmers
were struggling just to provide for their families.
Government
workers were sometimes unpaid, and many civil servants
found it
necessary to hold more than one job. Urban workers often
farmed
or had members of their families cultivate rural plots of
land
for subsistence and profit. Unskilled workers and peasant
farmers--i.e., the majority of Ugandans--appeared likely
to
remain poor.
Data as of December 1990
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