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Algeria
Role of the FIS
The Benjedid government in the early 1980s relaxed the restrictions
on Islam and its political expression, hoping to preclude the
development of a more politically active Islamist movement. Islamist
political opposition to the regime was tolerated, more mosques
were constructed, religious education in the schools was encouraged,
and in 1984 a new family code closely following Islamic tenets
was enacted. A number of prominent Islamic leaders were released
from prison, including Abbassi Madani, a university professor
who would be one of the founders of Algeria's first Islamic political
party.
The FIS emerged as a political party on September 16, 1989. One
of the first parties to apply for legal recognition in Algeria's
new multiparty system, the FIS had begun to take shape in the
months before the constitutional revision that legalized political
parties. Islamist leaders met between February and August 1989
while the APN was debating the new legislation that would enact
the constitutional provision allowing for the creation of "associations
of a political character." The FIS named Shaykh Abbassi Madani,
a moderate Western-educated professor of comparative literature
at the University of Algiers, as its leader. His second in command
was Ali Benhadj, a high school teacher known for his fiery and
militant rhetoric and radical notions of the role of political
Islam. This dual leadership and the lack of a clear doctrine allowed
for the variable interpretation and pluralistic nature of the
FIS as a political party. The more moderate Madani represented
a conservative faction within the party intent on using the democratic
system to implement its Islamist code. Belhadj, with wider grass-roots
supports, drew the younger population intent on the immediate
imposition of Islamic law.
In line with the nationalist appeal of the Islamic movement,
FIS as a political party has transcended religious affiliation.
In the economic sphere, the FIS advocates a free-market approach
with lower taxes and incentives for developing the private sector.
The party also calls for cuts in military spending. Its program
is largely driven by domestic interests and is not linked to an
international Islamist movement. In fact, the party platform in
late 1992 called for international cooperation with the West to
explore and expand Algeria's natural resources and export potential.
Many people have minimized the strength of the FIS by maintaining
that its greatest appeal has been in the impoverished urban centers
filled with unemployed and discontented youth. To this view one
must add a few qualifiers. First, in the early 1990s more than
70 percent of Algeria's total population was under the age of
thirty (more than 50 percent was under the age of nineteen). To
the extent that the party appeals to disgruntled youth, it appeals
to a huge percentage of the population. Second, whereas large
numbers of unemployed fill the ranks of the FIS, they are without
work primarily as a result of poor economic policy and limited
opportunity. These factors constitute an inevitable and legitimate
precipitate for a backlash vote against the incumbent regime.
Finally, the June 1990 local elections demonstrated that the appeal
of the FIS was not limited to the poorer districts. FIS candidates
won in many affluent districts in the capital and in such provinces
as El Tarf, home of Benjedid.
At the time of the June 1990 elections, the FIS was a pluralist
and generally moderate party. Under the leadership of Abbassi
Madani, in contrast to Ali Benhadj, the FIS resembled a moderate
social democratic party more than a radical Islamist party. The
radicalization of the Islamists and the violent uprisings that
dominated political life in 1992 and 1993 resulted from the revived
political authoritarianism led by the army and were not necessarily
an attribute of the party itself. In fact, the party, untested
in a national capacity, can be measured only by its actions. In
those local districts controlled by the FIS since the 1990 elections,
few of the radical changes feared by many outsiders and the old
guard in the ruling elite have transpired. In part the retention
of the status quo has been caused by substantial cuts in municipal
budgets and in part by the lack of time and flexibility to alter
drastically existing legislation. However, disagreements within
the leadership itself, especially over the timetable for implementation
of Islamic principles, have been perhaps the strongest factor
in the lack of change.
Data as of December 1993
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