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Angola FAPLA's Combat Performance
FAPLA's military performance was difficult to gauge,
particularly in view of the propagandistic reports issued
by the
various forces contending in the region. On the one hand,
UNITA had
extended its range of operations from the remote
southeastern
extremities throughout the entire country within a few
years of
Portugal's withdrawal. The SADF had occupied parts of
southern
Angola for extended periods, virtually without contest,
for the
purposes of resupplying UNITA, intervening on its behalf,
conducting reconnaissance flights and patrols, and
attacking SWAPO
encampments. UNITA reported low morale among captured
FAPLA
conscripts, lack of discipline among troops, heavy losses
of
personnel and equipment in battle, countless ambushes and
attacks
on FAPLA forces, successful sabotage operations, and
desertions by
battalion-size FAPLA units. In the late 1980s, Angola's
minister of
defense publicly called for greater discipline in FAPLA,
citing
reports of theft, assaults, and drunken military drivers.
As late
as 1988, in the wake of reports of increased FAPA/DAA
effectiveness, the South African Air Force (SAAF)
commander
dismissed the Angolans as "extremely unprofessional,"
noting that
"50 percent of the threat against us is Cuban."
On the other hand, it could be argued that FAPLA had
substantially improved its capabilities and performance.
In the
first place, FAPLA had begun to develop and acquire the
organization, doctrine, and equipment of a conventional
army only
during the civil war of 1975-76. It was then forced to
fight a
counterinsurgency war in the most remote and inaccessible
parts of
the country over extended lines of communications, without
the
requisite air or ground transport or logistical
infrastructure.
UNITA also enjoyed the advantages of operating in thinly
populated
areas along porous borders with Zambia and Zaire, with
extensive
SADF combat and logistic support, making it impossible for
FAPLA to
isolate or outflank UNITA. Moreover, military experts
believe that
counterinsurgency troops must outnumber guerrillas by ten
to one in
order to win such wars, a ratio FAPLA could never
approximate. The
air force and navy were even further behind and had
required years
to acquire the assets and the expertise needed for
effective
operations. Although the navy was of marginal use in the
war, air
power was critical. It was only after sufficient aircraft
and air
defense systems had been deployed in the mid-1980s that
Luanda was
able to launch and sustain large offensives in the south.
Although
they suffered heavy losses and perhaps relied too heavily
on Soviet
military doctrine, FAPLA and FAPA/DAA in the late 1980s
showed
increased strength, put greater pressure on UNITA, and
raised the
costs of South Africa's support for UNITA. Luanda's
resolve and the
improved capabilities and performance of its armed forces
were
among the essential conditions under which South Africa
agreed to
negotiate its withdrawal from Angola.
Data as of February 1989
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