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Angola The Enduring Rival: UNITA
![[PDF]](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf.gif)
Figure 16. Territory Claimed by UNITA, 1988
Source: Based on information from Jonas Bernstein, "A Freedon Fight
Deep in Africa," Insight, December 19, 1988, 11.
UNITA in the 1980s was a state within a state. Under
the
leadership of Jonas Savimbi, it survived defeat during the
civil
war, retreated to the remote southeastern corner of the
country,
regrouped and made its headquarters at Jamba, and launched
a
determined campaign to overturn the MPLA-PT regime or at
least
force it to accept UNITA in a coalition government
(see
fig. 16).
With increasing international support and military aid,
particularly from South Africa and, after 1985, the United
States,
UNITA extended its campaign of destruction throughout the
entire
country. It enlarged its military forces and scope of
operations
and withstood several major FAPLA offenses.
Starting with a small army of a few thousand defeated
and
poorly armed followers at the end of 1976, Savimbi built a
credible
political organization and fighting force. Unlike what
became of
the MPLA under its faction-ridden leadership, UNITA
remained the
creation and vehicle of its founder. Internal opposition
occasionally surfaced, but the lack of independent
reporting made
it difficult to assess its significance. South Africa kept
FAPLA
and Cuban forces at bay and intervened whenever FAPLA
offenses
threatened, leaving UNITA comparatively free to
consolidate its
control throughout the south and to extend its range of
operations
northward. In February 1988, Savimbi announced the
formation of a
UNITA government in "Free Angola," the area he controlled.
Although
his intent was to regularize administration, rather than
to secede
or seek international recognition, this event marked a new
stage in
UNITA's organizational development and consolidation, and
many
Africans states maintained at least informal ties to the
movement.
Savimbi's strategy and tactics were designed to raise
the costs
of foreign "occupation" through maximum disruption and
dislocation,
while minimizing his own casualties. UNITA's forces
infiltrated new
areas and contested as much territory as possible,
wresting it away
from FAPLA control whenever feasible. They rarely seized
and held
towns, except near their bases in the south. Rather, they
sabotaged
strategic targets of economic or military value and
ambushed FAPLA
units when the latter attempted to return to or retake
their
positions. FAPLA access was also obstructed by extensive
mine
laying along lines of communication, approaches to
settlements, and
infrastructure sites. To undermine support for the
MPLA-PT, UNITA
indiscriminately attacked or took hostage hundreds of
expatriate
technicians and advisers, and Savimbi repeatedly
threatened
multinational companies with retaliation for their support
of the
government. Apparently abandoning hope of military
victory, Savimbi
sought instead to strengthen UNITA's bargaining position
in
demanding direct negotiations with Luanda for the
establishment of
a government of national unity.
UNITA's military progress was remarkable. By 1982 it
had
declared all but six of the eighteen Angolan provinces to
be war
zones. In late 1983, with direct air support from South
Africa,
UNITA took the town of Cangamba, the last FAPLA stronghold
in
southeastern Angola. This operation marked a shift from
guerrilla
tactics to conventional warfare, at least in the
countryside. In
1984 UNITA announced the beginning of an urban guerrilla
campaign
and claimed responsibility for acts of sabotage in Luanda
itself
and even in Cabinda. The movement gained control of the
regions
bordering Zambia and Zaire, enabling it to develop secure
supply
lines plus infiltration and escape routes. From 1984 to
1987, UNITA
not only continued to advance north and northwest but also
repulsed
major FAPLA offenses backed by heavy Cuban and Soviet
logistic and
combat support, in the latter instances relying on SADF
air and
ground support. In spite of the 1988 regional accords,
according to
which FAPLA and UNITA were to lose much of their external
support,
no military solution to the war was expected.
Data as of February 1989
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