Angola Military Organization and Capability
UNITA's military wing, the Armed Forces for the
Liberation of
Angola (Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola -- FALA),
was under
the supreme authority of Savimbi as commander in chief.
The chief
of staff was second in command and controlled the
headquarters
elements of intelligence, personnel, logistics, and
operations. In
January 1985, the FALA chief of staff, Brigadier
Demosthenes Amos
Chilingutila, who had held that post since 1979, was
removed and
made chief of operations, possibly because of Savimbi's
dissatisfaction with his performance, and replaced by
Brigadier
Alberto Joaquim Vinama. However, following Vinama's death
in an
automobile accident in October 1986, Chilingutila was
reappointed
chief of staff.
By the mid-1980s, FALA had evolved into a well-defined
conventional military organization with command and
specialized
staff organs, a formal hierarchy of ranks, an impressive
array of
weapons and equipment, and considerable international
support.
Geographically, UNITA's nationwide area of operations
consisted of
five fronts commanded by a colonel or brigadier, which
were
subdivided into twenty-two military regions under a
colonel or
lieutenant colonel. The regions in turn were divided into
sectors
(usually three) commanded by a major and further
subdivided into
zones under captains or lieutenants.
FALA had a four-tiered hierarchical structure. The
lowest
level, the local defense forces, had six battalions of
poorly armed
men recruited as guards and local militia in contested
areas. The
next stratum consisted of dispersed guerrillas who trained
in their
local areas for about sixty days and then conducted
operations
there, either in small groups of about twenty or in larger
units of
up to 150. They were armed with automatic weapons and
trained to
attack and harass FAPLA convoys, bases, and aircraft. The
third
level included forty-four semi-regular battalions that
received a
three-month training course and were sent back to the
field in
units of up to 600. These forces were capable of attacking
and
defending small towns and strategic terrain and
infrastructure.
Finally, FALA regular battalions of about 1,000 troops
each
completed a six-month to nine-month training period, and
about a
quarter of them also received specialized training in
South Africa
or Namibia in artillery, communications, and other
technical
disciplines. Armed with heavy weapons plus supporting arms
such as
artillery, rockets, mortars, and antitank and air defense
weapons,
these FALA regulars had the tasks of taking territory and
holding
it.
By 1987 UNITA claimed to have 65,000 troops (37,000
guerrilla
fighters--those in the first three categories cited
above--and
28,000 regulars), but other estimates put FALA's total
strength
closer to 40,000. Among its specialized forces were
sixteen
platoons of commandos and other support units, including
engineering, medicine, communications, and intelligence.
In late
1987, women were integrated into FALA for the first time
when a
unit of fifty completed training as semi-regulars. Seven
members of
this group received commissions as officers.
In addition to combat forces, UNITA had an extensive
logistical
support infrastructure of at least 10,000 people, about
1,000
vehicles (mostly South African trucks), an expanding
network of
roads and landing strips, schools, hospitals, supply
depots, and
specialized factories, workshops and other facilities used
to
manufacture, repair, and refurbish equipment and weapons.
The main
logistical support center and munitions factory was Licua.
Many
smaller centers were scattered throughout UNITA-controlled
territory. Like Jamba, UNITA's capital, these centers were
mobile.
It was difficult to determine the conditions of service
with
UNITA guerrillas. Military service was voluntary and
uncompensated,
but soldiers and their families normally received their
livelihood,
even if it sometimes meant appropriating local food
supplies.
Moreover, political indoctrination was an essential part
of
military life and training. Although visitors to
UNITA-controlled
territory reported that the armed forces were highly
motivated,
FALA defectors and captives allegedly reported coercive
recruiting
and low morale.
FALA had a substantial arsenal of weapons and equipment
of
diverse origin, most of which was captured from FAPLA
during
attacks on convoys, raids, or pitched battles, or donated
by the
SADF as war booty. The remainder came from various
countries and
the international black market. Included in FALA's
inventory were
captured T-34 and T-55 tanks, armored vehicles,
vehicle-mounted
rocket launchers, 76mm and 122m field guns, mortars (up to
120mm),
RPG-7 and 106mm antitank weapons, heavy and light machine
guns,
various antiaircraft guns, SA-7 and United
States-manufactured
Redeye and Stinger SAMs, and G-3 and AK-47 assault rifles.
Data as of February 1989
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