Georgia Introduction
Figure 1. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Geographic
Setting, 1994
Figure 2. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Topography and
Drainage
Figure 3. Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994
THE THREE REPUBLICS of Transcaucasia--Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Georgia--were included in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s
after their inhabitants had passed through long and varied
periods as separate nations and as parts of neighboring empires,
most recently the Russian Empire. By the time the Soviet Union
dissolved at the end of 1991, the three republics had regained
their independence, but their economic weakness and the turmoil
surrounding them jeopardized that independence almost
immediately. By 1994 Russia had regained substantial influence in
the region by arbitrating disputes and by judiciously inserting
peacekeeping troops. Geographically isolated, the three nations
gained some Western economic support in the early 1990s, but in
1994 the leaders of all three asserted that national survival
depended chiefly on diverting resources from military
applications to restructuring economic and social institutions.
Location at the meeting point of southeastern Europe with the
western border of Asia greatly influenced the histories of the
three national groups forming the present-day Transcaucasian
republics
(see
fig. 1;
fig. 2). Especially between the twelfth
and the twentieth centuries, their peoples were subject to
invasion and control by the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian
empires. But, with the formation of the twentieth-century states
named for them, the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian peoples
as a whole underwent different degrees of displacement and played
quite different roles. For example, the Republic of Azerbaijan
that emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991 contains only 5.8
million of the world's estimated 19 million Azerbaijanis, with
most of the balance living in Iran across a southern border fixed
when Persia and Russia in the nineteenth century. At the same
time, slightly more than half the world's 6.3 million Armenians
are widely scattered outside the borders of the Republic of
Armenia as a result of a centuries-long diaspora and step-by-step
reduction of their national territory. In contrast, the great
majority of the world's Georgian population lives in the Republic
of Georgia (together with ethnic minorities constituting about 30
percent of the republic's population), after having experienced
centuries of foreign domination but little forcible alteration of
national boundaries.
The starting points and the outside influences that formed
the three cultures also were quite different. In pre-Christian
times, Georgia's location along the Black Sea opened it to
cultural influence from Greece. During the same period, Armenia
was settled by tribes from southeastern Europe, and Azerbaijan
was settled by Asiatic Medes, Persians, and Scythians. In
Azerbaijan, Persian cultural influence dominated in the formative
period of the first millennium B.C. In the early fourth century,
kings of Armenia and Georgia accepted Christianity after
extensive contact with the proselytizing early Christians at the
eastern end of the Mediterranean. Following their conversion,
Georgians remained tied by religion to the Roman Empire and later
the Byzantine Empire centered at Constantinople. Although
Armenian Christianity broke with Byzantine Orthodoxy very early,
Byzantine occupation of Armenian territory enhanced the influence
of Greek culture on Armenians in the Middle Ages.
In Azerbaijan, the Zoroastrian religion, a legacy of the
early Persian influence there, was supplanted in the seventh
century by the Muslim faith introduced by conquering Arabs.
Conquest and occupation by the Turks added centuries of Turkic
influence, which remains a primary element of secular Azerbaijani
culture, notably in language and the arts. In the twentieth
century, Islam remains the prevalent religion of Azerbaijan, with
about three-quarters of the population adhering to the
Shia (see Glossary)
branch.
Golden ages of peace and independence enabled the three
civilizations to individualize their forms of art and literature
before 1300, and all have retained unique characteristics that
arose during those eras. The Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian
languages also grew in different directions: Armenian developed
from a combination of Indo-European and non-Indo-European
language stock, with an alphabet based on the Greek; Azerbaijani,
akin to Turkish and originating in Central Asia, now uses the
Roman alphabet after periods of official usage of the Arabic and
Cyrillic alphabets; and Georgian, unrelated to any major world
language, use a Greek-based alphabet quite different from the
Armenian.
Beginning in the eighteenth century, the Russian Empire
constantly probed the Caucasus region for possible expansion
toward the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. These efforts engaged
Russia in a series of wars with the Persian and Ottoman empires,
both of which by that time were decaying from within. By 1828
Russia had annexed or had been awarded by treaty all of present-
day Azerbaijan and Georgia and most of present-day Armenia. (At
that time, much of the Armenian population remained across the
border in the Ottoman Empire.)
Except for about two years of unstable independence following
World War I, the Transcaucasus countries remained under Russian,
and later Soviet, control until 1991. As part of the Soviet Union
from 1922 to 1991, they underwent approximately the same degree
of economic and political regimentation as the other constituent
republics of the union (until 1936 the Transcaucasian Soviet
Federated Socialist Republic included all three countries). The
Sovietization process included intensive industrialization,
collectivization of agriculture, and large-scale shifts of the
rural work force to industrial centers, as well as expanded and
standardized systems for education, health care, and social
welfare. Although industries came under uniform state direction,
private farms in the three republics, especially in Georgia,
remained important agriculturally because of the inefficiency of
collective farms.
The achievement of independence in 1991 left the three
republics with inefficient and often crumbling remains of the
Soviet-era state systems. In the years that followed, political,
military, and financial chaos prevented reforms from being
implemented in most areas. Land redistribution proceeded rapidly
in Armenia and Georgia, although agricultural inputs often
remained under state control. In contrast, in 1994 Azerbaijan
still depended mainly on collective farms. Education and health
institutions remained substantially the same centralized
suppliers as they had in the Soviet era, but availability of
educational and medical materials and personnel dropped sharply
after 1991. The military conflict in Azerbaijan's Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Region put enormous stress on the health and
social welfare systems of combatants Armenia and Azerbaijan, and
Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia, which began in 1989, caused
acute shortages of all types of materials
(see
fig. 3).
The relationship of Russia to the former Soviet republics in
the Transcaucasus caused increasing international concern in the
transition years. The presence of Russian peacekeeping troops
between Georgian and Abkhazian separatist forces remained an
irritation to Georgian nationalists and an indication that Russia
intended to intervene in that part of the world when
opportunities arose. Russian nationalists saw such intervention
as an opportunity to recapture nearby parts of the old Russian,
and later Soviet empire. In the fall of 1994, in spite of strong
nationalist resistance in each of the Transcaucasus countries,
Russia was poised to improve its economic and military influence
in Armenia and Azerbaijan, as it had in Georgia, if its mediation
activities in Nagorno-Karabakh bore fruit.
The countries of Transcaucasia each inherited large state-
owned enterprises specializing in products assigned by the Soviet
system: military electronics and chemicals in Armenia, petroleum-
based and textile industries in Azerbaijan, and chemicals,
machine tools, and metallurgy in Georgia. As in most of the
nations in the former Soviet sphere, redistribution and
revitalization of such enterprises proved a formidable obstacle
to economic growth and foreign investment in Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Georgia. Efforts at enterprise privatization were hindered by
the stresses of prolonged military engagements, the staying power
of underground economies that had defied control under communist
and governments, the lack of commercial expertise, and the lack
of a legal infrastructure on which to base new business
relationships. As a result, in 1994 the governments were left
with oversized, inefficient, and often bankrupt heavy industries
whose operation was vital to provide jobs and to revive the
national economies. At the same time, small private enterprises
were growing rapidly, especially in Armenia and Georgia.
In the early 1990s, the Caucasus took its place among the
regions of the world having violent post-Cold War ethnic
conflict. Several wars broke out in the region once Soviet
authority ceased holding the lid on disagreements that had been
fermenting for decades. (Joseph V. Stalin's forcible relocation
of ethnic groups after the redrawing of the region's political
map was a chief source of the friction of the 1990s.) Thus, the
three republics devoted critical resources to military campaigns
in a period when the need for internal restructuring was
paramount.
In Georgia, minority separatist movements--primarily on the
part of the Ossetians and the Abkhaz, both given intermittent
encouragement by the Soviet regime over the years--demanded
fuller recognition in the new order of the early 1990s. Asserting
its newly gained national prerogatives, Georgia responded with
military attempts to restrain separatism forcibly. A year-long
battle in South Ossetia, initiated by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, post-
Soviet Georgia's ultranationalist first president, reached an
uneasy peace in mid-1992. Early in 1992, however, the violent
eviction of Gamsakhurdia from the presidency added another
opponent of Georgian unity as the exiled Gamsakhurdia gathered
his forces across the border.
In mid-1992 Georgian paramilitary troops entered the
Abkhazian Autonomous Republic of Georgia, beginning a new
conflict that in 1993 threatened to break apart the country. When
Georgian troops were driven from Abkhazia in September 1993,
Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze was able to gain Russian
military aid to prevent the collapse of the country. In mid-1994
an uneasy cease-fire was in force; Abkhazian forces controlled
their entire region, but no negotiated settlement had been
reached. Life in Georgia had stabilized, but no permanent answers
had been found to ethnic claims and counterclaims.
For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the center of nationalist self-
expression in this period was the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Region of Azerbaijan. After the Armenian majority there declared
unification with Armenia in 1988, ethnic conflict broke out in
both republics, leaving many Armenians and Azerbaijanis dead. For
the next six years, battles raged between Armenian and
Azerbaijani regular forces and between Armenian militias from
Nagorno-Karabakh ("mountainous Karabakh" in Russian), and foreign
mercenaries, killing thousands in and around Karabakh and causing
massive refugee movements in both directions. Armenian military
forces, better supplied and better organized, generally gained
ground in the conflict, but the sides were evened as Armenia
itself was devastated by six years of Azerbaijani blockades. In
1993 and early 1994, international mediation efforts were stymied
by the intransigence of the two sides and by competition between
Russia and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(
CSCE--see
Glossary) for the role of chief peace negotiator.
ARMENIA
Armenia, in the twentieth century the smallest of the three
republics in size and population, has undergone the greatest
change in the location of its indigenous population. After
occupying eastern Anatolia (now eastern Turkey) for nearly 2,000
years, the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire was
extinguished or driven out by 1915 adding to a diaspora that had
begun centuries earlier. After 1915, only the eastern population,
in and around Erevan, remained in its original location. In the
Soviet era, Armenians preserved their cultural traditions, both
in Armenia and abroad. The Armenian people's strong sense of
unity has been reinforced by periodic threats to their existence.
When Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia gained their independence
in 1991, Armenia possessed the fewest natural and man-made
resources upon which to build a new state. Fertile agricultural
areas are relatively small, transportation is limited by the
country's landlocked position and mountainous terrain (and,
beginning in 1989, by the Azerbaijani blockade), and the material
base for industry is not broad. A high percentage of cropland
requires irrigation, and disorganized land privatization has
delayed the benefits that should result from reducing state
agricultural control. Although harvests were bountiful in 1993,
gaps in support systems for transport and food processing
prevented urban populations from benefiting.
The intensive industrialization of Armenia between the world
wars was accomplished within the controlled barter system of the
Soviet republics, not within a separate economic unit. The
specialized industrial roles assigned Armenia in the Soviet
system offered little of value to the world markets from which
the republic had been protected until 1991. Since 1991 Armenia
has sought to reorient its Soviet-era scientific-research,
military electronics, and chemicals infrastructures to satisfy
new demands, and international financial assistance has been
forthcoming. In the meantime, basic items of Armenian
manufacturing, such as textiles, shoes, and carpets, have
remained exportable. However, the extreme paucity of energy
sources--little coal, natural gas, or petroleum is extracted in
Armenia--always has been a severe limitation to industry. And
about 30 percent of the existing industrial infrastructure was
lost in the earthquake of 1988. Desperate crises arose throughout
society when Azerbaijan strangled energy imports that had
provided over 90 percent of Armenia's energy. Every winter of the
early 1990s brought more difficult conditions, especially for
urban Armenians.
In the early 1990s, the Armenian economy was also stressed by
direct support of Karabakh self-determination Karabakh, which
received massive shipments of food and other materials through
the Lachin corridor that Karabakh Armenian forces had opened
across southwestern Azerbaijan. Although Karabakh sent
electricity to Armenia in return, the balance of trade was over
two to one in favor of Karabakh, and Armenian credits covered
most of Karabakh's budget deficits. Meanwhile, Armenia remained a
command rather than a free-market economy to ensure that the
military received adequate economic support.
In addition to the Karabakh conflict, wage, price, and social
welfare conditions have caused substantial social unrest since
independence. The dram (for value of the
dram--see
Glossary), the
national currency introduced in 1992, underwent almost immediate
devaluation as the national banking system tried to stabilize
international exchange rates. Accordingly, in 1993 prices rose to
an average of 130 percent of wages, which the government indexed
through that year. The scarcity of many commodities, caused by
the blockade, also pushed prices higher. In the first post-Soviet
years, and especially in 1993, plant closings and the energy
crisis caused unemployment to more than double. At the same time,
the standard of living of the average Armenian deteriorated; by
1993 an estimated 90 percent of the population were living below
the official poverty line.
Armenia's first steps toward democracy were uneven. Upon
declaring independence, Armenia adapted the political system,
set forth in its Soviet-style 1978 constitution, to the short-
term requirements of governance. The chief executive would be the
chairman of Armenia's Supreme Soviet, which was the chief
legislative body of the new republic--but in independent Armenia
the legislature and the executive branch would no longer merely
rubber-stamp policy decisions handed down from Moscow.
The inherited Soviet system was used in the expectation that
a new constitution would prescribe Western-style institutions in
the near future. However, between 1992 and 1994 consensus was not
reached between factions backing a strong executive and those
backing a strong legislature.
At the center of the dispute over the constitution was Levon
Ter-Petrosian, president (through late 1994) of post-Soviet
Armenia. Beginning in 1991, Ter-Petrosian responded to the twin
threats of political chaos and military defeat at the hands of
Azerbaijan by accumulating extraordinary executive powers. His
chief opposition, a faction that was radically nationalist but
held few seats in the fragmented Supreme Soviet, sought to build
coalitions to cut the president's power, then to finalize such a
move in a constitution calling for a strong legislature. As they
had on other legislation, however, the chaotic deliberations of
parliament yielded no decision. Ter-Petrosian was able to
continue his pragmatic approach to domestic policy, privatizing
the economy whenever possible, and to continue his moderate,
sometimes conciliatory, tone on the Karabakh issue.
Beginning in 1991, Armenia's foreign policy also was dictated
by the Karabakh conflict. After independence, Russian troops
continued serving as border guards and in other capacities that
Armenia's new national army could not fill. Armenia, a charter
member of the Russian-sponsored Commonwealth of Independent
States (
CIS--see
Glossary), forged security agreements with CIS
member states and took an active part in the organization. After
1991 Russia remained Armenia's foremost trading partner,
supplying the country with fuel. As the Karabakh conflict
evolved, Armenia took a more favorable position toward Russian
leadership of peace negotiations than did Azerbaijan.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union made possible closer
relations with Armenia's traditional enemy Turkey, whose
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (
NATO--see
Glossary) had put it on the opposite side in the Cold war. In the
Karabakh conflict, Turkey sided with Islamic Azerbaijan, blocking
pipeline deliveries to Armenia through its territory. Most
important, Turkey withheld acknowledgment of the 1915 massacre,
without which no Armenian government could permit a
rapprochement. Nevertheless, tentative contacts continued
throughout the early 1990s.
In spite of pressure from nationalist factions, the Ter-
Petrosian government held that Armenia should not unilaterally
annex Karabakh and that the citizens of Karabakh had a right to
self-determination (presumably meaning either independence or
union with Armenia). Although Ter-Petrosian maintained contact
with Azerbaijan's President Heydar Aliyev, and Armenia officially
accepted the terms of several peace proposals, recriminations for
the failure of peace talks flew from both sides in 1993.
The United States and the countries of the European Union
(EU) have aided independent Armenia in several ways, although the
West has criticized Armenian incursions into Azerbaijani
territory. Humanitarian aid, most of it from the United States,
played a large role between 1991 and 1994 in Armenia's survival
through the winters of the blockade. Armenia successively pursued
aid from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the International Monetary Fund (
IMF--see
Glossary), and the
World Bank (see
Glossary). Two categories of assistance,
humanitarian and technical, were offered through those lenders.
Included was aid for recovery from the 1988 earthquake, whose
destructive effects were still being felt in Armenia's industry
and transportation infrastructure as of late 1994.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia's national security
continued to depend heavily on the Russian military. The officer
corps of the new national army created in 1992 included many
Armenian former officers of the Soviet army, and Russian
institutes trained new Armenian officers. Two Russian divisions
were transferred to Armenian control, but another division
remained under full Russian control on Armenian soil.
Internal security was problematic in the transitional years.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs, responsible for internal
security agencies, remained outside regular government control,
as it had been in the Soviet period. This arrangement led to
corruption, abuses of power, and public cynicism, a state of
affairs that was especially serious because the main internal
security agency acted as the nation's regular police force. The
distraction of the Karabakh crisis combined with security lapses
to stimulate a rapid rise in crime in the early 1990s. The
political situation was also complicated by charges of abuse of
power exchanged by high government officials in relation to
security problems.
By the spring of 1994, Armenians had survived a fourth winter
of acute shortages, and Armenian forces in Karabakh had survived
the large-scale winter offensive that Azerbaijan launched in
December 1993. In May 1994, a flurry of diplomatic activity by
Russia and the CIS, stimulated by the new round of fighting,
produced a cease-fire that held, with some violations, through
the summer. A lasting treaty was delayed, however, by persistent
disagreement over the nationality of peacekeeping forces that
would occupy Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan resisted the return of
Russian troops to its territory, while the Russian plan called
for at least half the forces to be Russian. On both diplomatic
and economic fronts, new signs of stability caused guarded
optimism in Armenia in the fall of 1994.
The failure of the CSCE peace plan, which Azerbaijan
supported, had caused that country to mount an all-out, human-
wave offensive in December 1993 and January 1994, which initially
pushed back Armenian defensive lines in Karabakh and regained
some lost territory. When the offensive stalled in February,
Russia's minister of defense, Pavel Grachev, negotiated a cease-
fire, which enabled Russia to supplant the CSCE as the primary
peace negotiator. Intensive Russian-sponsored talks continued
through the spring, although Azerbaijan mounted air strikes on
Karabakh as late as April. In May 1994, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Nagorno-Karabakh signed the CIS-sponsored Bishkek Protocol,
calling for a cease-fire and the beginning of troop withdrawals.
In July the defense ministers of the three jurisdictions
officially extended the cease-fire, signaling that all parties
were moving toward some combination of the Russian and the CSCE
peace plans. In September the exchange of Armenian and
Azerbaijani prisoners of war began.
Under these conditions, Russia was able to intensify its
three-way diplomatic gambit in the Transcaucasus, steadily
erasing Armenians' memory of airborne Soviet forces landing
unannounced as a show of strength in 1991. In the first half of
1994, Armenia moved closer to Russia on several fronts. A
February treaty established bilateral barter of vital resources.
In March Russia agreed to joint operation of the Armenian Atomic
Power Station at Metsamor, whose scheduled 1995 reopening is a
vital element in easing the country's energy crisis. Also in
March, Armenia replaced its mission in Moscow with a full
embassy. In June the Armenian parliament approved the addition of
airborne troops to the Russian garrison at Gyumri near the
Turkish border. Then in July, Russia extended 100 billion rubles
(about US$35 million at that time) for reactivation of the
Metsamor station, and Armenia signed a US$250 million contract
with Russia for Armenia to process precious metals and gems
supplied by Russia. In addition, Armenia consistently favored the
Russian peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh, in opposition to
Azerbaijan's insistence on reviving the CSCE plan that prescribed
international monitors rather than combat troops (most of whom
would be Russian) on Azerbaijani soil.
Armenia was active on other diplomatic fronts as well in
1994. President Ter-Petrosian made official visits to Britain's
Prime Minister John Major in February (preceding Azerbaijan's
Heydar Aliyev by a few weeks when the outcome of the last large-
scale campaign in the Karabakh conflict remained in doubt) and to
President William J. Clinton in the United States in August.
Clinton promised more active United States support for peace
negotiations, and an exchange of military attachés was set. While
in Washington, Ter-Petrosian expressed interest in joining the
NATO Partnership for Peace, in which Azerbaijan had gained
membership three months earlier.
Relations with Turkey remained cool, however. In 1994 Turkey
continued its blockade of Armenia in support of Azerbaijan and
accused Armenia of fostering rebel activity by Kurdish groups in
eastern Turkey; it reiterated its denial of responsibility for
the 1915 massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. In June
these policies prompted Armenia to approve the security agreement
with Russia that stationed Russian airborne troops in Armenia
near the Turkish border. In July Armenia firmly refused Turkey's
offer to send peacekeeping forces to Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus,
Armenia became an important player in the continuing contest
between Russia and Turkey for influence in the Black Sea and
Caucasus regions. Armenians considered the official commemoration
by Israel and Russia of the 1915 Armenian massacre a significant
advancement in the country's international position.
Early in 1994, Armenia's relations with Georgia worsened
after Azerbaijani terrorists in Georgia again sabotaged the
natural gas pipeline supplying Armenia through Georgia. Delayed
rail delivery to Armenia of goods arriving in Georgian ports also
caused friction. Underlying these stresses were Georgia's
unreliable transport system and its failure to prevent violent
acts on Georgian territory. Pipeline and railroad sabotage
incidents continued through mid-1994.
The domestic political front remained heated in 1994. As the
parliamentary elections of 1995 approached, Ter-Petrosian's
centrist Armenian Pannational Movement (APM), which dominated
political life after 1991, had lost ground to the right and the
left because Armenians were losing patience with economic
hardship. Opposition newspapers and citizens' groups, which Ter-
Petrosian refused to outlaw, continued their accusations of
official corruption and their calls for the resignation of the
Ter-Petrosian government early in the year. Then, in mid-1994 the
opposition accelerated its activity by mounting antigovernment
street demonstrations of up to 50,000 protesters.
In the protracted struggle over a new constitution, the
opposition intensified rhetoric supporting a document built
around a strong legislature rather than the strong-executive
version supported by Ter-Petrosian. By the fall of 1994, little
progress had been made even on the method of deciding this
critical issue. While opposition parties called for a
constitutional assembly, the president offered to hold a national
referendum, following which he would resign if defeated.
Economic conditions were also a primary issue for the
opposition. The value of the dram, pegged at 14.5 to the United
States dollar when it was established in November 1993, had
plummeted to 390 to the dollar by May 1994. In September a major
overhaul of Armenia's financial system was under way, aimed at
establishing official interest rates and a national credit
system, controlling inflation, opening a securities market,
regulating currency exchange, and licensing lending institutions.
In the overall plan, the Central Bank of Armenia and the Erevan
Stock Exchange assumed central roles in redirecting the flow of
resources toward production of consumer goods. And government
budgeting began diverting funds from military to civilian
production support, a step advertised as the beginning of the
transition from a command to a market economy. This process
included the resumption of privatization of state enterprises,
which had ceased in mid-1992, including full privatization of
small businesses and cautious partial privatization of larger
ones. In mid-1994 the value of the dram stabilized, and
industrial production increased somewhat. As another winter
approached, however, the amount of goods and food available to
the average consumer remained at or below subsistence level, and
social unrest threatened to increase.
In September Armenia negotiated terms for the resumption of
natural gas deliveries from its chief supplier, Turkmenistan,
which had threatened a complete cutoff because of outstanding
debts. Under the current agreement, all purchases of Turkmen gas
were destined for electric power generation in Armenia. Also in
September, the IMF offered favorable interest rates on a loan of
US$800 million if Armenia raised consumer taxes and removed
controls on bread prices. Armenian officials resisted those
conditions because they would further erode living conditions.
Thus in mid-1994 Armenia, blessed with strong leadership and
support from abroad but cursed with a poor geopolitical position
and few natural resources, was desperate for peace after the
Karabakh Armenians had virtually won their war for self-
determination. With many elements of post-Soviet economic reform
in place, a steady flow of assistance from the West, and an end
to the Karabakh conflict in sight, Armenia looked forward to a
new era of development.
AZERBAIJAN
Azerbaijan, the easternmost and largest of the Transcaucasus
states in size and in population, has the richest combination of
agricultural and industrial resources of the three states. But
Azerbaijan's quest for reform has been hindered by the limited
contact it had with Western institutions and cultures before the
Soviet era began in 1922.
Although Azerbaijan normally is included in the three-part
grouping of the Transcaucasus countries (and was so defined
politically between 1922 and 1936), it has more in common
culturally with the Central Asian republics east of the Caspian
Sea than with Armenia and Georgia. The common link with the
latter states is the Caucasus mountain range, which defines the
topography of the northern and western parts of Azerbaijan. A
unique aspect of Azerbaijan's political geography is the enclave
of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, created by the Soviet
Union in 1924 in the area between Armenia and Iran and separated
from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory. In 1924 the
Soviet Union also created the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
within Azerbaijan, an enclave whose population was about 94
percent Armenian at that time and remained about 75 percent
Armenian in the late 1980s.
Beginning in the last years of the Soviet Union and extending
into the 1990s, the drive for independence by Nagorno-Karabakh's
Armenian majority was an issue of conflict between Armenia, which
insisted on self-determination for its fellow Armenians, and
Azerbaijan, which cited historical acceptance of its sovereignty
whatever the region's ethnic composition. By the 1991
independence struggle was an issue of de facto war between
Azerbaijan and the Karabakh Armenians, who by 1993 controlled all
of Karabakh and much of adjoining Azerbaijan.
The population of Azerbaijan, already 83 percent Azerbaijani
before independence, became even more homogeneous as members of
the two principal minorities, Armenians and Russians, emigrated
in the early 1990s and as thousands of Azerbaijanis immigrated
from neighboring Armenia. The heavily urbanized population of
Azerbaijan is concentrated around the cities of Baku, Gyandzha,
and Sumgait.
Like the other former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan began in
1991 to seek the right combination of indigenous and "borrowed"
qualities to replace the awkwardly imposed economic and political
imprint of the Soviet era. And, like Armenia and Georgia,
Azerbaijan faced the complications of internal political
disruption and military crisis in the first years of this
process.
For more than 100 years, Azerbaijan's economy has been
dominated by petroleum extraction and processing. In the Soviet
system, Azerbaijan's delegated role had evolved from supplying
crude oil to supplying oil-extraction equipment, as Siberian oil
fields came to dominate the Soviet market and as Caspian oil
fields were allowed to deteriorate. Although exploited oil
deposits were greatly depleted in the Soviet period, the economy
still depends heavily on industries linked to oil. The country
also depends heavily on trade with Russia and other former Soviet
republics. Azerbaijan's overall industrial production dropped in
the early 1990s, although not as drastically as that of Armenia
and Georgia. The end of Soviet-supported trade connections and
the closing of inefficient factories caused unemployment to rise
and industrial productivity to fall an estimated 26 percent in
1992; acute inflation caused a major economic crisis in 1993.
Azerbaijan did not restructure its agriculture as quickly as
did Armenia and Georgia; inefficient Soviet methods continued to
hamper production, and the role of private initiative remained
small. Agriculture in Azerbaijan also was hampered by the
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, which was an important source of
fruits, grain, grapes, and livestock. As much as 70 percent of
Azerbaijan's arable land was occupied by military forces at some
stage of the conflict.
In spite of these setbacks, Azerbaijan's economy remains the
healthiest among the three republics, largely because unexploited
oil and natural gas deposits are plentiful (although output
declined in the early 1990s) and because ample electric-power
generating plants are in operation. Azerbaijan has been able to
attract Western investment in its oil industry in the post-Soviet
years, although Russia remains a key oil customer and investor.
In 1993 the former Soviet republics remained Azerbaijan's most
important trading partners, and state bureaucracies still
controlled most foreign trade. Political instability in Baku,
however, continued to discourage Turkey, a natural trading
partner, from expanding commercial relations.
The political situation of Azerbaijan was extremely volatile
in the first years of independence. With performance in Nagorno-
Karabakh rather than achievement of economic and political reform
as their chief criterion, Azerbaijanis deposed presidents in 1992
and 1993, then returned former communist party boss Heydar Aliyev
to power. In 1992, in the country's first and only free election,
the people had chosen Abulfaz Elchibey, leader of the Azerbaijani
Popular Front (APF), as president. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani
Communist Party, formally disbanded in 1991, retained positions
of political and economic power and was key in the coup that
returned Aliyev to power in June 1993. Former communists
dominated policy making in the government Aliyev formed after his
rubber-stamp election as president the following October.
However, the APF remained a formidable opposition force,
especially critical of any sign of weakness on the Nagorno-
Karabakh issue.
During the transition period, the only national legislative
body was the Melli-Majlis (National Council), a fifty-member
interim assembly that came under the domination of former
communists and, by virtue of postponing parliamentary elections
indefinitely, continued to retain its power in late 1994. Aliyev
promised a new constitution and democratic rule, but he prolonged
his dictatorial powers on the pretext of the continuing military
emergency. Work on a new constitution was begun in 1992, but the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and political turmoil delayed its
completion; meanwhile, elements of the 1978 constitution (based
on the 1977 constitution of the Soviet Union) remain the highest
law of the land, supplemented only by provisions of the 1991 Act
of Independence.
Azerbaijan's post-Soviet foreign policy attempted to balance
the interests of three stronger, often mutually hostile,
neighbors--Iran, Russia, and Turkey--while using those nations'
interests in regional peace to help resolve the Karabakh
conflict. The Elchibey regime of 1992-93 leaned toward Turkey,
which it saw as the best mediator in Karabakh. Armenia took
advantage of this strategy, however, to form closer ties with
Russia, whose economic assistance it needed desperately.
Beginning in 1993, Aliyev sought to rekindle relations with
Russia and Iran, believing that Russia could negotiate a positive
settlement in Karabakh. Relations with Turkey were carefully
maintained, however.
Beginning in 1991, Azerbaijan's external national security
was breached by the incursion of the Armenian separatist forces
of Karabakh militias and reinforcements from Armenia.
Azerbaijan's main strategy in this early period was to blockade
landlocked Armenia's supply lines and to rely for national
defense on the Russian 4th Army, which remained in Azerbaijan in
1991. Clashes between Russian troops and Azerbaijani civilians in
1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, led Russia to
a rapid commitment for withdrawal of troops and equipment, which
was completed in mid-1993.
Under those circumstances, a new, limited national armed
force was planned in 1992, and, as had been done in Armenia, the
government appealed to Azerbaijani veterans of the Soviet army to
defend their homeland. But the force took shape slowly, and
outside assistance--mercenaries and foreign training officers--
were summoned to stem the Armenian advance that threatened all of
southern Azerbaijan. In 1993 continued military failures brought
reports of mass desertion and subsequent large-scale recruitment
of teenage boys, as well as wholesale changes in the national
defense establishment.
In the early 1990s, the domestic and international confusion
bred by the Karabakh conflict increased customs violations,
white-collar crime, and threats to the populace by criminal
bands. The role of Azerbaijanis in the international drug market
expanded noticeably. In 1993 the Aliyev government responded to
these problems with a major reform of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, which had been plagued by corruption and incompetence,
but experts agreed that positive results required a more stable
overall atmosphere.
In December 1993, Azerbaijan launched a major surprise attack
on all fronts in Karabakh, using newly drafted personnel in wave
attacks, with air support. The attack initially overwhelmed
Armenian positions in the north and south but ultimately was
unsuccessful. An estimated 8,000 Azerbaijani troops died in the
two-month campaign, which Armenian authorities described as
Azerbaijan's best-planned offensive of the conflict.
When the winter offensive failed, Aliyev began using
diplomatic channels to seek peace terms acceptable to his
constituents, involving Russia as little as possible. Already in
March, the chairman of the Azerbaijani parliament had initiated a
private meeting with his opposite number from Armenia, an event
hailed in the Azerbaijani press as a major Azerbaijani peace
initiative. Official visits by Aliyev to Ankara and London early
in 1994 yielded little additional support for Azerbaijan's
position. (Turkey remained suspicious of Aliyev's communist
background.)
At this point, Azerbaijan reasserted its support for the CSCE
peace plan, which would use international monitors rather than
military forces to enforce the cease-fire in Karabakh. Perhaps
with the goal of avoiding further military losses, Aliyev
approved in May the provisional cease-fire conditions of the
Bishkek Protocol, sponsored by the CIS. That agreement, which
softened Azerbaijan's position on recognizing the sovereignty of
Nagorno-Karabakh, was subsequently the basis for terms of a true
armistice.
Azerbaijan's official position on armistice conditions
remained unchanged, however, during the negotiations of the
summer and fall of 1994, in the face of Armenia's insistence that
only an armed peacekeeping force (inevitably Russian) could
prevent new outbreaks of fighting. During that period, sporadic
Azerbaijani attacks tended to confirm Armenia's judgment. At the
same time, Aliyev urged that his countrymen take a more
conciliatory position toward Russia. Aliyev argued that the
Soviet Union, not Russia, had sent the troops who had killed
Azerbaijanis when they arrived to keep peace with Armenia in 1990
and that Azerbaijan could profit from exploiting rather than
rejecting the remaining ties between the two countries.
In May Aliyev signed the NATO Partnership for Peace
agreement, giving Azerbaijan the associate status that NATO had
offered to East European nations and the former republics of the
Soviet Union in late 1993. The same month, Aliyev received a mid-
level United States delegation charged with discussing diplomatic
support for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, Caspian Sea oil
exploration by United States firms, and bilateral trade
agreements.
In July Aliyev extended his diplomacy to the Muslim world,
visiting Saudi Arabia and Iran in an effort to balance his
diplomatic contacts with the West. Iran was especially important
because of its proximity to Karabakh and its interest in ending
the conflict on its border. Iran responded to offers of economic
cooperation by insisting that any agreement must await a peace
treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
In the fall of 1994, a seventeen-point peace agreement was
drafted, but major issues remained unresolved. Azerbaijani
concerns centered on withdrawal of Armenian forces from
Azerbaijani territory and conditions that would permit
Azerbaijani refugees to return home. (An estimated 1 million
Azerbaijanis had fled to other parts of Azerbaijan or Iran from
occupied territory.) The top priorities for Armenia were ensuring
security for Armenians in Karabakh and defining the status of the
region prior to the withdrawal of forces.
A second result of the failed winter offensive of 1993-94 was
a new crackdown by the Aliyev government on dissident activity.
Early in 1994, censors in the Main Administration for Protecting
State Secrets in the Press sharply increased censorship of
material criticizing the regime, and the government cut the
supply of paper and printing plates to opposition newspapers. In
May a confrontation between Aliyev loyalists and opponents in the
Melli-Majlis resulted in arrests of opposition leaders and
reduction in the number of members required for a quorum to pass
presidential proposals.
The issue behind the May dispute was Aliyev's handling of the
Karabakh peace process. A variety of opposition parties and
organizations claimed that the Bishkek Protocol had betrayed
Azerbaijan by recognizing the sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh. A
new coalition, the National Resistance Movement, was formed
immediately after the May confrontation in the Mellis-Majlis. The
movement's two principles were opposition to reintroduction of
Russian forces in Azerbaijan and opposition to Aliyev's
"dictatorship." By the end of the summer, however, the movement
had drawn closer to Aliyev's position on the first point, and the
announcement of long-delayed parliamentary elections to be held
in the summer of 1995 aimed to defuse charges of dictatorship.
Draft election legislation called for replacing the "temporary"
Melli-Majlis with a 150-seat legislature in 1995.
In October 1994, a military coup, supported by Prime Minister
Suret Huseynov, failed to topple Aliyev. Aliyev responded by
declaring a two-month state of emergency, banning demonstrations,
and taking military control of key positions. Huseynov, who had
signed the Bishkek Protocol as Azerbaijan's representative, was
dismissed.
Price and wage levels continued to reduce the standard of
living in Azerbaijan in 1994. Between mid-1993 and mid-1994,
prices increased by an average of about sixteen times; from
November 1993 to July 1994, the state-established minimum wage
more than doubled. To speed conversion to a market economy, the
ministries of finance and economics submitted plans in July to
combine state-run enterprises in forms more suitable for
privatization. Land privatization has proceeded cautiously
because of strong political support for maintaining the Soviet-
era state-farm system. In mid-1994 about 1 percent of arable land
was in private hands, the bureaucratic process for obtaining
private land remained long and cumbersome, and state allocation
of equipment to private farmers was meager.
Meanwhile, in 1994 currency-exchange activity increased
dramatically in Azerbaijani banks, bringing more foreign currency
into the country. The ruble remained the most widely used foreign
unit in 1994. In June, at the insistence of the IMF and the World
Bank, the National Bank of Azerbaijan stopped issuing credit that
lacked monetary backing, a practice that had fueled inflation and
destabilized the economy.
The main hope for Azerbaijan's economic recovery lies in
reviving exploitation of offshore oil deposits in the Caspian
Sea. By 1993 these deposits had attracted strong interest among
British, Norwegian, Russian, Turkish, and United States firms.
Within a consortium of such firms, Russia would likely have a 10
percent share and provide the pipeline and the main port
(Novorossiysk on the Black Sea) for export of Azerbaijan's oil.
An agreement signed in September 1994 included United, British,
Turkish, Russian, and Azerbaijani oil companies.
In the early 1990s, the development of Azerbaijan's foreign
trade was skewed by the refusal of eighteen nations, including
the United States, Canada, Israel, India, and the Republic of
Korea (South Korea), to import products from Azerbaijan as long
as the blockade of Armenia continued. At the same time, many of
those countries sold significant amounts of goods in Azerbaijan.
Overall, in the first half of 1994 one-third of Azerbaijan's
imports came from the "far abroad" (all non-CIS trading
partners), and 46 percent of its exports went outside the CIS. In
that period, total imports exceeded total exports by US$140
million. At the same time, the strongest long-term commercial
ties within the CIS were with Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan,
and Ukraine.
Like Armenia, Azerbaijan was able to improve internal
conditions only marginally while awaiting the relief of a final
peace settlement in Karabakh. Unlike either of its Transcaucasus
neighbors, however, Azerbaijan had the prospect of major large-
scale Western investment once investment conditions improved.
Combined with potential oil earnings, diplomatic approaches by
President Aliyev in 1994 to a number of foreign countries,
including all of Azerbaijan's neighbors, seemed to offer it a
much-improved postwar international position. A great deal
depended, however, on the smooth surrender of wartime emergency
powers by the Aliyev government and on accelerating the stalled
development of a market economy.
GEORGIA
Georgia possesses the advantages of a subtropical Black Sea
coastline and a rich mixture of Western and Eastern cultural
elements. A combination of topographical and national
idiosyncracies has preserved that cultural blend, whose chief
impetus was the Georgian golden age of the twelfth and early
thirteenth centuries, during long periods of occupation by
foreign empires. Perhaps the most vivid result of this cultural
independence is the Georgian language, unrelated to any other
major tongue and largely unaffected by the languages of
conquering peoples--at least until the massive influx of
technical loanwords at the end of the twentieth century.
Since independence, Georgia has had difficulty establishing
solid political institutions. This difficulty has been caused by
the distractions of continuing military crises and by the chronic
indecision of policy makers about the country's proper long-term
goals and the strategy to reach them. Also, like the other
Transcaucasus states, Georgia lacks experience with the
democratic institutions that are now its political ideal; rubber-
stamp passage of Moscow's agenda is quite different from creation
of a legislative program useful to an emerging nation.
As in Azerbaijan, Georgia's most pressing problem has been
ethnic separatism within the country's borders. Despite Georgia's
modest size, throughout history all manifestations of a Georgian
nation have included ethnic minorities that have conflicted with,
or simply ignored, central power. Even in the golden age, when a
central ruling power commanded the most widespread loyalty, King
David the Builder was called "King of the Abkhaz, the
Kartvelians, the Ran, the Kakhetians, and the Armenians." In the
twentieth century, arbitrary rearrangement of ethnic boundaries
by the Soviet regime resulted in the sharpening of various
nationalist claims after Soviet power finally disappeared. Thus,
in 1991 the South Ossetians of Georgia demanded union with the
Ossetians across the Russian border, and in 1992 the Abkhaz of
Georgia demanded recognition as an independent nation, despite
their minority status in the region of Georgia they inhabited.
As in Armenia and Azerbaijan, influential, intensely
nationalist factions pushed hard for unqualified military success
in the struggle for separatist territory. And, as in the other
Transcaucasus nations, those factions were frustrated by military
and geopolitical reality: in Georgia's case, an ineffective
Georgian army required assistance from Russia, the imperialist
neighbor against whom nationalists had sharpened their teeth only
three years earlier, to save the nation from fragmentation. At
the end of 1993, Russia seemingly had settled into a long-term
role of peacekeeping and occupation between Georgian and
Abkhazian forces.
The most unsettling internal crisis was the failed presidency
of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, once a respected human rights advocate and
the undisputed leader of Georgia's nationalist opposition as the
collapse of the Soviet Union became imminent. In 1991
Gamsakhurdia's dictatorial and paranoid regime, followed by the
bloody process of unseating him, gave Georgia a lasting
reputation for instability that damaged prospects for foreign
investment and for participation in international organizations.
The failure of the one-year Gamsakhurdia regime necessitated
a new political beginning that coincided with the establishment
of Eduard Shevardnadze as head of state in early 1992. Easily the
most popular politician in Georgia and facing chronically
fragmented opposition in parliament, Shevardnadze acquired
substantial "temporary" executive powers as he maneuvered to
maintain national unity. At the same time, his hesitation to
imitate Gamsakhurdia's grab for power often left a vacuum that
was filled by quarreling splinter parties with widely varied
agendas. Shevardnadze preserved parts of his reform program by
forming temporary coalitions that dissolved when a contentious
issue appeared. Despite numerous calls for his resignation, and
despite rampant government corruption and frequent shifts in his
cabinet between 1992 and 1994, there were no other serious
contenders for Shevardnadze's position as of late 1994.
Shevardnadze also used familiarity with the world of
diplomacy to reestablish international contacts, gain sympathy
for Georgia's struggle to remain unified, and seek economic ties
wherever they might be available. Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Georgia did not arouse particular loyalty or hostility among any
group of nations. In the first years of independence,
Shevardnadze made special overtures to Russia, Turkey, and the
United States and attempted to balance Georgia's approach to
Armenia and Azerbaijan, its feuding neighbors in the
Transcaucasus.
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed Georgia's economic
position significantly, although industrial production already
was declining in the last Soviet years. In the Soviet system,
Georgia's assignment was mainly to supply the union with
agricultural products, metal products, and the foreign currency
collected by Georgian tourist attractions. This specialization
made Georgia dependent on other Soviet republics for a wide range
of products that were unavailable after 1991. Neither
diversification nor meaningful privatization was possible,
however, under the constant upheaval and energy shortages of the
early 1990s. In addition, powerful organized criminal groups
gained control of large segments of the national economy,
including the export trade.
After the January 1992 fall of Gamsakhurdia's xenophobic
regime, the maintenance of internal peace and unity was a
critical national security issue. Although some progress was made
in establishing a national armed force in 1994 the paramilitary
organizations--the Mkhedrioni (horsemen) and the National Guard--
remained influential military forces in the fall of 1994. The
small size and the poor organization of those groups had forced
the request for Russian troop assistance in late 1993, which in
turn renewed the national security dilemma of occupation by
foreign troops. Meanwhile, civilian internal security forces, of
which Shevardnadze took personal control in 1993, gained only
partial victories over the crime wave that accompanied Georgia's
post-Soviet upheavals. A series of reorganizations in security
agencies failed to improve the protection of individuals against
random crime or of the economic system against organized groups.
Through most of 1994, the Abkhazian conflict was more
diplomatic than military. In spite of periodic hostilities, the
uneasy truce line held along the Inguri River in far northwestern
Georgia (in the campaign of October 1993, Georgian forces had
been pushed out of all of Abkhazia except the far northern
corner). The role of the 3,000 Russian peacekeepers on the
border, and their relationship with United Nations (UN)
observers, was recognized by a resolution of the UN Security
Council in July. Throughout that period, the issue of the return
of as many as 300,000 Georgian refugees to Abkhazia was the main
sticking point of negotiations. The Abkhaz saw the influx of so
many Georgians as a danger to their sovereignty, which Georgia
did not recognize, and the refugees' plight as a bargaining chip
to induce further Georgian withdrawal. No settlement was likely
before the refugee issue was resolved. Meanwhile, supporting the
refugees placed additional stress on Georgian society.
A legal basis for the presence of Russian troops in Georgia
had been established in a status-of-forces treaty between the two
nations in January 1994. The treaty prescribed the authority and
operating conditions of the Group of Russian Troops in the
Caucasus (GRTC), which was characterized as on Georgian territory
for a "transitional period." In the summer of 1994, high-level
bilateral talks covered Georgian-Russian military cooperation and
further integration of CIS forces.
The Georgian economy continued to struggle in 1994, showing
only isolated signs of progress. At the beginning of the year,
state monopolies were reaffirmed in vital industries such as tea
and food processing and electric power. By May, however, after
prodding from the IMF, Shevardnadze began issuing decrees that
eased privatization conditions. This policy spurred a noticeable
acceleration of privatization in the summer of 1994. When the new
stimulus began, about 23 percent of state enterprises had been
privatized, and only thirty-nine joint-stock companies had formed
out of the more than 900 large firms designated for that type of
conversion. A voucher system for collecting private investment
funds, delayed by a shortage of hard currency, finally began
operating. But the state economic bureaucracy, entrenched since
the Soviet era, was able to slow the privatization process when
dispersal of economic power threatened its privileged position in
1994.
Between mid-1993 and mid-1994, prices rose by an average of
300 percent, and inflation severely eroded the government-
guaranteed minimum wage. (In August the minimum wage, which was
stipulated in coupons [for value of the
coupon--see
Glossary],
equaled US$0.33 per month.) Often wages were withheld for months
because of the currency shortage. In September the government
raised price standards sharply for basic food items,
transportation, fuel, and services. Lump-sum payments to all
citizens, designed to offset this cost, failed to reach many,
prompting new calls for Shevardnadze's resignation. Under those
conditions, most Georgians were supported by a vast network of
unofficial economic activities.
In mid-1994 unemployment was estimated unofficially at 1.5
million people, nearly 50 percent of Georgia's working-age
population. The exchange rate of the Georgian coupon stabilized
in early 1994 after many months of high inflation, but by that
time the coupon had been virtually displaced in private
transactions by the ruble and the dollar. The national financial
system remained chaotic--especially in tax collection, customs,
and import-export operations. The first major state bank was
privatized in the summer of 1994. In August parliament approved a
major reform program for social welfare, pricing, and the
financial system.
In July 1994, a Georgian-Russian conference on economic
cooperation discussed transnational corporations and concluded
some contracts for joint economic activities, but most Russian
investors demanded stronger legal guarantees for their risks.
Numerous Western firms established small joint ventures in 1994,
but the most critical investment project under discussion sought
to exploit the substantial oil deposits that had been located by
recent Australian, British, Georgian, and United States
explorations in the Black Sea shelf near Batumi and Poti. A first
step in foreign involvement, an oil refinery near Tbilisi,
received funding in July, but the Western firms demanded major
reform of commercial legislation before expanding their
participation.
Georgia experienced a major energy crisis in the winter of
1993-94; following the crisis, in mid-1994 Turkmenistan
drastically reduced natural gas supplies because of unpaid debts.
Some fuel aid was expected for the winter of 1994-95 from
Azerbaijan, the EU, Iran, and Turkey. The output of the domestic
oil industry increased sharply in mid-1994. As winter approached,
Georgia also offered Turkmenistan new assurances of payment in
return for resumption of natural gas delivery.
Georgia's communications system, a chronically weak
infrastructure link that also had discouraged foreign investment,
began integration into world systems in early 1994 when the
country joined international postal, satellite, and electronic
communications organizations. Joint enterprises with Australian,
French, German, Turkish, and United States communications
companies allowed the upgrading of the national telephone system
and installation of fiber-optic cables.
In the first half of 1994, the most frequent topic of
government debate was the role of Russian troops in Abkhazia. By
that time, opposition nationalist parties had accepted the
Russian presence but rejected Abkhazian delays in allowing the
return of refugees and Shevardnadze's tolerance of those delays.
In May Shevardnadze overcame parliament's objections to new
concessions to the Abkhaz by threatening to resign. The new
agreement passed, and opposition leaders muted their demands for
Shevardnadze's ouster in the belief that Russia was seeking to
replace him with someone more favorable to Russian intervention.
Nevertheless, in the fall of 1994 few Georgian refugees had
returned to Abkhazia.
Shevardnadze's exercise of extraordinary executive powers
remained a hot issue in parliament. One faction called for
reduced powers in the name of democracy, but another claimed that
a still stronger executive was needed to enforce order. In a July
poll, 48 percent of respondents said the government was
obstructing the mass media. Although the 1992 state of emergency
continued to restrict dissemination of information, the Georgian
media consistently presented various opposition views. Likewise,
the Zviadists, Gamsakhurdia's supporters, although banned from
radio and television, continued to hold rallies under the
leadership of a young radical, Irakli Tsereteli.
In 1994 the government took steps to improve the internal
security situation. In the latest of a long series of
organizational and leadership shuffles, Shevardnadze replaced the
Emergency Committee, which had been headed by former Mkhedrioni
leader Jaba Ioseliani, with the Emergency Coordinating
Commission, headed by Shevardnadze, and gave the commission a
vague mandate to coordinate economic, political, defense, and
law-enforcement matters. Ioseliani, whose command of the
Mkhedrioni still gave him great influence, became a deputy head
of the commission.
Shevardnadze's attempt to form a new, one-battalion Georgian
army was delayed throughout the first half of 1994. The Ministry
of Defense continued drafting potential soldiers (a very high
percentage of whom evaded recruitment) for the Georgian armed
forces and streamlining its organization. In September the
national budget had not yet allocated wages, and sources of
rations and equipment had not been identified--mainly because
parliament had not passed the necessary legislation. Ministry of
Defense plans called for the country's remaining state farms to
be designated for direct military supply, as was the practice in
the Soviet era. The disposition of existing paramilitary forces
remained undecided as of late 1994.
The intelligence service had been reorganized in late 1993 to
include elite troops mandated to fight drug smuggling and
organized crime. In the spring of 1994, new agencies were formed
in the State Security Service to investigate fiscal crimes and to
combat terrorism. And in August 1994, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs announced a major new drive against organized crime and
drug traffickers throughout Georgia. Parliament and local
jurisdictions offered indifferent support, however.
In 1994 Georgia began solving some of its most critical
problems--laying a political base for a market economy,
solidifying to a degree Shevardnadze's position as head of state,
stabilizing inflation, and avoiding large-scale military
conflict. But long-term stability will depend on comprehensive
reform of the entire economy, eradication of the corruption that
has pervaded both government and economic institutions,
redirection of resources from the Abkhazian conflict into a
civilian infrastructure suitable for international trade (and for
major loans from international lenders), and, ultimately, finding
political leaders besides Shevardnadze who are capable of
focusing Georgians' attention on building a nation, rather than
on advancing local interests. All those factors will influence
the other major imponderable: Russia's long-term economic and
political influence in Georgia, which increased greatly in late
1993 and in the first half of 1994.
October 18, 1994
* * *
In the months following preparation of this manuscript, a
number of significant events occurred in the three countries of
the Transcaucasus. Cease-fires in two major conflicts, between
Abkhazia and Georgia and between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on
one side and Azerbaijan on the other, remained in effect despite
periodic hostilities. Although the two sets of peace talks
continued to encounter fundamental differences, signs of
compromise emerged from both in the first months of 1995, with
the assistance of international mediators. All three countries
continued efforts to stabilize their economies, reduce crime, and
normalize political systems distorted by lengthy states of
emergency.
At the beginning of 1995, Armenia had made the most progress
toward economic recovery and political stability, although its
population suffered another winter of privation because of
Azerbaijan's fuel blockade. In December a summit of the
Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE,
formerly the CSCE) had succeeded in merging OSCE and Russian
peace efforts on Nagorno-Karabakh for the first time in an accord
signed in Budapest. Russia was expected to become the head of the
OSCE Minsk Group, which had been negotiating on behalf of Western
Europe for the previous two years. In return, Russia accepted
OSCE oversight of peacekeeping in the conflict zone. Armenia's
President Ter-Petrosian reported the opening of three defense
plants and full staffing of the Armenian Army in 1994, improving
Armenia's national security position.
In November 1994, the World Bank announced loans to Armenia
of US$265 million for infrastructural, agricultural, and energy
applications. The bank cited Armenia's new reform program to
control inflation and expand the private sector, together with
the first increase in Armenia's gross national product (
GNP--see Glossary)
since independence, as the reasons for this investment.
In December the reform package went into effect. Expected to
improve the standing of President Ter-Petrosian's embattled
government, the reform included substantial reduction of the
government's budget deficit, which had caused many workers to go
unpaid and others, including teachers, to accept barely
subsistence wages. The second major reform measure was ending
government subsidies for basic staples, including bread and
utilities--a stringency measure highly unpopular in the short
term but calculated to attract more international assistance. The
price of bread rose by ten times as soon as the new law went into
effect. In late 1994 and early 1995, Armenia also continued
reestablishing commercial ties with Iran by signing a series of
three economic treaties covering taxation, free trade, and
capital investments. Beginning in 1992, commercial activity
between the two countries had doubled annually, and the pace was
expected to accelerate markedly in 1995.
Although the Armenian government had made more extensive
preparations for another winter of hardship under the Azerbaijani
blockade, conditions for the average Armenian were barely better
than the year before. In the winter of 1994-95, Armenia's chronic
fuel shortage, and the rising social unrest caused by it, were
relieved somewhat by a new fuel agreement with Georgia and
Turkmenistan. The pact provided for substantial increases in
delivery of Turkmen natural gas through the Georgian pipeline.
Although this measure increased the daily electricity ration from
one hour to two hours, long-term fuel increases depended on
additional negotiations and of the payment of Armenia's
substantial debt to Turkmenistan. In January the State Duma, the
lower house of Russia's legislative body, was considering a major
grant of credit to Armenia, which would be used in reopening the
Armenian Atomic Power Station at Metsamor. The arrangement would
be a major step in solidifying economic ties with Russia, which
has also given technical assistance for the plant.
According to Armenian Ministry of Industry figures, 40
percent of the country's industrial 1994 output, worth a total of
US$147 million, was sold for hard currency. Among the main
customers were Iran, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Cyprus,
Belgium, and several North African countries. Although
machinebuilding industries did not work at full capacity in 1994
because of a reduced market in Russia, industry was buoyed by the
resumption of full production at the Nairit Chemical Plant after
several years of shutdown. Nairit was expected to produce goods
worth US$60 million per month in 1995.
Armenia's state commission for privatization vouchers began
voucher distribution to the public in October 1994. At that
point, vouchers for ten enterprises were available, with another
fifty due for consideration in February 1995. High profitability
was the chief criterion for listing enterprises for
privatization. The Nairit plant and the Armenian Electrical
Machine Plant, Armenia's largest and most profitable industrial
facilities, were converted to private joint-stock enterprises in
January 1995.
In Azerbaijan, hopes for economic improvement depended most
on foreign investment in offshore oil deposits in the Caspian
Sea. Those hopes were subdued somewhat by disagreements over the
September 1994 agreement of Western, Russian, and Iranian oil
interests to aid Socar, Azerbaijan's state oil company, to
develop offshore deposits in the Caspian Sea.
Throughout the last months of 1994, Russia insisted that its
10 percent share of the new deal was unfair on the grounds that
all Caspian countries should have equal access to Caspian
resources. Russia also continued strong opposition to a new
pipeline through Iran to Turkey, which the Western partners
favored. The Western firms were dismayed by Azerbaijan's offer of
25 percent of its oil deal to Iran, by the political uncertainty
that seemed to escalate in Azerbaijan after the oil deal was
signed, and by the rapid deterioration of existing Caspian
fields, many of which were deserted in early 1995. Experts agreed
an important determinant of Azerbaijan's profit from the
agreement would be the maintenance of world oil prices.
In December 1994, Russia's military occupation of its
separatist Chechen Autonomous Republic closed the main rail line
from Russia, the chief trade route to other CIS republics and
elsewhere. Replacement trade routes were sought through Iran,
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. At the same time,
hyperinflation continued (the value of the manat had dropped to
4,300 per US$1 at the end of 1994, down from 120 manats per US$1
in October 1993), spurred by full liberalization of prices to
conform with IMF credit requirements. The 1995 budget deficit
equaled 20 percent of the gross domestic product (
GDP--see
Glossary). Foreign credit, especially loans from Turkey, was
being used to provide food and social services--needs exacerbated
by the continuing influx of Karabakh refugees. Economic reform,
meanwhile, was delayed by more immediate concerns. Most
industries were operating at about 25 percent of capacity in the
winter of 1994-95.
In the last months of 1994, Russia struggled to maintain
influence in Azerbaijan. Its position was threatened by approval
of the multinational Caspian oil deal in September and by the
Azerbaijani perception that the West was restraining Armenian
aggression in Karabakh. In November President Aliyev met with
Russia's President Yeltsin, who offered 300,000 tons of Russian
grain and the reopening of Russian railroad lines in an apparent
effort to optimize Russia's influence throughout the
Transcaucasus. Azerbaijani opposition parties, led by the
Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF), continued to predict that
Aliyev's overtures to Russia would return Russia to a dominant
position in Azerbaijani political and economic affairs. Experts
predicted, however, that Russia would continue to play a vital
economic role; at the end of 1994, about 60 percent of
Azerbaijan's trade turnover involved Russia.
In early 1995, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's status
continued to stymie the peace talks jointly sponsored in Moscow
by the OSCE and Russia under the Budapest agreement of November
1994. Although Azerbaijan had signed several agreements with
Nagorno-Karabakh as a full participant, the extent of the
region's autonomy remained a key issue, as did the terms of the
liberation of Azerbaijan's Lachin and Shusha regions from
Armenian occupation. The Azerbaijani position was that the
principals of the negotiations were Armenia and Azerbaijan, with
the respective Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in Nagorno-
Karabakh as "interested parties." (At the end of 1994, an
estimated 126,000 Armenians and 37,000 Azerbaijanis remained in
the region.) Azerbaijan lodged an official protest against
Russian insistence that the Karabakh Armenians constituted a
third principal. In February presidents Aliyev and Ter-Petrosian
met with presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and
Shevardnadze of Georgia in Moscow and expressed optimism that the
nine-month cease-fire would hold until complete settlement could
be reached. Nazarbayev and the presidents of Russia and Ukraine
offered to be guarantors of stability in Nagorno-Karabakh if
Azerbaijan would guarantee the region's borders.
After the unsuccessful coup against him by Prime Minister
Suret Huseynov in October 1994, Azerbaijan's President Heydar
Aliyev maintained his position. Despite loud opposition from the
APF and other parties, Aliyev appeared to occupy a strong
position at the beginning of 1995. In early 1995, friction
developed between Aliyev and Rusul Guliyev, speaker of the Melli-
Majlis (National Council), each accusing the other of
responsibility for worsening socioeconomic conditions. Former
president Abulfaz Elchibey of the APF remained a vocal critic of
Aliyev and had a substantial following.
In Georgia, the unresolved conflict with the Abkhazian
Autonomous Republic remained the most important issue. The
repatriation of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia, a process
conducted very slowly by Abkhazian authorities in the early
autumn of 1994, ended completely between November 1994 and
January 1995. Opposition parties in Georgia, especially the
National Liberation Front led by former Prime Minister Tengiz
Sigua, increased their pressure on the government to take action,
likening Abkhazia to Russia's secessionist Chechen Autonomous
Republic, which Russia invaded in December 1994. (In fact, the
official position of the Shevardnadze government supported the
Russian move, both because of the parallel with Abkhazia and
because of the need for continued Russian military monitoring of
the cease-fire.) In January an attempted march of 1,400 armed
Georgian refugees into Abkhazia was halted by Georgian government
troops, and organizer Tengiz Kitovani, former minister of
defense, was arrested for having organized the group. Although
the UN adopted resolutions in January condemning the Abkhazian
refugee policy, UN officials saw little hope of a rapid change in
the situation in 1995.
The issue of human rights continued to dog the Shevardnadze
administration in late 1994 and early 1995. In February 1995, the
Free Media Association of Georgia, which included most of the
country's largest independent newspapers, officially protested
police oppression and confiscation of newspapers. Newspaper
production had already been restricted since the beginning of
winter because of Georgia's acute energy shortage.
The Georgian political world was shocked by the assassination
in December 1994 of Gia Chanturia, leader of the moderate
opposition National Democratic Party and one of the country's
most popular politicians. Responsibility for the act was not
established. Chanturia's death escalated calls for resignation of
the Cabinet of Ministers, an outcome made more likely by the
parliament's failure to pass Shevardnadze's proposed 1995 budget
and by continued factionalism within the cabinet.
An important emerging figure was Minister of Defense Vardiko
Nadibaidze, an army general entrusted in 1994 with finally
developing a professional Georgian military force that would
reduce reliance on outside forces (such as Russia's) to protect
national security. At the end of 1994, Georgian forces were
estimated at 15,000 ground troops, 3,000 air and air defense
personnel, and 1,500 to 2,000 in the coastal defense force.
Economic reform continued unevenly under the direction of
Vice Premier for Economics Temur Basilia. By design, inflation
and prices continued to rise in the last months of 1994, and
rubles and dollars remained the chief currency instead of the
Georgian coupon. In a November 1994 poll, one-third of
respondents said they spent their entire income on food.
Distribution of privatization vouchers among the population was
scheduled to begin in mid-1995. In November 1994, more than 1,500
enterprises had been privatized, most of them classified as
commercial or service establishments. A group of Western and
Japanese donors pledged a minimum of US$274 million in credits to
Georgia in 1995, with another US$162 million available pending
"visible success" in economic reform.
In Geneva, peace talks between the Georgian government and
the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic reached the eighteen-month
mark; the major points of disagreement continued to be the
political status of Abkhazia and the repatriation of Georgian
refugees. The Abkhazian delegation insisted on equal status with
Georgia in a new confederation. The Russian and UN mediators
proposed a federal legislature and joint agencies for foreign
policy, foreign trade, taxation, energy, communications, and
human rights, providing Abkhazia substantially more autonomy than
it had had when Georgia became independent but leaving open the
question of relative power within such a system. In early
February 1995, preliminary accord was reached on several points
of the mediators' proposal.
As 1995 began, prospects for stability in the Transcaucasus
were marginally better than they had been since the three
countries achieved independence in 1991. Much depended on
continued strong leadership from presidents Aliyev, Shevardnadze,
and Ter-Petrosian, on a peaceful environment across the borders
in Russia and Iran, and on free access to the natural resources
needed to restart the national economies.
February 28, 1995
Glenn E. Curtis
Data as of March 1994
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