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Japan Relations with the United States
Japan-United States relations were more uncertain in
the early
1990s than at any time since World War II. As
long-standing
military allies and increasingly interdependent economic
partners,
Japan and the United States cooperated closely to build a
strong,
multifaceted relationship based on democratic values and
interests
in world stability and development. Japan-United States
relations
improved enormously in the 1970s and 1980s, as the two
societies
and economies became increasingly intertwined. In 1990
their
combined gross national product
(GNP--see Glossary)
totaled about
one third of the world's GNP. Japan received about 11
percent of
United States exports (a larger share than any other
country except
Canada), and the United States bought about 34 percent of
Japan's
exports
(see United States and Canada
, ch. 5). Japan had
US$148
billion in direct investment in the United States in 1991,
while
the United States had more than US$17 billion invested in
Japan.
Some US$100 billion in United States government securities
held by
institutions in Japan helped finance much of the United
States
budget deficit. Economic exchanges were reinforced by a
variety of
scientific, technical, tourist, and other exchanges. Each
society
continued to see the other as its main ally in Asia and
the
Pacific. Certain developments in the late 1980s damaged
bilateral
relations. Nevertheless, public opinion surveys continued
to reveal
that substantial majorities of Japanese and Americans
believed that
the bilateral relationship was vital to both countries.
Growing interdependence was accompanied by markedly
changing
circumstances at home and abroad that were widely seen to
have
created a crisis in Japan-United States relations in the
late
1980s. United States government officials continued to
emphasize
the positive aspects of the relationship but warned that
there was
a need for "a new conceptual framework." The Wall
Street
Journal publicized a series of lengthy reports
documenting
changes in the relationship in the late 1980s and
reviewing the
considerable debate in Japan and the United States over
whether a
closely cooperative relationship was possible or
appropriate for
the 1990s. An authoritative review of popular and media
opinion,
published in 1990 by the Washington-based Commission on
US-Japan
Relations for the Twenty-first Century, was concerned with
preserving a close Japan-United States relationship. It
warned of
a "new orthodoxy" of "suspicion, criticism and
considerable self-
justification," which it said was endangering the fabric
of Japan-
United States relations.
Three sets of factors stand out as the most important
in
explaining the challenges facing Japan-United States
relations.
They are economic, political-military, and domestic in
nature.
The relative economic power of Japan and the United
States was
undergoing sweeping change, especially in the 1980s. This
change
went well beyond the implications of the United States
trade
deficit with Japan, which had remained between US$40
billion and
US$48 billion annually since the mid-1980s. The persisting
United
States trade and budget deficits of the early 1980s led to
a series
of decisions in the middle of the decade that brought a
major
realignment of the value of Japanese and United States
currencies.
The stronger Japanese currency gave Japan the ability to
purchase
more United States goods and to make important investments
in the
United States. By the late 1980s, Japan was the main
international
creditor.
Japan's growing investment in the United States--it was
the
second largest investor after Britain--led to complaints
from some
American constituencies. Moreover, Japanese industry
seemed well
positioned to use its economic power to invest in the
high-
technology products in which United States manufacturers
were still
leaders. The United States's ability to compete under
these
circumstances was seen by many Japanese and Americans as
hampered
by heavy personal, government, and business debt and a low
savings
rate.
In the late 1980s, the breakup of the Soviet bloc in
Eastern
Europe and the growing preoccupation of Soviet leaders
with massive
internal political and economic difficulties forced the
Japanese
and United States governments to reassess their
longstanding
alliance against the Soviet threat. Officials of both
nations had
tended to characterize the security alliance as the
linchpin of the
relationship, which should have priority over economic and
other
disputes. Some Japanese and United States officials and
commentators continued to emphasize the common dangers to
Japan-
United States interests posed by the continued strong
Soviet
military presence in Asia
(see Relations with Russia
, this
ch.).
They stressed that until Moscow followed its moderation in
Europe
with major demobilization and reductions in its forces
positioned
against the United States and Japan in the Pacific,
Washington and
Tokyo needed to remain militarily prepared and vigilant.
Increasingly, however, other perceived benefits of
close Japan-
United States security ties were emphasized. The alliance
was seen
as deterring other potentially disruptive forces in East
Asia,
notably the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North
Korea).
Ironically, some United States officials noted that the
alliance
helped keep Japan's potential military power in check and
under the
supervision of the United States.
The post-Cold War environment strengthened the relative
importance of economic prowess over military power as the
major
source of world influence in the early 1990s. This shift
affected
the perceived relative standing of Japan, the United
States, and
other powers. Increasingly, Japan was expected to shoulder
international aid and economic responsibilities that in
the past
were discharged by the United States and other Western
countries.
The declining Soviet threat, the rising power of the
Japanese
economy, increasingly close United States interaction (and
related
disputes) with Japan, and other factors led by 1990 to a
decided
shift in United States opinion about Japan and to less
marked but
nonetheless notable shifts in Japanese opinion. In the
United
States, this shift was reflected in questions about which
was the
more serious, the military threat from the Soviet Union or
the
economic challenge from Japan. In a series of polls in
1989 and
1990, most respondents considered the challenge from Japan
the more
serious. Similarly, poll data from early 1990 showed that
most
Japanese considered negative United States attitudes
toward Japan
a reflection of United States anger at "America's slipping
economic
position." Meanwhile, Japanese opinion was showing greater
confidence in Japan's ability to handle its own affairs
without
constant reference--as in the past--to the United States.
Japan's
belief in United States reliability as a world leader also
lessened.
In both countries, new or "revisionist" views of the
Japan-
United States relationship were promoted. In Japan some
commentators argued that the United States was weak,
dependent on
Japan, and unable to come to terms with world economic
competition.
They urged Japan to strike out on a more independent
course. In the
United States, prominent commentators warned of a Japanese
economic
juggernaut, out of control of the Japanese government,
which needed
to be "contained" by the United States.
At the same time, it was easy to overstate the changes
in
opinion in both countries. The Japanese still considered
the United
States positively as their closest friend, the principal
guardian
of their external security, their most important economic
partner
and market, and the exemplar of a life-style that had much
to
offer--and much to envy. Moreover, the vast majority of
Americans
still viewed Japan positively, had high respect for
Japanese
accomplishments, and supported the United States defense
commitment
to Japan.
In the years after World War II, Japan's relations with
the
United States were placed on an equal footing for the
first time at
the end of the occupation by the Allied forces in April
1952. This
equality, the legal basis of which was laid down in the
peace
treaty signed by forty-eight Allied nations and Japan, was
initially largely nominal, because in the early
postoccupation
period Japan required direct United States economic
assistance. A
favorable Japanese balance of payments with the United
States was
achieved in 1954, mainly as a result of United States
military and
aid spending in Japan.
The Japanese people's feeling of dependence lessened
gradually
as the disastrous results of World War II subsided into
the
background and trade with the United States expanded.
Self-confidence grew as the country applied its resources
and
organizational skill to regaining economic health. This
situation
gave rise to a general desire for greater independence
from United
States influence. During the 1950s and 1960s, this feeling
was
especially evident in the Japanese attitude toward United
States
military bases on the four main islands of Japan and in
Okinawa
Prefecture, occupying the southern two-thirds of the
Ryukyu Islands
(see
fig. 1).
The government had to balance left-wing pressure
advocating
dissociation from the United States against the realities
of the
need for military protection. Recognizing the popular
desire for
the return of the Ryukyu Islands and the Bonin Islands
(also known
as the Ogasawara Islands), the United States as early as
1953
voluntarily relinquished its control of the Amami group of
islands
at the northern end of the Ryukyu Islands. But the United
States
made no commitment to return Okinawa, which was then under
United
States military administration for an indefinite period as
provided
in Article 3 of the peace treaty. Popular agitation
culminated in
a unanimous resolution adopted by the Diet in June 1956,
calling
for a return of Okinawa to Japan.
Bilateral talks on revising the 1952 security pact
began in
1959, and the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security was
signed in Washington on January 19, 1960. When the pact
was
submitted to the Diet for ratification on February 5, it
became the
subject of bitter debate over the Japan-United States
relationship
and the occasion for violence in an all-out effort by the
leftist
opposition to prevent its passage. It was finally approved
by the
House of Representatives on May 20. Japan Socialist Party
deputies
boycotted the lower house session and tried to prevent the
LDP
deputies from entering the chamber; they were forcibly
removed by
the police. Massive demonstrations and rioting by students
and
trade unions followed. These outbursts prevented a
scheduled visit
to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and
precipitated the
resignation of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, but not
before the
treaty was passed by default on June 19, when the House of
Councillors failed to vote on the issue within the
required thirty
days after lower house approval.
Under the treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to
assist
each other in case of armed attack on territories under
Japanese
administration. (It was understood, however, that Japan
could not
come to the defense of the United States because it was
constitutionally forbidden to send armed forces overseas.
In
particular, the constitution forbids the maintenance of
"land, sea,
and air forces." It also expresses the Japanese people's
renunciation of "the threat or use of force as a means of
settling
international disputes". Accordingly, the Japanese find it
difficult to send their "self-defense" forces overseas,
even for
peace-keeping purposes.) The scope of the new treaty did
not extend
to the Ryukyu Islands, but an appended minute made clear
that in
case of an armed attack on the islands, both governments
would
consult and take appropriate action. Notes accompanying
the treaty
provided for prior consultation between the two
governments before
any major change occurred in the deployment of United
States troops
or equipment in Japan. Unlike the 1952 security pact, the
new
treaty provided for a ten-year term, after which it could
be
revoked upon one year's notice by either party. The treaty
included
general provisions on the further development of
international
cooperation and on improved future economic cooperation.
Both countries worked closely to fulfill the United
States
promise, under Article 3 of the peace treaty, to return
all
Japanese territories acquired by the United States in war.
In June
1968 the United States returned the Bonin Islands
(including Iwo
Jima) to Japanese administration control. In 1969 the
Okinawa
reversion issue and Japan's security ties with the United
States
became the focal points of partisan political campaigns.
The
situation calmed considerably when Prime Minister Sato
Eisaku
visited Washington in November 1969, and in a joint
communiqué
signed by him and President Richard M. Nixon, announced
the United
States agreement to return Okinawa to Japan in 1972. In
June 1971,
after eighteen months of negotiations, the two countries
signed an
agreement providing for the return of Okinawa to Japan in
1972.
The Japanese government's firm and voluntary
endorsement of the
security treaty and the settlement of the Okinawa
reversion
question meant that, two major political issues in
Japan-United
States relations were eliminated. But new issues arose. In
July
1971, the Japanese government was surprised by Nixon's
dramatic
announcement of his forthcoming visit to the People's
Republic of
China. Many Japanese were chagrined by the failure of the
United
States to consult in advance with Japan before making such
a
fundamental change in foreign policy. The following month,
the
government was again surprised to learn that, without
prior
consultation, the United States had imposed a 10 percent
surcharge
on imports, a decision certain to hinder Japan's exports
to the
United States. Relations between Tokyo and Washington were
further
strained by the monetary crisis involving the December
1971
revaluation of the Japanese yen (for value of the
yen--see Glossary).
These events of 1971 marked the beginning of a new
stage in
relations, a period of adjustment to a changing world
situation
that was not without episodes of strain in both political
and
economic spheres, although the basic relationship remained
close.
The political issues between the two countries were
essentially
security-related and derived from efforts by the United
States to
induce Japan to contribute more to its own defense and to
regional
security. The economic issues tended to stem from the
ever-widening
United States trade and payments deficits with Japan,
which began
in 1965 when Japan reversed its imbalance in trade with
the United
States and, for the first time, achieved an export
surplus.
The United States withdrawal from Indochina in 1975 and
the end
of the Second Indochina War meant that the question of
Japan's role
in the security of East Asia and its contributions to its
own
defense became central topics in the dialogue between the
two
countries. United States dissatisfaction with Japanese
defense
efforts began to surface in 1975 when Secretary of Defense
James A.
Schlesinger publicly stigmatized Japan as a passive
defense
partner.
United States pressures continued and intensified,
particularly
as events in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East after
1979
caused the United States to relocate more than 50 percent
of its
naval strength from East Asian waters to the Indian Ocean.
Japan
was repeatedly pressed not only to increase its defense
expenditures and build up its antisubmarine and naval
patrol
capabilities but also to play a more active and positive
security
role generally.
The Japanese government, constrained by constitutional
limitations and strongly pacifist public opinion,
responded slowly
to pressures for a more rapid buildup of its Self-Defense
Forces
(SDF). It steadily increased its budgetary outlays for
those
forces, however, and indicated its willingness to shoulder
more of
the cost of maintaining the United States military bases
in Japan.
In 1976 the United States and Japan formally established a
subcommittee for defense cooperation, in the framework of
a
bilateral Security Consultative Committee provided for
under the
1960 security treaty. This subcommittee, in turn, drew up
new
Guidelines for Japan-United States Defense Cooperation,
under which
military planners of the two countries have conducted
studies
relating to joint military action in the event of an armed
attack
on Japan.
On the economic front, Japan sought to ease trade
frictions by
agreeing to Orderly Marketing Arrangements, which limited
exports
on products whose influx into the United States was
creating
political problems. In 1977 an Orderly Marketing
Arrangement
limiting Japanese color television exports to the United
States was
signed, following the pattern of an earlier disposition of
the
textile problem. Steel exports to the United States were
also
curtailed, but the problems continued as disputes flared
over
United States restrictions on Japanese development of
nuclear fuel-
reprocessing facilities, Japanese restrictions on certain
agricultural imports, such as beef and oranges, and
liberalization
of capital investment and government procurement within
Japan.
To respond to the call, from its allies and from within
the
country as well, for a greater and more responsible role
in the
world, Japan developed what Ohira Masayoshi, after he
became prime
minister in December 1978, called a "comprehensive
security and
defense strategy to safeguard peace." Under this policy,
Japan
sought to place its relations with the United States on a
new
footing--one of close cooperation but on a more reciprocal
and
autonomous basis, and on a global scale.
This policy was put to the test in November 1979, when
radical
Iranians seized the United States embassy in Tehran,
taking sixty
hostages. Japan reacted by condemning the action as a
violation of
international law. At the same time, Japanese trading
firms and oil
companies reportedly purchased Iranian oil that had become
available when the United States banned oil imported from
Iran.
This action brought sharp criticism from the United States
of
Japanese government "insensitivity" for allowing the oil
purchases
and led to a Japanese apology and agreement to participate
in
sanctions against Iran in concert with other United States
allies.
Following that incident, the Japanese government took
greater
care to support United States international policies
designed to
preserve stability and promote prosperity. Japan was
prompt and
effective in announcing and implementing sanctions against
the
Soviet Union following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in
December 1979. In 1981, in response to United States
requests, it
accepted greater responsibility for defense of seas around
Japan,
pledged greater support for United States forces in Japan,
and
persisted with a steady buildup of the SDF.
A qualitatively new stage of Japan-United States
cooperation in
world affairs appeared to be reached in late 1982 with the
election
of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. Officials of the
Ronald Reagan
administration worked closely with their Japanese
counterparts to
develop a personal relationship between the two leaders
based on
their common security and international outlook. Nakasone
reassured
United States leaders of Japan's determination against the
Soviet
threat, closely coordinated policies with the United
States toward
such Asian trouble spots as the Korean Peninsula and
Southeast
Asia, and worked cooperatively with the United States in
developing
China policy. The Japanese government welcomed the
increase of
United States forces in Japan and the western Pacific,
continued
the steady buildup of the SDF, and positioned Japan firmly
on the
side of the United States against the threat of Soviet
international expansion. Japan continued to cooperate
closely with
United States policy in these areas following Nakasone's
term of
office, although the political leadership scandals in
Japan in the
late 1980s made it difficult for newly elected President
George
Bush to establish the same kind of close personal ties
that marked
the Reagan years.
A specific example of Japan's close cooperation with
the United
States included its quick response to the United States
call for
greater host nation support from Japan following the rapid
realignment of Japan-United States currencies in the
mid-1980s. The
currency realignment resulted in a rapid rise of United
States
costs in Japan, which the Japanese government, upon United
States
request, was willing to offset. Another set of examples
was
provided by Japan's willingness to respond to United
States
requests for foreign assistance to countries considered of
strategic importance to the West. During the 1980s, United
States
officials voiced appreciation for Japan's "strategic aid"
to
countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jamaica.
Prime
Minister Kaifu Toshiki's pledges of support for East
European and
Middle Eastern countries in 1990 fit the pattern of
Japan's
willingness to share greater responsibility for world
stability.
Despite complaints from some Japanese businesses and
diplomats,
the Japanese government remained in basic agreement with
United
States policy toward China and Indochina. The government
held back
from large-scale aid efforts until conditions in China and
Indochina were seen as more compatible with Japanese and
United
States interests. Of course, there also were instances of
limited
Japanese cooperation. Japan's response to the United
States
decision to help to protect tankers in the Persian Gulf
during the
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) was subject to mixed reviews. Some
United
States officials stressed the positive, noting that Japan
was
unable to send military forces because of constitutional
reasons
but compensated by supporting the construction of a
navigation
system in the Persian Gulf, providing greater host nation
support
for United States forces in Japan, and providing loans to
Oman and
Jordan
(see The Article 9 "No War" Clause
, ch. 6). Japan's
refusal
to join even in a mine-sweeping effort in the Persian Gulf
was an
indication to some United States officials of Tokyo's
unwillingness
to cooperate with the United States in areas of
sensitivity to
Japanese leaders at home or abroad.
The main area of noncooperation with the United States
in the
1980s was Japanese resistance to repeated United States
efforts to
get Japan to open its market more to foreign goods and to
change
other economic practices seen as adverse to United States
economic
interests. A common pattern was followed. The Japanese
government
was sensitive to political pressures from important
domestic
constituencies that would be hurt by greater openness. In
general,
these constituencies were of two types--those representing
inefficient or "declining" producers, manufacturers, and
distributors, who could not compete if faced with full
foreign
competition; and those up-and-coming industries that the
Japanese
government wished to protect from foreign competition
until they
could compete effectively on world markets. To deal with
domestic
pressures while trying to avoid a break with the United
States, the
Japanese government engaged in protracted negotiations.
This tactic
bought time for declining industries to restructure
themselves and
new industries to grow stronger. Agreements reached dealt
with some
aspects of the problems, but it was common for trade or
economic
issues to be dragged out in talks over several years,
involving
more than one market-opening agreement. Such agreements
were
sometimes vague and subject to conflicting interpretations
in Japan
and the United States
(see Import Policies
, ch. 5).
During the 1970s and 1980s, United States
administrations had
favored an issue-by-issue approach in negotiating such
economic
disputes with Japan. This approach ostensibly limited the
areas of
dispute. But it resulted in widespread negative publicity,
at a
time when changing economic and security circumstances
were causing
both countries to reevaluate the relationship. Notable
outpourings
of United States congressional and media rhetoric critical
of Japan
accompanied the disclosure in 1987 that Toshiba had
illegally sold
sophisticated machinery of United States origin to the
Soviet
Union, which reportedly allowed Moscow to make submarines
quiet
enough to avoid United States detection, and the United
States
congressional debate in 1989 over the Japan-United States
agreement
to develop a new fighter aircraft--the FSX--for Japan's
Air Self-
Defense Force
(see The Defense Industry
, ch. 8).
A new approach was added in 1989. The so-called
Structural
Impediments Initiative was a series of talks designed to
deal with
domestic structural problems limiting trade on both sides.
After
several rounds of often contentious talks, agreements were
reached
in April and July 1990 that promised major changes in such
sensitive areas as Japanese retailing practices, land use,
and
investment in public works. The United States pledged to
deal more
effectively with its budget deficit and to increase
domestic
savings. United States supporters saw the Structural
Impediments
Initiative talks as addressing fundamental causes of
Japan-United
States economic friction. Skeptics pointed to them as ways
for
officials to buy time and avoid an acute crisis in
Japan-United
States relations. The Bill Clinton administration decided
to end
the Structural Impediments Initiative in the summer of
1993 as a
framework for dealing with United States-Japan bilateral
relations.
Data as of January 1994
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