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Japan Vietnam and Cambodia
Stability in Indochina also is very important to
Japanese
interests. During the Indochina War of the 1960s and
1970s, Japan
had consistently encouraged a negotiated settlement at the
earliest
possible date. Even before the hostilities ended, it had
made
contact with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North
Vietnam)
government and had reached an agreement to establish
diplomatic
relations in September 1973. Implementation, however, was
delayed
by North Vietnamese demands that Japan pay the equivalent
of US$45
million in World War II reparations in two yearly
installments, in
the form of "economic cooperation" grants. Giving in to
the
Vietnamese demands, Japan paid the money and opened an
embassy in
Hanoi in October 1975 following the unification of North
Vietnam
and South Vietnam into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
Recognition of the communist Khmer Rouge regime in
Cambodia came in
1975, and diplomatic relations with that country were
established
in August 1976.
This Indochina policy was justified at home and to the
member
countries of ASEAN--some of which were hostile to and
suspicious of
Vietnam--on the grounds that official contacts and
eventually aid
to Vietnam would promote the peace and stability of
Southeast Asia
as a whole. In December 1978, after a visit to Tokyo by
Vietnam's
minister of foreign affairs, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Japan
agreed to give
Vietnam US$195 million in grant aid, as well as commodity
loans and
food shipments. When Vietnam launched its invasion of
Cambodia
later that same month, Japan was embarrassed and
irritated. It
joined ASEAN in condemning the invasion, supported the UN
resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese
forces,
and suspended the aid commitments it had made with Hanoi.
Japan and the United States shared common ground in
opposing
the Soviet-backed Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in
December 1978.
Japan's policy of restricting aid and other economic
cooperation
with Vietnam reinforced international pressures on Hanoi
to pull
back its forces and seek a comprehensive Cambodian
settlement.
Faced with international isolation, waning Soviet bloc
support,
continued armed resistance in Cambodia, and large-scale
economic
problems at home, Hanoi withdrew most if not all of its
combat
troops from Cambodia in 1989. It appealed to developed
countries to
open channels of economic cooperation, trade, and aid.
Although
some Japanese businesses were interested in investment and
trade
with Vietnam and Cambodia, the Japanese government still
opposed
economic cooperation with those countries until there had
been a
comprehensive settlement in Cambodia. This stand was
basically
consistent with United States policy of the time.
Meanwhile, Japan gave informal assurances that Tokyo
was
prepared to bear a large share of the financial burden to
help with
reconstruction aid to Cambodia, whenever a comprehensive
settlement
was reached, and to help fund UN or other international
peacekeeping forces, should they be required.
Japan carried through on its promises. Following the
October
23, 1991 Final Act of the International Paris Conference
on
Cambodia among the Cambodian parties, Indonesia (as
co-chair with
France), and the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council,
Japan promptly established diplomatic relations and ended
economic
restrictions with Cambodia and Vietnam. In November 1992,
Tokyo
offered Vietnam US$370 million in aid. Japan also took a
leading
role in peacekeeping activities in Cambodia. Japan's
Akashi
Yasushi, UN undersecretary for disarmament, was head of
the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and Japan pledged US$3
million
and even sent approximately 2,000 personnel, including
members of
the SDF, to participate directly in maintaining the peace.
Despite
the loss of a Japanese peacekeeper killed in an ambush,
the force
remained in Cambodia until the Cambodians were able to
elect and
install a government.
Data as of January 1994
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