Japan Relations with Russia
The 1980s saw a decided hardening in Japanese attitudes
toward
the Soviet Union. Japan was pressed by the United States
to do more
to check the expansion of Soviet power in the developing
world
following the December 1979 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. It
responded by cutting off contacts beneficial to the Soviet
regime
and providing assistance to "front line" states, such as
Pakistan
and Thailand. Under Nakasone, Japan worked hard to
demonstrate a
close identity of views with the Reagan administration on
the
Soviet threat. Japan steadily built up its military
forces,
welcomed increases in United States forces in Japan and
the western
Pacific, and pledged close cooperation to deal with the
danger
posed by Soviet power.
Although public and media opinion remained skeptical of
the
danger to Japan posed by Soviet forces in Asia, there was
strong
opposition in Japan to Moscow's refusal to accede to
Japan's claims
to the Northern Territories, known to the Japanese as
Etorofu and
Kunashiri, at the southern end of the Kuril Island chain,
and the
smaller island of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands,
northeast of
Hokkaido, which were seized by the Soviets in the last
days of
World War II
(see
fig. 11). The stationing of Soviet
military
forces on the islands gave tangible proof of the Soviet
threat, and
provocative maneuvers by Soviet air and naval forces in
Japanese-
claimed territory served to reinforce Japanese official
policy of
close identification with a firm United States-backed
posture
against Soviet power. In 1979 the Japanese government
specifically
protested a build up in Soviet forces in Etorofu,
Kunashiri, and
Shikotan.
The advent of the Mikhail Gorbachev regime in Moscow in
1985
saw a replacement of hard-line Soviet government diplomats
who were
expert in Asian affairs with more flexible spokespersons
calling
for greater contact with Japan. Gorbachev took the lead in
promising new initiatives in Asia, but the substance of
Soviet
policy changed more slowly. In particular, throughout the
rest of
the 1980s, Soviet officials still seemed uncompromising
regarding
the Northern Territories, Soviet forces in the western
Pacific
still seemed focused on and threatening to Japan, and
Soviet
economic troubles and lack of foreign exchange made
prospects for
Japan-Soviet Union economic relations appear poor. By 1990
Japan
appeared to be the least enthusiastic of the major
Western-aligned
developed countries in encouraging greater contacts with
and
assistance to the Soviet Union.
Strains in Japan-Soviet Union relations had deep
historical
roots, going back to the competition of the Japanese and
Russian
empires for dominance in Northeast Asia. In 1993, nearly
fifty
years after the end of World War II, a state of war
between Japan
and Russia existed technically because the government in
Moscow had
refused in the intervening years to sign the 1951 peace
treaty. The
main stumbling block in all Japan's subsequent efforts to
establish
bilateral relations on what it called "a truly stable
basis" was
the territorial dispute over the Northern Territories.
During the first half of the 1950s, other unsettled
problems
included Japanese fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk and
off the
coast of the Soviet maritime provinces and repatriation of
Japanese
prisoners of war, who were still being held in the Soviet
Union.
Negotiation of these issues broke down early in 1956
because of
tension over territorial claims.
Negotiations soon resumed, however, and the two
countries
issued a joint declaration in October 1956 providing for
the
restoration of diplomatic relations. The two parties also
agreed to
continue negotiations for a peace treaty, including
territorial
issues. In addition, the Soviet Union pledged to support
Japan for
UN membership and waive all World War II reparations
claims. The
joint declaration was accompanied by a trade protocol that
granted
reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and provided for
the
development of trade.
Japan derived few apparent gains from the normalization
of
diplomatic relations. The second half of the 1950s saw an
increase
in cultural exchanges. Soviet propaganda, however, had
little
success in Japan, where it encountered a longstanding
antipathy
stemming from the Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea,
Manchuria, and
China proper in the late nineteenth century, from the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5; and from the Soviet
declaration of
war on Japan in the last days of World War II, in
violation of the
Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact of 1941.
The Soviet Union sought to induce Japan to abandon its
territorial claims by alternating threats and persuasion.
As early
as 1956, it hinted at the possibility of considering the
return of
the Habomai Islands and Shikotan if Japan abandoned its
alliance
with the United States. In 1960 the Soviet government
warned Japan
against signing the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security with
the United States, and after the treaty was signed,
declared that
it would not hand over the Habomai Islands and Shikotan
under any
circumstances unless Japan abrogated the treaty forthwith.
In 1964
the Soviet Union offered to return these islands
unconditionally if
the United States ended its military presence on Okinawa
and the
main islands of Japan.
Despite divergence on the territorial question, on
which
neither side was prepared to give ground, Japan's
relations with
the Soviet Union improved appreciably after the mid-1960s.
The
Soviet government began to seek Japanese cooperation in
its
economic development plans, and the Japanese responded
positively.
The two countries signed a five-year trade agreement in
January
1966 and a civil aviation agreement as well.
Economic cooperation expanded rapidly during the 1970s,
despite
an often strained political relationship. The two
economies were
complementary, for the Soviet Union needed Japan's
capital,
technology, and consumer goods, while Japan needed Soviet
natural
resources, such as oil, gas, coal, iron ore, and timber.
By 1979
overall trade had reached US$4.4 billion annually and had
made
Japan, after the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany), the
Soviet Union's most important nonsocialist trading
partner.
This economic cooperation was interrupted by Japan's
decision
in 1980 to participate in sanctions against the Soviet
Union for
its invasion of Afghanistan and by its actions to hold in
obeyance
a number of projects being negotiated, to ban the export
of some
high-technology items, and to suspend Siberian development
loans.
Subsequently, Japanese interest in economic cooperation
with the
Soviet Union waned as Tokyo found alternative suppliers
and
remained uncertain about the economic viability and
political
stability of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev.
Japan-Soviet trade
in 1988 was valued at nearly US$6 billion.
Japanese-Soviet political relations during the 1970s
were
characterized by the frequent exchange of high-level
visits to
explore the possibility of improving bilateral relations
and by
repeated discussions of a peace treaty, which were
abortive because
neither side was prepared to yield on the territorial
issue.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko of the Soviet
Union
visited Tokyo in January 1972--one month before United
States
president Nixon's historic visit to China--to reopen
ministerial-level talks after a six-year lapse. Other
high-level
talks, including an October 1973 meeting between Prime
Minister
Tanaka Kakuei and Leonid I. Brezhnev, general secretary of
the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, were held in Moscow
during the
next three years, but the deadlock on the territorial
issue
continued, and prospects for a settlement dimmed. Moscow
began to
propose a treaty of friendship and goodwill as an interim
step
while peace treaty talks were continued. This proposal was
firmly
rejected by Japan.
After 1975 the Soviet Union began openly to warn that
the
Japanese peace treaty with China might jeopardize
Soviet-Japan
relations. In January 1976, Gromyko again visited Tokyo to
resume
talks on the peace treaty. When the Japanese again refused
to budge
on the territorial question, Gromyko, according to the
Japanese,
offered to return two of the Soviet-held island areas--the
Habomai
Islands and Shikotan--if Japan would sign a treaty of
goodwill and
cooperation. He also reportedly warned the Japanese, in an
obvious
reference to China, against "forces which come out against
the
relaxation of tension and which try to complicate
relations between
states, including our countries."
The signing of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty in
mid-1978 was
a major setback to Japanese-Soviet relations. Despite
Japanese
protestations that the treaty's antihegemony clause was
not
directed against any specific country, Moscow saw it as
placing
Tokyo with Washington and Beijing firmly in the
anti-Soviet camp.
Officially, both sides continued to express the desire for
better
relations, but Soviet actions served only to alarm and
alienate the
Japanese side. The 1980s Soviet military buildup in the
Pacific was
a case in point.
Changes in Soviet policy carried out under Gorbachev
beginning
in the mid-1980s, including attempts at domestic reform
and the
pursuit of détente with the United States and Western
Europe,
elicited generally positive Japanese interest, but the
Japanese
government held that the Soviet Union had not changed its
policies
on issues vital to Japan. The government stated that it
would not
conduct normal relations with the Soviet Union until
Moscow
returned the Northern Territories. The government and
Japanese
business leaders stated further that Japanese trade with
and
investment in the Soviet Union would not grow appreciably
until the
Northern Territories issue has been resolved.
By 1990 the Soviet government had altered its tactics.
The
Soviet Union now acknowledged that the territorial issue
was a
problem and talked about it with Japanese officials at the
highest
levels and in working-level meetings. Soviet officials
reportedly
floated a proposal to lease the Northern Territories and
part of
Sakhalin--once a colonial holding of Japan's--to Japan.
Gorbachev
and others also referred to a 1956 Soviet offer to return
one of
the three main islands (Shikotan, the smallest of the
three) and
the Habomai Islands, and there were indications that
Moscow might
be prepared to revive the offer. The Soviet Union
emphasized that
it would not return all the islands because of Soviet
public
opposition and the possible reawakening of other
countries'
territorial claims against the Soviet Union. The Soviet
military
reportedly opposed a return because the Kuril Islands
provided a
protective barrier to the Sea of Okhotsk, where the Soviet
navy
deployed submarines carrying long-range ballistic
missiles.
The Soviet government also stepped up its diplomacy
toward
Japan with the announcement in 1990 that Gorbachev would
visit
Japan in 1991. Soviet officials asserted that their
government
would propose disarmament talks with Japan and might make
more
proposals on the Northern Territories in connection with
the visit.
Observers believed that Gorbachev might propose a package
dealing
with the islands, arms reduction, and economic
cooperation. In
January 1990, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
shifted its
position, which previously had rejected negotiations with
the
Soviet Union on arms reductions, indicating that Japan
would be
willing to negotiate. Ministry officials stated that the
government
would formulate policy on arms reduction in close
coordination with
the United States.
The government of Boris Yeltsin took power in Russia in
late
1991 when the Soviet Union was dissolved. Once again,
Moscow took
a stand in firm opposition to returning the disputed
territories to
Japan. Although Japan joined with the Group of Seven
industrialized
nations in providing some technical and financial
assistance to
Russia, relations between Japan and Russia remained cool.
In
September 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin postponed
a
scheduled visit to Japan. The visit finally took place in
October
1993. During the visit, although various substantive
issues,
including the Northern Territories and the signing of a
peace
treaty, were discussed, no significant improvement was
seen in
Japan-Russia relations.
Data as of January 1994
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