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Japan Postwar Developments
When Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 and
reentered the
international community as an independent nation, it found
itself
in a world preoccupied by the Cold War between East and
West, in
which the Soviet Union and the United States headed
opposing camps.
By virtue of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed in San
Francisco
on September 8, 1951 (effective April 28, 1952), ending
the state
of war between Japan and most of the Allied powers except
the
Soviet Union and China, and the Mutual Security Assistance
Pact
between Japan and the United States, signed in San
Francisco the
same day, Japan essentially became a dependent ally of the
United
States, which continued to maintain bases and troops on
Japanese
soil.
Japan's foreign policy goals during most of the early
postwar
period were essentially to regain economic viability and
establish
its credibility as a peaceful member of the world
community.
National security was entrusted to the protective shield
and
nuclear umbrella of the United States, which was permitted
under
the security pact that came into effect in April 1952 to
deploy its
forces in and about Japan. The pact provided a framework
governing
the use of United States forces against military
threats--internal
or external--in the region. A special diplomatic task was
to
assuage the suspicions and alleviate the resentments of
Asian
neighbors who had suffered from Japanese colonial rule and
imperialist aggression in the past. Japan's diplomacy
toward its
Asian neighbors, therefore, tended to be extremely
low-key,
conciliatory, and nonassertive. With respect to the world
at large,
the nation avoided political issues and concentrated on
economic
goals. Under its omnidirectional diplomacy, it sought to
cultivate
friendly ties with all nations, proclaimed a policy of
"separation
of politics and economics," and adhered to a neutral
position on
some East-West issues.
During the 1950s and 1960s, foreign policy actions were
guided
by three basic principles: close cooperation with the
United States
for both security and economic reasons; promotion of a
free-trade
system congenial to Japan's own economic needs; and
international
cooperation through the United Nations (UN)--to which it
was
admitted in 1956--and other multilateral bodies. Adherence
to these
principles worked well and contributed to phenomenal
economic
recovery and growth during the first two decades after the
end of
the occupation.
In the 1970s, the basic postwar principles remained
unchanged
but were approached from a new perspective, owing to the
pressure
of practical politics at home and abroad. There was
growing
domestic pressure on the government to exercise more
foreign policy
initiatives independent of the United States, without,
however,
compromising vital security and economic ties. The
so-called Nixon
"shock," involving the surprise United States opening to
China and
other regional issues, also argued for a more independent
Japanese
foreign policy. The nation's phenomenal economic growth
had made it
a ranking world economic power by the early 1970s and had
generated
a sense of pride and self-esteem, especially among the
younger
generation. The demand for a more independent foreign
policy
reflected this enhanced self-image.
Changes in world economic relations during the 1970s
also
encouraged a more independent stance. Japan had become
less
dependent on the Western powers for resources. Oil, for
example,
was obtained directly from the producing countries and not
from the
Western-controlled multinational companies. Other
important
materials also came increasingly from sources other than
the United
States and its allies, while trade with the United States
as a
share of total trade dropped significantly during the
decade of the
1970s. Thus, political leaders began to argue that in the
interests
of economic self-preservation, more attention should be
paid to the
financial and development needs of other countries,
especially
those that provided Japan with vital energy and raw
material
supplies.
The move toward a more autonomous foreign policy was
accelerated in the 1970s by the United States decision to
withdraw
troops from Indochina. Japanese public opinion had earlier
favored
some distance between Japan and the United States
involvement in
war in Vietnam. The collapse of the war effort in Vietnam
was seen
as the end of United States military and economic
dominance in Asia
and brought to the fore a marked shift in Japan's
attitudes about
the United States. This shift, which had been developing
since the
early 1970s, took the form of questioning the credibility
of the
United States nuclear umbrella, as well as its ability to
underwrite a stable international currency system,
guarantee
Japan's access to energy and raw materials, and secure
Japan's
interests in a stable political order. The shift therefore
required
a reassessment of omnidirectional diplomacy.
Japan's leaders welcomed the reassertion of United
States
military power in Asian and world affairs following the
Islamic
revolution in Iran, the United States hostage crisis, and
the
Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, all of which
occurred in
1979. Japanese leaders played a strong supporting role in
curbing
economic and other interaction with the Soviet Union and
its allies
in order to help check the expansion of Soviet power in
sensitive
areas among the developing world countries. Under Prime
Minister
Nakasone Yasuhiro, Japan built up a close
political-military
relationship with the United States as part of a de facto
international front of a number of developed and
developing
countries intent on checking Soviet expansion. Japan's
defense
spending continued to grow steadily despite overall
budgetary
restraint. Japan became increasingly active in granting
foreign
assistance to countries of strategic importance in
East-West
competition
(see
Strategic Considerations;
Defense Spending
, ch.
8).
The realignment of United States and Japanese
currencies in the
mid-1980s increased the growth of Japanese trade, aid, and
investment, especially in Asia. It also accelerated the
reversal of
the United States fiscal position, from one of the world's
largest
creditors in the early 1980s to the world's largest debtor
at the
end of the decade. Japan became the world's largest
creditor, an
increasingly active investor in the United States, and a
major
contributor to international debt relief, financial
institutions,
and other assistance efforts.
The crucial issue for the United States and many other
world
governments centers on how Japan will employ this growing
economic
power. The strategic framework of the Japan-United States
alliance
also was called into question by the ending of the Cold
War and
collapse of the Soviet Union. Could a new rationale be
found to
sustain the active security tie that had been the basis
for Japan's
foreign affairs in the postwar period? Had Japan's foreign
interactions become so broad and multifaceted that new
mechanisms
were needed? Were new ways of thinking about Japan's
foreign policy
being formulated and implemented in Japan? It appears
clear to
observers in Japan that the majority of the Japanese
public and
elite are satisfied with the general direction of Japan's
foreign
policy. That policy direction is characterized by
continued close
ties with the United States to sustain world stability and
prosperity that are so beneficial to Japan, and
incrementally more
assertive Japanese policies, especially regarding
international
economic and political institutions and Asian affairs. Yet
the
world order ias changing rapidly, and there are deep
frustrations
in some quarters in the United States, China, and Western
Europe
over Japanese practices. There also is some evidence of
deep
frustrations in Japan over Tokyo's seeming slowness in
taking a
more active world role. The possibility of more radical
change in
Japan's foreign policy, perhaps in directions more
independent of
the United States, remains a distinct possibility.
Data as of January 1994
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