Japan Defense Spending
According to Japanese security policy, maintaining a
military
establishment is only one method--and by no means the best
method--
to achieve national security. Diplomacy, economic aid and
development, and a close relationship with the United
States under
the terms of the 1960 security treaty are all considered
more
important. Even in the 1980s, defense spending was
accorded a
relatively low priority. For FY 1986 through FY 1990,
defense's
share of the general budget was around 6.5 percent,
compared with
approximately 28 percent for the United States. In 1987
Japan
ranked sixth in the world in total defense expenditures
behind the
Soviet Union, the United States, France, the Federal
Republic of
Germany (West Germany), and Britain. By 1989 it ranked
third after
the United States and the Soviet Union, mainly because of
the
increased value of the yen. In FY 1991, defense accounted
for 6.2
percent of the budget.
In addition to annual budgets, the Defense Agency
prepared a
series of cabinet-approved buildup plans beginning in
1957, which
set goals for specific task capabilities and established
procurement targets to achieve them. Under the first three
plans
(for 1958-60, 1962-66, and 1967-71), funding priorities
were set to
establish the ability to counter limited aggression.
Economic
difficulties following the 1973 oil crisis, however,
caused major
problems in achieving the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan
(1972-76),
and forced funding to be cut, raising questions about the
basic
concepts underlying defense policies
(see Monetary and Fiscal Policy
, ch. 4).
In 1976 the government recognized that substantial
increases in
spending, personnel, and bases would be virtually
impossible.
Instead, a "standard defense concept" was suggested, one
stressing
qualitative improvements in the SDF, rather than
quantitative ones.
It was decided that defense spending would focus on
achieving a
basic level of defense as set forth in the 1976 National
Defense
Program Outline. Thereafter, the government ceased to
offer buildup
plans that alarmed the public by their seemingly
open-ended nature
and switched to reliance on single fiscal year formulas
that
offered explicit, attainable goals.
Defense spending increased slightly during the late
1970s, and
in the 1980s only the defense and Official Development
Assistance
budgets were allowed to increase in real terms. In 1985
the Defense
Agency developed the Mid-Term Defense Estimate objectives
for FY
1986 through FY 1990, to improve SDF front-line equipment
and
upgrade logistic support systems. For the GSDF, these
measures
included the purchase of advanced weapons and equipment to
improve
antitank, artillery, ground-to-sea firepower, and mobile
capabilities. For the MSDF, the focus was on upgrading
antisubmarine capabilities, with the purchase of new
destroyer
escorts equipped with the Aegis system and SH-60J
antisubmarine
helicopters, and on improving antimine warfare and air
defense
systems. ASDF funds were concentrated on the purchase of
fighter
aircraft and rescue helicopters. The entire cost of the
Mid-Term
Defense Estimate for FY 1986 through FY 1990 was projected
at
approximately ¥18.4 trillion (approximately US$83.2
billion, at the
1985 exchange rate; for value of the
yen--see Glossary).
In FY 1989, the ¥3.9 trillion defense budget accounted
for 6.49
percent of the total budget, or 1.006 percent of GNP. In
addition
to the Defense Agency itself, the defense budget supported
the
Defense Facilities Administration Agency and the Security
Council.
Defense Agency funding covered the GSDF, the MSDF, the
ASDF, the
internal bureaus, the Joint Staff Council, the National
Defense
Academy, the National Defense Medical College, the
National
Institute for Defense Studies, the Technical Research and
Development Institute, and the Central Procurement Office.
The FY 1990 defense budget, at 0.997 percent of the
forecasted
GNP, dipped below the 1 percent level for the first time
since it
was reached in 1987. But the more than ¥4.1 trillion
budget still
marked a 6.1 percent increase over the FY 1989 defense
budget and
provided virtually all of the ¥104 billion requested for
research
and development, including substantial funds for
guided-missile and
communications technologies. Although some ¥34.6 billion
was
authorized over several years for joint Japan-United
States
research and development of the experimental FSX fighter
aircraft,
disputes over this project were believed to have convinced
the
Defense Agency to strengthen the capability of the
domestic arms
industry and increase its share of SDF contracts. After
originally
being cut, funds were also restored for thirty advanced
model tanks
and the last Aegis multiple-targeting-equipped destroyer
escort
needed to complete the Mid-Term Defense Estimate. The 6.1
percent
defense increase was accompanied by an even larger (8.2
percent)
increase in Official Development Assistance funding. The
defense
budget continued to grow in real terms in the early 1990s
to ¥43.8
trillion in 1991 and ¥45.5 trillion in 1992 but remained
less than
1 percent of GNP.
Japanese officials resist United States pressure to
agree
formally that Japan will support more of the cost of
maintaining
United States troops, claiming that such a move will
require
revision of agreements between the two nations. But in FY
1989, the
Japanese government contributed US$2.4 billion--roughly 40
percent-
-of the total cost. The contribution slated for FY 1990
was
increased to US$2.8 billion--nearly 10 percent of the
total defense
budget--and by the end of FY 1990 the Japanese government
expected
to assume all expenses for utilities and building
maintenance costs
for United States troops stationed in Japan.
Data as of January 1994
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