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Japan Place in National Life
The Defense Agency, aware that it could not accomplish
its
programs without popular support, paid close attention to
public
opinion. Although the Japanese people retained a lingering
suspicion of the armed services, in the late 1980s
antimilitarism
had moderated, compared with its form in the early 1950s
when the
SDF was established. At that time, fresh from the terrible
defeat
of World War II, most people had ceased to believe that
the
military could maintain peace or serve the national
interest. By
the mid-1970s, memories of World War II had faded, and a
growing
number of people believed that Japan's military and
diplomatic
roles should reflect its rapidly growing economic
strength. At the
same time, United States-Soviet strategic contention in
the area
around Japan had increased. In 1976 Defense Agency
director general
Sakata Michita called upon the cabinet to adopt the
National
Defense Program Outline to improve the quality of the
armed forces
and more clearly define their strictly defensive role. For
this
program to gain acceptance, Sakata had to agree to a
ceiling on
military expenditures of 1 percent of the gross national
product
(GNP--see Glossary)
and a prohibition on exporting weapons
and
military technology. The outline was adopted by the
cabinet and,
according to public opinion polls, was approved by
approximately 60
percent of the people. Throughout the remainder of the
1970s and
into the 1980s, the quality of the SDF improved and public
approval
of the improved forces went up.
In November 1982, when the Defense Agency's former
director
general, Nakasone Yasuhiro, became prime minister, he was
under
strong pressure from the United States and other Western
nations to
move toward a more assertive defense policy in line with
Japan's
status as a major world economic and political power.
Strong
antimilitarist sentiment remained in Japanese public
opinion,
however, especially in the opposition parties. Nakasone
chose a
compromise solution, gradually building up the SDF and
steadily
increasing defense spending while guarding against being
drawn
beyond self-defense into collective security. In 1985 he
developed
the Mid-Term Defense Estimate
(see Missions
, this ch.).
Although
that program had general public backing, its goals could
not be met
while retaining the ceiling of 1 percent of GNP on
military
spending, which still had strong public support. At first
the
government tried to get around the problem by deferring
payment,
budgeting only the initial costs of major military
hardware. But by
late 1986, it had become obvious that the 1 percent
ceiling had to
be superseded. Thus, on January 24, 1987, in an
extraordinary night
meeting, the cabinet abandoned this ceiling. A March 1987
Asahi
Shimbun [Tokyo] poll indicated that this move was made
in
defiance of public opinion: only 15 percent approved the
removal of
the ceiling and 61 percent disapproved. But a January 1988
poll
conducted by the Office of the Prime Minister reported
that 58
percent approved the defense budget of 1.004 percent of
GNP for
fiscal year
(FY--see Glossary) 1987.
During 1987 the Japanese government reviewed ways in
which it
could assist friendly forces in protecting shipping in the
Persian
Gulf. Several possibilities were seriously considered,
including
sending minesweepers to the gulf. But, in the end, the
government
determined that sending any military forces to the gulf
would be
unacceptable to the Japanese people. Instead, the Japanese
government agreed to fund the installation of radio
navigation
guides for gulf shipping.
Appreciation of the SDF continued to grow in the 1980s,
with
over half of the respondents in a 1988 survey voicing an
interest
in the SDF and over 76 percent indicating that they were
favorably
impressed. Although the majority (63.5 percent) of
respondents were
aware that the primary purpose of the SDF was maintenance
of
national security, an even greater number (77 percent) saw
disaster
relief as the most useful SDF function. The SDF therefore
continued
to devote much of its time and resources to disaster
relief and
other civic action. Between 1984 and 1988, at the request
of
prefectural governors, the SDF assisted in approximately
3,100
disaster relief operations, involving about 138,000
personnel,
16,000 vehicles, 5,300 aircraft, and 120 ships and small
craft. In
addition, the SDF participated in earthquake disaster
prevention
operations and disposed of a large quantity of World War
II
explosive ordnance, especially in Okinawa. The forces also
participated in public works projects, cooperated in
managing
athletic events, took part in annual Antarctic
expeditions, and
conducted aerial surveys to report on ice conditions for
fishermen
and on geographic formations for construction projects.
Especially
sensitive to maintaining harmonious relations with
communities
close to defense bases, the SDF built new roads,
irrigation
networks, and schools in those areas. Soundproofing was
installed
in homes and public buildings near airfields. Despite
these
measures, local resistance to military installations
remained
strong in some areas.
Data as of January 1994
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