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Japan Strategic Considerations
The expansion of military capabilities in the Soviet
Far East
beginning in 1970 was of grave concern to Japan, and
Japanese
authorities regularly monitored the activities of the
Soviet
Pacific Fleet and Soviet aircraft in the waters and air
space
around Japan. Despite a general lessening of world
tensions and
Soviet overtures for improved bilateral relations, in 1990
the
Soviet Union still maintained a variety of units,
including a
division headquarters, on the southernmost Kuril Islands
claimed by
Japan as its Northern Territories. The Soviet Union also
operated
about 100 major surface war ships and 140 submarines
(about
seventy-five nuclear powered) out of Vladivostok and other
Pacific
ports. Soviet naval combatants passed through the Soya,
Tsugaru,
and Korea straits and sailed in the Sea of Japan, in the
Sea of
Okhotsk, and in Pacific Ocean areas adjacent to Japan
(see
fig. 1).
Japan also was within range of Tu-22M Backfire bombers and
sea- and
air-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons
based in
the Soviet Union. However, with the breakup of the Soviet
Union in
1991 and Russia's preoccupation with domestic economic and
political problems, Japan has become more concerned about
Russia's
contributing to a stepped-up global arms trade and nuclear
proliferation than about any direct threat from Russia's
military
forces.
An area of greater strategic interest to Japan is the
Korean
Peninsula. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(North Korea)
and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) have remained
implacable
enemies since the Korean War, and the border between them
is one of
the most heavily fortified in the world. Stable and
peaceful
relations between the two Koreas are considered vital to
Japan's
interests: an outbreak of hostilities would involve United
States
forces stationed in Japan, presenting political and
possibly
security problems for the nation, in addition to
interrupting its
flourishing trade with South Korea. Although Japan
maintains formal
diplomatic relations only with South Korea, it has refused
to
contribute to that nation's defense, stating that any aid
to a
foreign military establishment would violate its own
constitution.
North Korea's attempts to develop nuclear weapons
coupled with
its capability to target Japan with any weapon that it
developed,
is a matter of great concern to Japanese military
strategists. In
May 1993, North Korea test fired a Nodong-1
intermediate-range
ballistic missile with a 1,000-kilometer range in the Sea
of Japan,
showing that it had the capability to strike Japan.
Events on the Asian mainland could also affect Japan.
From the
early 1970s, China possessed a nuclear force capable of
striking
Japan and a large standing army and substantial navy, even
though
the navy is geared primarily to coastal defense. China
itself is
unlikely to present a direct military threat to Japan, but
Chinese
internal unrest or China's conflicts with its neighbors
could have
an indirect impact on Japanese security and trade
(see Trade and Investment Relations
, ch. 5).
The nation is vitally dependent on maintaining access
to
regional and worldwide shipping lanes and fishing areas,
but it is
incapable of defending the sea routes on which it relied.
Its
energy supplies came primarily from Middle Eastern
sources, and its
tankers had to pass through the Indian Ocean, the Strait
of
Malacca, and the South China Sea, making them vulnerable
to
hostilities in Southeast Asia. Vulnerability to
interception of
oceangoing trade remained the country's greatest strategic
weakness. Efforts to overcome this weakness, beginning
with Prime
Minister Suzuki Zenko's statement in May 1981 that Japan
would
attempt to defend its sea lines of communication (SLOC) to
a
distance of 1,000 nautical miles, met with controversy.
Within the
Defense Agency itself, some viewed a role for the MSDF in
defending
the SLOC as "unrealistic, unauthorized, and impossible."
Even the
strongest supporters of this program allowed that
constitutional
and other legal restrictions would limit active
participation of
the MSDF to cases where Japan was under direct attack.
Japan could,
however, provide surveillance assistance, intelligence
sharing, and
search-and-rescue support to United States naval forces.
Japan's small size, its geographically concentrated
industry,
and the close proximity of potentially hostile powers all
render
the country vulnerable to a major nuclear strike. As for
defense
against conventional aggression, strategy is determined by
the
nation's elongated insular geography, its mountainous
terrain, and
the nearness of the Asian mainland. The terrain favors
local
defense against invasion by ground forces, but protection
of the
approximately 15,800-kilometer coastline of the four main
islands
would present unique problems in the event of a
large-scale
invasion. Potentially hostile aircraft and missile bases
are so
close that timely warning even by radar facilities might
be
difficult to obtain.
Maneuver space is limited to such an extent that ground
defenses would have to be virtually in place at the onset
of
hostilities. No point of the country is more than 150
kilometers
from the sea. Moreover, the straits separating Honshu from
the
other main islands restrict the rapid movement of troops
from one
island to another, even though all major islands are now
connected
by bridges and tunnels. Within each island, mountain
barriers and
narrow roads restrict troop and supply movements. The key
strategic
region is densely populated and highly industrialized
central
Honshu, particularly the area from Tokyo to Kobe
(see Physical Setting
, ch. 2).
Data as of January 1994
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