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Libya
OPPOSITION TO QADHAFI
It was not surprising that opposition arose to the rapid radical
changes ushered in by the Qadhafi regime. The wealthy, the privileged,
and the traditional tribal and religious elites resented their
postrevolutionary loss of power. The ranks of the opposition also
grew to include sections of the armed forces, university students,
intellectuals and technocrats, and even some of the new political
and tribal leaders who clashed with the core elite for one reason
or another.
For its part, the revolutionary regime made it clear from the
outset that it would brook no opposition. Opposition from political
parties or other interest groups was viewed as harmful to national
unity. Speaking in October 1969, Qadhafi stated that Libya needed
"national unity free of party activities and division" and that
"he who engages in party activities commits treason." The December
1969 Decision on the Protection of the Revolution, the Penal Code,
and Law No. 71 of 1972 rendered political party activities a crime
and formed a strict legal injunction against unauthorized political
activity, particularly if such activity should physically threaten
the state. Insulting the Constitution or popular authorities and
joining a nonpolitical international society without permission
were both punishable by imprisonment. Attempting to change the
government or the Constitution through force, propagandizing theories
or principles aimed at such action, and forming an illegal group
were crimes punishable by death. One of the basic points of the
cultural revolution, declared in April 1973, called for the repression
of communism and conservatism. Also to be repressed were capitalism,
atheism, and the secretive Muslim Brotherhood (see Glossary).
Despite legal strictures and physical attempts to nullify opposition,
there has been resistance to the revolutionary regime. The discovery
of a plot involving two cabinet ministers (lieutenant colonels
who were not RCC members) was announced in December 1969. A second
plot, allegedly based in Fezzan and involving a distant cousin
of former King Idris, was discovered in July 1970. Participation
of foreign mercenaries was alleged in both cases (see Qadhafi
and the Revolutionary Command Council , ch. 1). Other resistance
has been encountered from traditional tribal leaders who have
not welcomed their own displacement by modernizing technocrats,
government administrators, people's committees, and popular congresses.
Numerous technocrats and other elements of the urban population
opposed Qadhafi's emphasis on religion. Traditional Islamic religious
leaders also opposed Qadhafi's approach to Islam because its uniquely
personal and fundamentalist nature superseded their intermediary
position and interpretive function. As in many other developing
countries, aspects of the modernization process--such as education
and mass communications-- also result in impatience and dissatisfaction
with the ruling regime. Increased education and exposure to the
mass media were intended to inculcate Libyan citizens with patriotism
and loyalty to the regime; however, through education and the
media, Libyans also were informed of standards of living and political
freedoms enjoyed elsewhere in the world. Exposure to the media
created rising expectations that probably increased demands on
the government rather than increasing support for it through propaganda.
Data as of 1987
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