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Libya
Summary and Trends in 1987
Despite the fact that Qadhafi has established an elaborate and
complex system of overlapping institutions to foster public representation
and "direct democracy," the Libyan regime in 1987 was still controlled
by a small group of powerful men. Although no official leadership
hierarchy delineated the relative power of these top leaders,
Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi was de facto chief of state without
holding such a title. He remained the primary decision maker and
continued to act as the supreme commander of the armed forces,
the Leader of the Revolution, and its founding father and foremost
theoretician. Dr. Miftah al Usta Umar, Secretary of the General
People's Congress, theoretically served as the chief of state.
Abdel Salaam Jallud continued to be identified as Libya's number
two man, despite doubts raised by his three-month stay in Syria.
His return to Libya in early March 1987, however, indicated that
rumors of a rift with Qadhafi were exaggerated.
The most recent government shuffle, taking place in early March
1987, entailed the replacement of Jadallah Azzuz at Talhi as Secretary
General of the General People's Committee (a position corresponding
to prime minister). His successor, Umar al Muntasir, who served
previously as secretary of industries, was little known outside
Libya. The Libyan news agency JANA announced that Talhi had replaced
Kamal Hassan Mansur as secretary of foreign liaison (corresponding
to foreign minister).
Outside the formal government or cabinet structure, the most
important figures of the Libyan regime, in addition to Jallud,
included Armed Forces Chief of Staff Abu Bakr Yunis, Inspector
General of the Armed Forces Mustafa Kharrubi, and Colonel Khuwayldi
al Hamidi, head of the "shock force" of the revolutionary committees
tasked with suppressing political dissent. All of these men were
among the twelve founders of the Free Officers Movement, whose
members seized power in September 1969. And, following the purges
in the aftermath of a 1975 coup attempt, they were the only original
members of the original twelve Free Officers Movement who remained
in power. The cohesion of this inner core has continued with little
or no sign of conflict or dissension.
Prominent among the revolutionary committees' young radicals
was Musa Kusa, who was in charge of the International Revolutionary
Committee (sometimes called the Libyan World Center for Resistance
to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reaction, and Fascism). Qadhafi's
cousin, Ahmad Qadhafadam, played a prominent role in actions against
"stray dogs," i.e., Libyans opposed to Qadhafi who were outside
the country and were targets for assassination. Finally, Khalifa
Hunaysh headed the presidential guard, a group that safeguarded
Qadhafi.
The regime faced tumultuous internal crises in 1987. The military
establishment was disgruntled and demoralized by the war in Chad,
economic problems were exacerbated by the world oil glut, and
disputes among certain key regime figures threatened to erode
Qadhafi's personal power base (see Growth and Structure of the
Economy , ch. 3; State of Internal Security , ch. 5). A rift between
Colonel Hassan Ishkal (also seen as Eshkal), military commander
of the oil-rich central region and a long-time friend of Qadhafi,
and Hunaysh, culminated in Ishkal's death under mysterious circumstances
in Tripoli on November 24, 1986. Although the facts were not definitively
established, foreign observers believed that Ishkal, who was Qadhafi's
cousin, was killed by supporters of Khanish. Significantly, both
men were members of Qadhafi's tribe-- the Qadhafadam--upon which
Qadhafi has relied increasingly in recent years. But after the
daily newspaper Jamahiriyah vehemently criticized the
Qadhafadam tribe, the Libyan leader decided to distance himself
from his kin. Foreign observers believed that unless intratribal
conflicts were kept within manageable limits, yet another crucial
base of Qadhafi's support would be eroded. The question arose
as to how many domestic interest groups the regime could afford
to alienate before it was left with no support.
Unlike many leaders, who, when confronted by mounting threats
to regime stability, adopted a conservative and cautious approach
to consolidate their grip on power, Qadhafi met threats with further
changes. Qadhafi had often launched new domestic or foreign political
initiatives to distract attention from domestic crises, and in
view of this record, further political change came as no surprise.
On November 3, 1986, Az Zahf al Akhdar (The Green March),
the mouthpiece of the revolutionary committees, carried a long
article, probably written by Qadhafi, which surprisingly argued
the urgent need to form a new political party. In an astonishing
assertion, the article indicated that such a new political party
would replace the people's congresses. According to the article,
the people's congresses should be "crushed" because of "exploitation,
stealing, monopoly, haughtiness, domination, favoritism, tribalism,
reactionism, and corruption" among the masses, which they represented.
The statement was apparently motivated by recognition of the need
to purge the GPC and the people's congresses of elements who voiced
their opposition to some of Qadhafi's policies.
In the opinion of informed observers, Qadhafi's practical political
decision making contradicted his political theories. For ideological
reasons, he genuinely wanted the masses to evolve into a self-governing
polity. For pragmatic reasons, however, he vetoed popular policies
with which he disagreed, using the rationale that he was protecting
the people from "opportunists" and "counterrevolutionaries." However,
such paternalistic intervention contravened the very political
process Qadhafi advocated by preventing the masses from reaching
the stage of true self- reliance, Qadhafi's ostensible goal.
Despite these shortcomings, however, it seemed clear that the
basic goal of direct democracy had been achieved to some extent.
Certainly, most Libyans were better represented than they had
been under the monarchy. By the late 1980s, there were many opportunities
for the populace to participate in the political process and to
influence the planning and regulations that affected their daily
life. On occasion, the populace have succeeded in revising or
changing national policy. For example, faced with the strong opposition
of the 1984 GPC, Qadhafi conceded that military training of women
would not require women to move away from home. In addition, "people's
power" did provide for some genuine debate and consultation on
most local and many regional matters. The jamahiriya
system gave people experience in the exercise of responsibility
that had largely been denied them in the past, if only because
Qadhafi, whether or not by choice, did not wield absolute dictatorial
power.
Qadhafi's power and his ability to veto citizens' wishes was
circumscribed to some extent by the General Secretariat, which
challenged his views. Moreover, Qadhafi's frequent resignations
did not gain him many concessions from his colleagues. As Raymond
Hinnebusch pointed out, the fact that Qadhafi felt the need to
resort to such measures or threats indicated that policy decisions
were taken by a majority vote and that Qadhafi could be defied.
Although popular participation and self-representation in Libya's
government have increased, there are clearly limits to how much
control citizens can ultimately exert over their government. On
the one hand, Qadhafi has set limits to the extent of dissent
he will permit. Qadhafi created the revolutionary committees specifically
to counteract growing people's power. And, just as the Chinese
Cultural Revolution degenerated into chaos because of the excesses
of the Red Guards, Libya's own Cultural Revolution, in its quest
to remold society according to Qadhafi's idiosyncratic vision
of a pure Islam, may culminate in similar disruptions and upheavals.
As of late 1987, however, the Libyan case had been far less radical,
with markedly less violence. On the other hand, the implementation
of the direct democracy is predicated on the assumption of sustained
political interest and sound judgment that may be unrealistic
for many of the citizenry. For example, women's participation
in the political system was still at a low level in 1987, despite
official encouragement of their participation. Nevertheless, as
a unique type of direct popular democracy, the jamahiriya experiment
was not likely to be of more than fleeting interest for policy
makers, political theorists, and, those concerned with Third World
development. Lillian Craig Harris suggested that although Qadhafi's
utopian and simplistic The Green Book will not survive
his tenure, the fact that he has so radically changed the Libyan
political order indicates that at least some vestiges of his philosophy
will endure indefinitely.
Although the ideal of greater public participation in government
through direct democracy had appeal as a theory, Qadhafi was not
been able to implement it practically; therefore, Libya's extremely
complicated and inefficient system of government was not likely
to be emulated. One reason for the incredible, and growing, complexity
of the Libyan political system was that new structures were frequently
superimposed on already existing ones without the elimination
or even simplification of the existing structures. As a result
of blurred lines of authority and responsibility, problems of
cooperation and coordination between different parts of institutions
have arisen. In the late 1970s, for instance, there were tensions
between the ASU and the popular committees. Later, in the 1980s,
friction developed between the revolutionary committees on the
one hand and the army and people's congresses on the other. In
view of the extremely rapid pace of political and socioeconomic
change, it seemed evident that the jamahiriya system
needed time to mature.
Qadhafi's revolutionary transformations have outpaced government
institution-building and the citizen's political absorptive capacity,
causing widespread reaction and rejection of his plans. The GPC
in 1977 rejected Qadhafi's plan to dismantle the government (the
presidency, the cabinet, and other political and administrative
structures). The 1983 GPC called for more moderate changes at
a slower rate. Similarly, the 1984 GPC rejected Qadhafi's proposals
to enlist women in the armed forces, to revise the law to give
women equal rights in divorce, and to abolish elementary schools
in favor of parental tutoring. As of April 1987, the second and
third of these proposals appeared to have been put aside while
a compromise was worked out regarding the highly controversial
issue of women's military training in locations far from home.
The preceding examples underline the resilience of traditions
and traditional culture, including Islamic values and teachings
(see Religious Life , ch. 2). Much to Qadhafi's chagrin, various
aspects of traditional culture have proved to be too deeply rooted
to permit the elite to sweep them aside easily. Therefore, Qadhafi's
impatience at what he considers an unduly slow pace of change
will probably continue for a long time. From this standpoint,
the whole edifice of political and socioeconomic change wrought
by the Libyan revolutionary elite under the guidance of Qadhafi
still appears rather fragile. The post-Qadhafi era may go in directions
very different from, and at odds with, at least some of the basic
ideological features espoused by the previous elite. The real
challenge facing Qadhafi was whether he could transform his revolution
from above into a truly broad-based and popular mass revolution.
Data as of 1987
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