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Libya
Arab Relations
Qadhafi has been a leading proponent of Arab unity (qawmiya),
calling for a union that would stretch from the Persian Gulf to
the Atlantic Ocean. He believes that the members of such a union
would have complementary resources: oil and other minerals, manpower,
and space for population expansion. Apparently, Qadhafi views
this union as taking the form of a strong federation, similar
to those of the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than
as a unitary state. Qadhafi has said that "it is ironic to see
that Americans and Soviets, who are not of the same origin, have
come together to create united federations, while the Arabs, who
are of the same race and religion, have so far failed to realize
the most cherished goal of the present Arab generation." Whether
each Arab country's borders are considered sacrosanct or "natural"
in some historical sense, over time, particularistic nationalisms
have proved too powerful to be superseded by Arab unity.
Pursuing unity on a step-by-step basis, Qadhafi has sponsored
or joined ill-fated mergers with Egypt, Syria, and, most recently,
Morocco. He also has called on Sudan, Algeria, and other countries
to participate in unity schemes. Since 1969 there have been seven
unity attempts, all except one initiated by Libya. Less than four
months after Qadhafi's coup d'état, Libya joined Egypt and Sudan
in signing on December 27, 1969, the Tripoli Charter, which called
for the formation of a "flexible federation." On January 1, 1972,
the Federation of Arab Republics, consisting of Egypt, Syria,
and Libya came into existence. Yet another merger, accepted in
principle in August 1972, between Egypt and Libya theoretically
took effect on September 1, 1973. The union failed, however, because
of disagreements over the timing and objectives of war and diplomatic
alternatives to the conflict with Israel. In early 1974, a merger
of Libya and Tunisia was proclaimed, only to be repudiated two
days later by President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia. Looking once
again toward the Mashriq (see Glossary), Qadhafi and President
Hafiz al Assad of Syria proclaimed a unity of their two countries
on September 10, 1980. In 1987, however, the unity provisions
existed only on paper because neither side was willing to surrender
its sovereignty.
Turning his attention to his weak neighbor to the south, Qadhafi
in 1981 proposed a merger plan with Chad. Goukouni Oueddei, then
in power in N'Djamena, rejected the proposal and this merger plan,
like all previous plans, failed to materialize. Since then, Libya's
involvement in the Chadian civil war has deepened (see Invasion
of Chad , ch. 5).
Obsessed by the goal of pan-Arab unity, Qadhafi tirelessly, albeit
thus far ineffectively, continued to seek partners. On August
13, 1984, a marriage of convenience between Libya and Morocco
was consummated with the signing of the Oujda treaty. At the time
of the treaty, Qadhafi was at odds with all the Arab states except
Syria and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen),
so the agreement signaled an end to Libyan isolation and revived
Qadhafi's ambitions of pan-Arab leadership. The treaty also restored
Qadhafi's hope of extending the union to include Algeria and Tunisia
as well as Syria. Such a scheme, he thought, could be the nucleus
of a more complete pan-Arab union. Not surprisingly, dissolution
of this union came as abruptly as its formation. The visit of
Shimon Peres, Israel's prime minister, to Morocco in July 1986
provided the main reason for the estrangement (also see Maghrib
Relations , this ch.).
Despite the failure of unification attempts, Qadhafi condemn
Arab leaders who for various reasons opposed such schemes. Because
they worked against his purported goal of achieving unity, Qadhafi's
resorts to subversion, threats, and meddling in the internal affairs
of others proved unsuccessful and costly. Qadhafi's methods have
alienated potential cooperators, frightened possible Arab union
candidates, and, in the last analysis, isolated Libya in regional
affairs. With ambitions of their own, and with differing agendas
and priorities, Arab governments have learned, at best, to tolerate
the Libyan leader. Many resent his self-appointed role as philosopher-leader
of all Arabs. Few, if any, are by temperament given to impetuousness;
therefore, they oppose Qadhafi's sudden radical policy shifts.
Nevertheless, the pan-Arab thesis championed by Qadhafi, that
strength increases with unity, is still valid. It is also widely
shared as a goal among Arabs, notwithstanding the aforementioned
difficulties.
Data as of 1987
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