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Libya
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Paralleling the swift and fundamental domestic transformations
Qadhafi initiated upon coming to power in 1969 were equally radical
and controversial foreign policy changes. King Idris had been
proWestern , quiescent if not passive, and scarcely interested
in panArab issues. Qadhafi, in contrast, was markedly anti-Western,
highly activist, and a strong advocate of Arab unity. Although
Qadhafi's internal policies could be ignored or tolerated by the
rest of the world, regardless of their radicalism, his foreign
policies elicited strong resentment and widespread condemnation
from many quarters. Even the so-called "progressive" or revolutionary
regimes in Algeria, Iraq, and Syria that supported some of Qadhafi's
policies opposed his maladroit diplomacy, rhetorical excess, and
provocative tactics.
Allegations of Qadhafi's involvement in subversive activities
were numerous (see International Terrorism and Support for Insurgent
Groups , ch. 5). Over the years, Libya has been accused of subversion
by several Arab countries, including Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. For example, Libyan agents reportedly
planned on several occasions to disrupt the pilgrimage at Mecca
in Saudi Arabia. And for many years Libya supported the mostly
Christian rebels in southern Sudan, who are led by John Garang,
as against the central government in Khartoum. Many observers
linked Libya's lack of restraint in foreign affairs with its oil
wealth, which paid for foreign adventures while keeping the domestic
population content.
By disregarding the rules of the international political game,
Libya became so ostracized and isolated that when the United States
bombed Libyan cities in April 1986, only a few countries condemned
the action strongly. Potential friends in the Arab world were
already alienated by the constantly changing pattern of Libyan
alliances.
Nevertheless, Libya was subject to certain practical limitations.
Its oil revenues were dependent on the world market and subject
to inflationary pressures. Although well armed, Libya's military
was undermanned, unable in most cases to support foreign policy
initiatives by force. Libyan foreign policy was not so erratic
and disjointed as it appeared, however. Instead, it was consistent
with, and in large part based on, the initially proclaimed ideals
of the Revolution and the developments that followed (see Political
Ideology , this ch.).
Libyan foreign policy grew from the historical legacy of colonial
domination, Nasser's philosophy, and most important, the creation
of Israel. Qadhafi's concept of foreign relations has been determined
to a large extent by his implacable hatred of Israel and his desire
to destroy it. The policy of eradicating Israel either shapes
or takes precedence over his ideology. For example, Qadhafi advocates
Arab unity not only for ideological reasons, but because of his
conviction that a unified Arab nation would be capable of defeating
Israel militarily.
Qadhafi's worldwide support of revolutionary and insurgent movements
evolved in part from the sponsorship and funding he provided to
Palestinian organizations that fought against Israel. Moreover,
Qadhafi's antipathy toward imperialism derives less from Libya's
struggle against Italian colonialism than from the perceived creation
of Israel by the United States and European powers. And, although
Qadhafi espouses nonalignment, he has advocated a close Arab relationship
with the Soviet Union as a means of obtaining arms to defeat Israel
and excoriated the United States because of its support of Israel.
Libyan foreign policy is not, however, dictated entirely by opposition
to Israel. Libya's activism in Africa and the Mediterranean basin
is motivated by a desire to be a regional power. In the 1980s,
Libya's reckless and adventurous intervention in the Third World
was driven by QQadhafi's desire to disseminate his Third Universal
Theory and his personal aspirations for worldwide recognition.
Data as of 1987
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