MongoliaThe Mongolian Army, 1921-68
Headquarters of Mongolian partisan army,
March 1921, near Altanbulag
Courtesy Institute of Party History, Ulaanbaatar
Early Development
The provisional national government in March 1921 declared
that every male in the country, regardless of class, must perform
military service. This compulsory service included the large
numbers of monks and others who traditionally had been exempt,
although in practice monks were not conscripted during the 1920s.
The new government also proclaimed that it could declare war,
negotiate peace, and determine budgets. A Mongolian-Russian
accord signed on November 5, 1921, provided Russian assistance in
organizing a regular army and in conducting training. In
addition, special Comintern representatives eventually set up a
military council in the government and propagated militant
communism. Thus began a continuing close military association
between the Soviet Union and Mongolia, which has endured with
varying intensity through 1989
(see Foreign Relations
, ch. 4).
This association helped to communize and modernize Mongolia, as
well as to provide the Soviet Union with a loyal ally and a
buffer against Japan and later China.
In the early 1920s, Russian White Guard remnants remained as
brigands in remote parts of Mongolia, and Chinese bandits and
detachments of warlord armies constantly encroached upon the
borders. Thus one of the first orders of business for the new
Mongolian government was to establish a strong and politically
reliable army. To help suppress White Guard remnants and Chinese
bandits and to carry out Comintern policy, detachments of the
Soviet Red Army remained in Mongolia at least until 1925.
Thereafter, until the revolts of the early 1930s and the Japanese
border probes beginning in the mid-1930s, Red Army troops in
Mongolia amounted to little more than instructors and guards for
diplomatic and trading installations.
The development and politicization of the Mongolian People's
Army became an essential element of the Comintern's plan for
Mongolia. As early as August 1921, the Main Political
Administration of the army was established to supervise the work
of the political commissars and the party cells in all army
units, and to act as a political link between the Central
Committee of the Mongolian People's Party and the army
(see Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
, ch. 4). This
politicization of the army served not only to ensure its loyalty,
but also that of the government at large. Up to one-third of the
soldiers were members of the party, which became the Mongolian
People's Revolutionary Party in 1924; still others belonged to
the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League. The army received up to
60 percent of the government budget in these early years, and it
expanded from 2,560 men in 1923 to 4,000 in 1924, and to 17,000
by 1927. The more leftist members of the government, who also
were prominent in the party, tended to be connected with the army
as well, which made the army an important political force in the
1920s. With the close cooperation of the Red Army and the
Mongolian and Soviet secret police, purges of rightists and
nationalists were conducted, and the Buddhist theocracy was
severely curtailed.
Most of the Altanbulag revolutionaries--soldiers and
politicians alike--appear to have been more nationalist than
communist. Choybalsan and a few of his immediate associates were
exceptions. From an early age, Choybalsan had been Russian-
oriented by schooling and communist-influenced by Bolsheviks at
the Russian consular compound and print shop in Yihe Huree. In
the early 1920s, however, the nationalists either became
communists or were purged. Choybalsan's close cooperation with
Comintern agents and the Soviet Union enabled him to survive to
become premier.
Horloogiyn Dandzan, another member of the original Altanbulag
government, succeeded Sukhe Bator as minister of war and
commander in chief of the army when Sukhe Bator died in 1923.
With the growth of the Mongolian People's Army and the reduction
of the Soviet garrison, Dandzan thought he had sufficient power
to opt for a Mongolian nationalist policy. Dandzan's anti-Soviet
remarks to the Third Party Congress in 1924, however, led to his
arrest by armed Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League members,
directed by Choybalsan. His trial and execution were completed
within twenty-four hours, and Choybalsan was elevated to
commander in chief of the army. The portfolio of minister of war
was given to Sandagdargiyn (Khatan Baatar) Majsarjab, a
revolutionary military hero who had secured western Mongolia for
the government. Members of the new top command, however, did not
have the supreme authority enjoyed by Sukhe Bator and Dandzan.
Comintern agents, many of whom were Russian-trained Buryat
Mongols (see Glossary)
acting either as advisers or as actual
administrators, were the real power in the government, which was
backed by the secret police and by the Red Army. They instituted
organizational changes that effectively attenuated the authority
exercised by Majsarjab and by Choybalsan.
The Military Council was inserted in the chain of command
between the Presidium of the National Great Hural and Council of
Ministers and the minister of war. The council was headed by a
Buryat Comintern agent, and its members were among the more
trustworthy leftists. Furthermore, interposed between the
commander in chief of the army and his staff departments was a
Soviet general as chief of the general staff. Thus restricted,
the Mongolian military leadership would have had difficulty
becoming deviationist even if it had chosen to. Majsarjab may
have tried, for he soon was executed, but Choybalsan displayed
complete loyalty to the Soviets. He succeeded Majsarjab as
minister of war and continued his rise. In 1926 Choybalsan was a
member of both the Central Committee and the Presidium of the
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.
Even with substantial Soviet assistance, organizing and
training the Mongolian army in the 1920s was a frustrating
experience for both the Soviets and the Mongolians. It helped
that the recruits were excellent riders and good shots. The
training base of experienced soldiers, however, initially was
little better than it had been ten years before when the Russians
first attempted to train Mongolian soldiers. The illiteracy rate
of 90 percent among the population at large must have been
reflected among the recruits. Venereal disease, tuberculosis, and
trachoma were endemic. About one-third of the men of military age
were monks exempt from military service in the 1920s. The young
nomads who were conscripted were resentful of military
discipline, were passive by conditioning, and were influenced
against military service by the monks. Finally, the building of
the army had to be carried out along with the simultaneous
suppression of revolts in the Hovd and the Uliastay areas of
western Mongolia in the 1922-23 and the 1925-26 periods and along
with guarding the borders against the encroachments of Chinese
bandits and warlord armies.
From the beginning, the army consisted of a cadre of regulars
augmented by short-term conscripts, who were trained and returned
to their homes as part of a reserve pool from which they could be
mobilized when needed. In the beginning, both regulars and
conscripts frequently deserted; a deserter was virtually
impossible to apprehend in the steppes or the mountains.
Initially, training of conscripts lasted only three months
before they returned home. Although the training period was
short, it was an effort to bring as many men as possible under
the unifying and modernizing influence of military training and
political indoctrination. Administration of conscription and the
conduct of post-service military training were delegated to
aymag (see Glossary)
and to somon councils. Those
eighteen years and older were conscripted locally and were sent
either to the capital or to one of the principal garrison towns.
Upon completion of their three-month training period, they
returned to their native districts, where they were to reassemble
every three years for refresher training and maneuvers. The
population, however, still was largely nomadic and constantly on
the move, and the administrative structure of the subdivisions
was rudimentary and inefficient at best. Because individuals were
hard to locate--if indeed they were known to exist--initial and
retraining call-ups were hard to enforce.
By 1926 the government hoped to train 10,000 conscripts
annually and to increase the training period to six months.
Chinese intelligence reports in 1927 indicated that between
40,000 and 50,000 reservists could be mustered at short notice.
These reports greatly overestimated the mobilization potential of
the Mongolian army. In the fall of 1929, a general mobilization
was called to test the training and reserve systems. The expected
turnout was 30,000, but only 2,000 presented themselves. This
fiasco prompted several changes and reforms. A new Soviet chief
adviser arrived early the following year to aid in enforcing
military service, but his unpopularity provoked an assassination
attempt. The Military Council was reorganized, and in September,
when the National Great Hural met, it strengthened the military
service enforcement provisions of the legal code
(see Government Structure
, ch. 4). These actions, together with new laws that
abolished all but a few monasteries--returning monks to civilian
life, prohibiting young men from becoming monks, and making them
available for conscription--laid the foundation for an effective
army.
By the end of the 1920s, despite its deficiencies, an army
with some cohesion and effectiveness had been established by
Soviet instructors and Mongolian leaders through both patient
efforts and draconian measures. The groundwork was laid for an
army that was to put down the popular revolts of the early 1930s
despite some disaffection, to meet the challenge--with its Soviet
allies--of large-scale border clashes initiated by the Japanese,
and finally to mount the invasions of Manchuria and Inner
Mongolia in 1945. In March 1925, an aviation branch was formed
with four aircraft; the anniversary of this event continues to be
celebrated annually as Mongolian Aviation Day. By 1927 the army,
almost exclusively cavalry, numbered about 17,000 mounted troops,
and it boasted more than 200 heavy machine guns, 50 mountain
howitzers, 30 field guns, and 2 armored cars. The basic unit was
the 2,000-man cavalry regiment of three squadrons. Each 600-plus-
man squadron had five companies, a machine gun company, and an
engineer unit. Cavalry regiments were organized into larger
units--brigades or divisions--which included artillery and
service support units. The chief characteristic of this force was
mobility over the great distances of Mongolia; small mounted
units were able to cover more than 160 kilometers in 24 hours.
Data as of June 1989
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