MongoliaInternal Discord and War with Japan
Detail of mosaic commemorating the
Mongolian-Soviet victory over Japan in 1939, Ulaanbaatar
Courtesy Steve Mann
In the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the army frequently
was called on to put down widespread popular revolts led by
nobles and monks
(see Purges of the Opposition, 1928-32
, ch. 1).
The revolts erupted from a basic feeling of nationalism
(particularly in western Mongolia), from opposition to the pro-
Soviet line, and from the government's extreme measures in
forcing collectivization of stock raising and harsh actions
against the monks. The revolts culminated in an uprising by 13
detachments of more than 3,000 troops in April 1932; it was put
down by the Mongolian army, assisted by a large Soviet Red Army
force. By the mid-1930s, the communist government had suppressed
the insurgency. It then decided that a more reliable army was
necessary, both for internal security and for actions as a
forward screen for Soviet troop deployment in the event of a
Japanese invasion.
As the army recovered from the revolt, it began rebuilding.
The number of young Mongolians on active duty increased annually.
During this period, the army acted as an important unifier of the
population, in effect supplanting the liquidated monasteries in
this role. In striving for national reinvigoration, the army's
military role was less important than its social and political
roles. A Soviet observer wrote that the army taught the soldier
to read and write the national language and converted him into a
politically aware soldier-citizen. Soviet arms and military
equipment were provided to the expanding army, and Soviet
officers acted not only as instructors, but also as unit advisers
and commanders. These arrangements were formalized first in
November 1934, when a Mongolian-Soviet "gentlemen's agreement"
was reached in Moscow to provide for mutual assistance in the
event of attack. This accord was unpublished, because Moscow
still nominally recognized the Chinese government
(see Economic Gradualism and National Defense, 1932-45
, ch. 1).
Monasticism directly inhibited military buildup. Therefore,
it was imperative that the monasteries be dealt with. During the
period of the "leftist deviation" in the early 1930s, almost half
the monasteries had been closed. This policy was relaxed during
the insurrectionary period between 1933 and 1936, however, and
the monasteries were reopened. By 1936 the monastic population
had increased by 10,000 to more than 100,000--11 percent of the
total population and 35 percent of men of military age. This
drain adversely affected the government's ability to meet the
increasing personnel requirements both for defense and for
economic production. Monastic influence also perpetuated a
general lack of interest among the general population in
establishing an effective national army. The government,
therefore, undertook drastic measures against the monks.
Monasteries were taxed severely for each monk of military age who
did not respond to the military call-up. A law was passed
requiring the first son of every family to enter the army when of
age; the second son was to remain with the family to work; only
the third son was permitted to enter the monastery. Because few
Mongol families had more than two sons, this measure was
effective in diminishing the monastic population. Monastic power
was reduced, senior monks were liquidated, and monks of middle-
rank were imprisoned. Finally, ordinary monks were forced out of
the monasteries, which then were destroyed, and all monastic
livestock (10 to 15 percent of the national total) was
confiscated. By 1939 these repressive measures had ended
monasticism and had released a substantial reservoir of manpower
for military service and for the civilian economy.
Japan's occupation and annexation of neighboring Manchuria in
1931 left no doubt of Tokyo's long-range objectives in Northeast
Asia. A program of subversion among the Mongolians and of
agitation in support of pan-Mongolism was followed by minor
clashes along the Mongolian-Manchurian border in 1934 that
reached major intensity in 1935. After serious clashes with the
Japanese along the eastern Mongolian border in early 1935, a
conference of Mongolian and Japanese representatives was convened
in June at the Chinese border town of Manzhouli to settle border
demarcation and other matters. After six months without reaching
agreement, the effort was abandoned. On March 1, 1936, Josef
Stalin publicly and unequivocally stated that "If Japan should
venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach
upon its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian
People's Republic...just as we helped in 1921...." Two weeks
later, a Protocol Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance
reiterated the main provisions of the 1934 agreement. Apparently
the Soviets at the time were less concerned about Chinese
sensibilities than they had been earlier. The protocol was to run
for ten years; it provided for joint consultation and protective
action in the event of threat to either party by a third power,
for military assistance in the case of a third-power attack, and
for the stationing of troops in each other's territory as
necessary. Some Soviet troops had remained in Mongolia after the
suppression of the revolts; when Japan invaded northern China and
occupied Inner Mongolia, this treaty provided a basis for
increasing Soviet strength to a reinforced corps, the Fifty-
seventh Independent Rifle Corps.
In 1937 the Japanese invaded northern China, which enabled
Japanese forces to occupy the Inner Mongolian provinces of Qahar
and Suiyuan along Mongolia's southern border. This widened the
zone of contact between Mongolian and Japanese forces and
increased Mongolian security problems. Incidents continued along
the Mongolian borders with Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In July
1938, the Japanese Guandong (Kwantung in Wade-Giles romanization)
Army (the Japanese army in Manchuria, 1931-45) mounted a major,
yet unsuccessful, attack against Soviet positions in an
ambiguously demarcated area along the Manchurian-Siberian border
near Vladivostok. Frustrated along the Siberian border, Japan
turned the following year to the more vulnerable Mongolian
border, where it thought that subversion against the Mongolians
would pave the way.
Mongolia's easternmost portion is a salient jutting deep into
Manchuria
(see
fig. 1). A branch railroad runs from Changchun on
the Shenyang-Harbin railroad to within a few kilometers of the
border; on the other side of the frontier, the Halhin Gol runs
parallel to the border on the Mongolian side for about 70
kilometers. This area had been the scene of serious clashes in
early 1935. To facilitate military deployment into this
vulnerable area, the Soviet Union built a wide-gauge railroad,
completed in 1939, connecting the Chinese-Eastern railroad to the
Mongolian town of Choybalsan. The frequency of border clashes
increased until they occurred almost daily in this area during
1938 and early 1939. In early May 1939, Soviet foreign minister
Vyacheslav M. Molotov issued another stern warning to Japan: "I
give warning that the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic
will be defended by the USSR as vigorously as we shall defend our
own borders."
On May 11, 1939, the Japanese army occupied portions of
Mongolia between the border and the Halhin Gol. A combined
Mongolian-Soviet force quickly moved against the invaders. By the
end of May, the joint force had seized a bridgehead on the Halhin
Gol's eastern bank. To counter this move, the Japanese by early
July concentrated a corps of 38,000 troops and attacked the
northern flank of the Mongolian-Soviet bridgehead. The Japanese
drove the allies back across the Halhin Gol, crossed it
themselves, and established their own bridgehead on the western
bank. On July 5, 1939, Soviet armor counterattacked and
eliminated the Japanese bridgehead, after which both sides began
a major force buildup.
During July 1939, the Mongolian-Soviet forces were
reorganized. The Trans-Baykal Military District was set up as a
front headquarters, with the First Army Group under General
Georgi Zhukov as the striking force. Soviet forces were
concentrated in eastern Mongolia, and the Mongolian army
mobilized to its full strength of 80,000 in eight cavalry
divisions; the 515 aircraft of the combined force were used
mostly in screening the southern borders. Zhukov's First Army
Group included Mongolia's Sixth and Eighth Mongolian cavalry
divisions, both of which were employed as flank protection for
the army group along the 70-kilometer front on the Halhin Gol.
During July and early August, the Japanese forces, setting August
20, 1939, as the target date, prepared to cross the river and to
destroy the opposing forces.
The Japanese decision to attack must have been based on
faulty intelligence or on extreme overconfidence, because the
Japanese were weaker in infantry battalions by 30 percent, in
tanks by 60 percent, and in aircraft by 25 percent. Further,
Soviet intelligence was superior to the Japanese, because the
Soviets had detected the Japanese buildup for the attack and had
evidently correctly estimated its timing. At dawn August 20,
1939, the commander of the Mongolian-Soviet troops preempted the
Japanese attack: 150 bombers struck Japanese positions, rear
areas, and lines of communication. A ground attack by the
southern and the northern wings of the First Army Group
penetrated the Japanese flank with armor and infantry, and then
they turned inward in a classic double envelopment as Mongolian
cavalry protected the outer flanks.
The Japanese defended tenaciously, but by August 23 the
Soviets had encircled the Japanese forces along the Halhin Gol.
For five days, the Mongolian-Soviet forces beat back fierce
attacks by Japanese relief forces as well as attempts by the
surrounded units to break out. Japanese relief attempts
slackened, and pockets of resistance were cleared out. On August
31, 1939, the Mongolian-Soviet forces advanced to the frontier.
The Japanese conceded defeat and a cease-fire took effect on
September 16, 1939.
Soviet casualties came to nearly 10,000, and the Mongolians
lost 1,130. Japanese losses were far greater, with more than
18,000 killed and 25,000 wounded (some total estimates were as
high as 80,000). More than 170 guns and 200 aircraft were lost.
After the defeat, Japan turned its military thrust southward. On
June 9, 1940, an agreement fixing the Manchukuo-Mongolian border
was signed in Moscow. This was followed on April 13, 1941, by the
Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, which included a Soviet pledge
to recognize the territorial integrity of Manchukuo and a similar
Japanese pledge with respect to Mongolia. Germany's invasion of
the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the entry of the United States
into World War II in December fully committed the Soviet Union
and Japan to other flanks of their respective domains; thus,
their Mongolian flanks remained relatively quiet until the final
weeks of World War II.
Mongolia stayed mobilized, however, at the 80,000-troop level
to guard its frontiers and to discourage any further Japanese
incursion. Mongolia also devoted extensive resources to its part
of the 1936 mutual-assistance pact, providing the Soviet armed
forces with winter clothing, wool, hides, leather goods, meat,
and almost half a million ponies and horses for draft and remount
use from 1941 to 1945. The Mongolian people raised the money for
a brigade of tanks, named the Revolutionary Mongolian Tank
Brigade, and for a squadron of aircraft, named Mongolian
Herdsmen, presented to the Red Army. In August 1945, Mongolian
and Soviet forces joined in the invasion of Manchuria and Inner
Mongolia, destroyed the greatly weakened Japanese army, and
achieved Soviet political and military goals in northeastern
Asia.
Data as of June 1989
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