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Nicaragua United States Intervention, 1909-33
United States interest in Nicaragua, which had waned
during
the last half of the 1800s because of isolationist
sentiment
following the United States Civil War (1861-65), grew
again
during the final years of the Zelaya administration.
Angered by
the United States choice of Panama for the site of a
transisthmian canal, President Zelaya made concessions to
Germany
and Japan for a competing canal across Nicaragua.
Relations with
the United States deteriorated, and civil war erupted in
October
1909, when anti-Zelaya liberals joined with a group of
conservatives under Juan Estrada to overthrow the
government. The
United States broke diplomatic relations with the Zelaya
administration after two United States mercenaries serving
with
the rebels were captured and executed by government
forces. Soon
thereafter, 400 United States marines landed on the
Caribbean
coast. Weakened and pressured by both domestic and
external
forces, Zelaya resigned on December 17, 1909. His minister
of
foreign affairs, José Madriz, was appointed president by
the
Nicaraguan Congress. A liberal from León, Madriz was
unable to
restore order under continuing pressure from conservatives
and
the United States forces, and he resigned on August 20,
1910.
Conservative Estrada, governor of Nicaragua's
easternmost
department, assumed power after Madriz's resignation. The
United
States agreed to support Estrada, provided that a
Constituent
Assembly was elected to write a constitution. After
agreeing with
this stipulation, a coalition conservative-liberal regime,
headed
by Estrada, was recognized by the United States on January
1,
1911. Political differences between the two parties soon
surfaced, however, and minister of war General Luis Mena
forced
Estrada to resign. Estrada's vice president, the
conservative
Adolfo Díaz, then became president. In mid-1912 Mena
persuaded a
Constituent Assembly to name him successor to Díaz when
Díaz's
term expired in 1913. When the United States refused to
recognize
the Constituent Assembly's decision, Mena rebelled against
the
Díaz government. A force led by liberal Benjamín Zelaydón
quickly
came to the aid of Mena. Díaz, relying on what was
becoming a
time-honored tradition, requested assistance from the
United
States. In August 1912, a force of 2,700 United States
marines
once landed again at the ports of Corinto and Bluefields.
Mena
fled the country, and Zelaydón was killed.
The United States kept a contingent force in Nicaragua
almost
continually from 1912 until 1933. Although reduced to 100
in
1913, the contingent served as a reminder of the
willingness of
the United States to use force and its desire to keep
conservative governments in power. Under United States
supervision, national elections were held in 1913, but the
liberals refused to participate in the electoral process,
and
Adolfo Díaz was reelected to a full term. Foreign
investment
decreased during this period because of the high levels of
violence and political instability. Nicaragua and the
United
States signed but never ratified the Castill-Knox Treaty
in 1914,
giving the United States the right to intervene in
Nicaragua to
protect United States interest. A modified version, the
Chamorro-
Bryan Treaty omitting the intervention clause, was finally
ratified by the United States Senate in 1916. This treaty
gave
the United States exclusive rights to build an
interoceanic canal
across Nicaragua. Because the United States had already
built the
Panama Canal, however, the terms of the Chamorro-Bryan
Treaty
served the primary purpose of securing United States
interests
against potential foreign countries--mainly Germany or
Japan--building another canal in Central America. The
treaty also
transformed Nicaragua into a near United States
protectorate.
Collaboration with the United States allowed the
conservatives to remain in power until 1925. The liberals
boycotted the 1916 election, and conservative Emiliano
Chamorro
was elected with no opposition. The liberals did
participate in
the 1920 elections, but the backing of the United States
and a
fraudulent election assured the election of Emiliano
Chamorro's
uncle, Diego Manuel Chamorro.
A moderate conservative, Carlos Solórzano, was elected
president in open elections in 1924, with liberal Juan
Bautista
Sacasa as his vice president. After taking office on
January 1,
1925, Solórzano requested that the United States delay the
withdrawal of its troops from Nicaragua. Nicaragua and the
United
States agreed that United States troops would remain while
United
States military instructors helped build a national
military
force. In June, Solórzano's government contracted with
retired
United States Army Major Calvin B. Carter to establish and
train
the National Guard. The United States marines left
Nicaragua in
August 1925. However, President Solórzano, who had already
purged
the liberals from his coalition government, was
subsequently
forced out of power in November 1925 by a conservative
group who
proclaimed General Emiliano Chamorro (who had also served
as
president from 1917 to 1921), as president in January
1926.
Fearing a new round of conservative-liberal violence
and
worried that a revolution in Nicaragua might result in a
leftist
victory as happened a few years earlier in Mexico, the
United
States sent marines, who landed on the Caribbean coast in
May
1926, ostensibly to protect United States citizens and
property.
United States authorities in Nicaragua mediated a peace
agreement
between the liberals and the conservatives in October
1926.
Chamorro resigned, and the Nicaraguan Congress elected
Adolfo
Díaz as president (Díaz had previously served as
president, 1911-
16). Violence resumed, however, when former vice president
Sacasa
returned from exile to claim his rights to the presidency.
In
April 1927, the United States sent Henry L. Stimson to
mediate
the civil war. Once in Nicaragua, Stimson began
conversations
with President Díaz as well as with leaders from both
political
parties. Stimson's meetings with General José María
Moncada, the
leader of the liberal rebels, led to a peaceful solution
of the
crisis. On May 20, 1927, Moncada agreed to a plan in which
both
sides--the government and Moncada's liberal forces--would
disarm.
In addition, a nonpartisan military force would be
established
under United States supervision. This accord was known as
the
Pact of Espino Negro.
As part of the agreement, President Díaz would finish
his
term and United States forces would remain in Nicaragua to
maintain order and supervise the 1928 elections. A truce
between
the government and the rebels remained in effect and
included the
disarmament of both liberal rebels and government troops.
Sacasa,
who refused to sign the agreement, left the country.
United
States forces took over the country's military functions,
and
strengthened the Nicaraguan National Guard.
A rebel liberal group under the leadership of Augusto
César
Sandino also refused to sign the Pact of Espino Negro. An
illegitimate son of a wealthy landowner and a mestizo
servant,
Sandino had left his father's home early in his youth and
traveled to Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico. During his
three-year stay in Tampico, Mexico, Sandino had acquired a
strong
sense of Nicaraguan nationalism and pride in his mestizo
heritage. At the urging of his father, Sandino had
returned to
Nicaragua in 1926 and settled in the department of Nueva
Segovia,
where he worked at a gold mine owned by a United States
company.
Sandino, who lectured the mine workers about social
inequalities
and the need to change the political system, soon
organized his
own army, consisting mostly of peasants and workers, and
joined
the liberals fighting against the conservative regime of
Chamorro. Highly distrusted by Moncada, Sandino set up
hit-and-run operations against conservative forces
independently
of Moncada's liberal army. After the United States
mediated the
agreement between liberal forces and the conservative
regime,
Sandino, calling Moncada a traitor and denouncing United
States
intervention, reorganized his forces as the Army for the
Defense
of Nicaraguan Sovereignty (Ejército Defensor de la
Soberanía de
Nicaragua-EDSN). Sandino then staged an independent
guerrilla
campaign against the government and United States forces.
Although Sandino's original intentions were to restore
constitutional government under Sacasa, after the Pact of
Espino
Negro agreement his objective became the defense of
Nicaraguan
sovereignty against the United States. Receiving his main
support
from the rural population, Sandino resumed his battle
against
United States troops. At the height of his guerrilla
campaign,
Sandino claimed to have some 3,000 soldiers in his army,
although
official figures estimated the number at only 300.
Sandino's
guerrilla war caused significant damage in the Caribbean
coast
and mining regions. After debating whether to continue
direct
fighting against Sandino's forces, the United States opted
to
develop the nonpartisan Nicaraguan National Guard to
contain
internal violence. The National Guard would soon become
the most
important power in Nicaraguan politics.
The late 1920s and early 1930s saw the growing power
of
Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza García, a leader who would create
a
dynasty that ruled Nicaragua for four and a half decades.
Moncada
won the 1928 presidential elections in one of the most
honest
elections ever held in Nicaragua. For the 1932 elections,
the
liberals nominated Juan Bautista Sacasa and the
conservatives,
Adolfo Díaz. Sacasa won the elections and was installed as
president on January 2, 1933. In the United States,
popular
opposition to the Nicaraguan intervention rose as United
States
casualty lists grew. Anxious to withdraw from Nicaraguan
politics, the United States turned over command of the
National
Guard to the Nicaraguan government, and United States
marines
left the country soon thereafter. President Sacasa, under
pressure from General Moncada, appointed Somoza García as
chief
director of the National Guard. Somoza García, a close
friend of
Moncada and nephew of President Sacasa, had supported the
liberal
revolt in 1926. Somoza García also enjoyed support from
the
United States government because of his participation at
the 1927
peace conference as one of Stimson's interpreters. Having
attended school in Philadelphia and been trained by United
States
marines, Somoza García, who was fluent in English, had
developed
friends with military, economic, and political influence
in the
United States.
After United States troops left Nicaragua in January
1933,
the Sacasa government and the National Guard still were
threatened by Sandino's EDSN. True to his promise to stop
fighting after United States marines had left the country,
Sandino agreed to discussions with Sacasa. In February
1934,
these negotiations began. During their meetings, Sacasa
offered
Sandino a general amnesty as well as land and safeguards
for him
and his guerrilla forces. However, Sandino, who regarded
the
National Guard as unconstitutional because of its ties to
the
United States military, insisted on the guard's
dissolution. His
attitude made him very unpopular with Somoza Garcia and
his
guards. Without consulting the president, Somoza Garcia
gave
orders for Sandino's assassination, hoping that this
action would
help him win the loyalty of senior guard officers. On
February
21, 1934, while leaving the presidential palace after a
dinner
with President Sacasa, Sandino and two of his generals
were
arrested by National Guard officers acting under Somoza
García's
instructions. They were then taken to the airfield,
executed, and
buried in unmarked graves. Despite Sacasa's strong
disapproval of
Somoza García's action, the Nicaraguan president was too
weak to
contain the National Guard director. After Sandino's
execution,
the National Guard launched a ruthless campaign against
Sandino's
supporters. In less than a month, Sandino's army was
totally
destroyed.
President Sacasa's popularity decreased as a result of
his
poor leadership and accusations of fraud in the 1934
congressional elections. Somoza García benefited from
Sacasa's
diminishing power, while at the same time he brought
together the
National Guard and the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal-PL)
in
order to win the presidential elections in 1936. Somoza
García
also cultivated support from former presidents Moncada and
Chamorro while consolidating control within the Liberal
Party.
Early in 1936, Somoza García openly confronted
President
Sacasa by using military force to displace local
government
officials loyal to the president and replacing them with
close
associates. Somoza García's increasing military
confrontation led
to Sacasa's resignation on June 6, 1936. The Congress
appointed
Carlos Brenes Jarquín, a Somoza García associate, as
interim
president and postponed presidential elections until
December. In
November, Somoza García officially resigned as chief
director of
the National Guard, thus complying with constitutional
requirements for eligibility to run for the presidency.
The
Liberal Nationalist Party (Partido Liberal
Nacionalista--PLN) was
established with support from a faction of the
Conservative Party
to support Somoza García's candidacy. Somoza García was
elected
president in the December election by the remarkable
margin of
107,201 votes to 108. On January 1, 1937, Somoza García
resumed
control of the National Guard, combining the roles of
president
and chief director of the military. Thus, Somoza García
established a military dictatorship, in the shadows of
democratic
laws, that would last more than four decades.
Data as of December 1993
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