Nicaragua THE SANDINISTA YEARS, 1979-90
Figure 3. Areas of Insurgency, 1985
Source: Based on information from Mike Edwards, "Nicaragua, Nation
in Conflict," National Geographic, 168, No. 6, June 1985,
786.
Consolidation of the Revolution, 1979-80
The new government inherited a country in ruins, with a
stagnant economy and a debt of about US$1.6 billion. An
estimated
50,000 Nicaraguans were dead, 120,000 were exiles in
neighboring
countries, and 600,000 were homeless. Food and fuel
supplies were
exhausted, and international relief organizations were
trying to
deal with disease caused by lack of health supplies. Yet
the
attitude of the vast majority of Nicaraguans toward the
revolution was decidedly hopeful. Most Nicaraguans saw the
Sandinista victory as an opportunity to create a system
free of
the political, social, and economic inequalities of the
almost
universally hated Somoza regime.
One of the immediate goals of the new government was
reconstruction of the national economy. The junta
appointed
individuals from the private sector to head the
government's
economic team. They were responsible for renegotiating the
foreign debt and channeling foreign economic aid through
the
state-owned International Reconstruction Fund (Fondo
Internacional de Reconstrucción--FIR). The new government
received bilateral and multinational financial assistance
and
also rescheduled the national foreign debt on advantageous
terms.
Pledging food for the poor, the junta made restructuring
the
economy its highest priority.
At first the economy experienced positive growth,
largely
because of renewed inflow of foreign aid and
reconstruction after
the war
(see The Sandinista Era
, ch. 3). The new
government
enacted the Agrarian Reform Law, beginning with the
nationalization of all rural properties owned by the
Somoza
family or people associated with the Somozas, a total of
2,000
farms representing more than 20 percent of Nicaragua's
cultivable
land. These farms became state property under the new
Ministry of
Agrarian Reform. Large agroexport farms not owned by the
Somozas
generally were not affected by the agrarian reform.
Financial
institutions, all in bankruptcy from the massive capital
flight
during the war, were also nationalized.
The second goal of the Sandinistas was a change in the
old
government's pattern of repression and brutality toward
the
general populace. Many of the Sandinista leaders were
victims of
torture themselves, and the new minister of interior,
Tomás Borge
Martínez, tried to keep human rights violations low. Most
prisoners accused of injustices under the Somoza regime
were
given a trial, and the Ministry of Interior forbade
cruelty to
prisoners. In their first two years in power, Amnesty
International and other human rights groups found the
human
rights situation in Nicaragua greatly improved
(see Human Rights
, ch. 5).
The third major goal of the country's new leaders was
the
establishment of new political institutions to consolidate
the
revolution. On August 22, 1979, the junta proclaimed the
Fundamental Statute of the Republic of Nicaragua. This
statute
abolished the constitution, presidency, Congress, and all
courts.
The junta ruled by unappealable degree under emergency
powers.
National government policy, however, was generally made by
the
nine-member Joint National Directorate (Dirección Nacional
Conjunto--DNC), the ruling body of the FSLN, and then
transmitted
to the junta by Daniel Ortega for the junta's discussion
and
approval.
The new government established a consultive corporatist
representative assembly, the Council of State, on May 4,
1980.
The council could approve laws submitted to it by the
junta or
initiate its own legislation. The junta, however, had the
right
of veto over council-initiated legislation, and the junta
retained control over much of the budget. Although its
powers
were limited, the council was not a rubber stamp and often
amended legislation given it by the junta. The
establishment of
the Council of State and the political makeup of its
thirty-three
members had been decided in negotiations among the
revolutionary
groups in 1979. The members were not elected but appointed
by
various political groups. In the discussions establishing
the
council, it was agreed that the FSLN could name twelve of
the
thirty-three members. Soon after its formation, however,
the
junta added fourteen new members to the Council of State,
with
twelve of those going to the FSLN. This new configuration
gave
the FSLN twenty-four of the forty-seven seats. Opponents
of the
FSLN viewed the addition of the new members as a power
grab, but
the FSLN responded that new groups had been formed since
the
revolution and that they needed to be represented.
The membership of the junta changed during its early
years.
Chamorro resigned in early 1980, ostensibly for health
reasons,
but later asserted that she had become dissatisfied with
increased FSLN dominance in the government. Robelo
resigned in
mid-1980 to protest the expansion of the Council of State.
Chamorro and Robelo were replaced by a rancher who
belonged to
the PDC and a banker, one of the members of Los Doce. In
1983 the
junta was reduced to three members, with Daniel Ortega
clearly
playing the lead role among the remaining three.
Immediately after the revolution, the Sandinistas had
the
best organized and most experienced military force in the
country. To replace the National Guard, the Sandinistas
established a new national army, the Sandinista People's
Army
(Ejército Popular Sandinista--EPS), and a police force,
the
Sandinista Police (Policía Sandinista--PS; see
The Sandinista People's Army, 1979-90
; and
Police and Law Enforcement
,
ch. 5).
These two groups, contrary to the original Puntarenas Pact
were
controlled by the Sandinistas and trained by personnel
from Cuba,
Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. Opposition to the
overwhelming FSLN influence in the security forces did not
surface until 1980. Meanwhile, the EPS developed, with
support
from Cuba and the Soviet Union, into the largest and bestequipped military force in Central America. Compulsory
military
service, introduced during 1983, brought the EPS forces to
about
80,000 by the mid-1980s.
Immediately after the revolution, the FSLN also
developed
mass organizations representing most popular interest
groups in
Nicaragua. The most significant of these included the
Sandinista
Workers' Federation (Central Sandinista de
Trabajadores--CST)
representing labor unions, the Luisa Amanda Espinoza
Nicaraguan
Women's Association (Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses
Luisa
Amanda Espinoza--AMNLAE), and in 1982 the National Union
of
Farmers and Cattlemen (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y
Ganaderos--UNAG) composed of small farmers and peasants.
The FSLN
also created neighborhood groups, similar to the Cuban
Committees
for the Defense of the Revolution, called Sandinista
Defense
Committees (Comités de Defensa Sandinista--CDSs). One of
the CDSs
primary purposes was the gathering and dissemination of
information to all Nicaraguans. The CDSs did a
block-by-block
census of all numbered houses in cities and therefore knew
everyone's whereabouts. The CDSs were also responsible for
distributing rationed goods and community improvement
projects.
The opponents of the Sandinistas made little attempt to
develop
effective mass organizations that could challenge the well
organized and well disciplined Sandinista groups. Thus,
the FSLN
mass organizations were instrumental in consolidating
Sandinista
power over political and military institutions. By 1980
Sandinista organizations embraced some 250,000
Nicaraguans. Less
than a year after their victory, the Sandinistas
controlled the
government.
Data as of December 1993
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