Nicaragua INTRODUCTION
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Nicaragua, 1993
NICARAGUA IS A COUNTRY OVERWHELMED by its history.
Since
colonial times, Nicaragua has suffered from political
instability, civil war, poverty, foreign intervention, and
natural disasters. Successive governments have been unable
to
bring political stability or significant economic growth
to the
country. Personal and foreign special interests have
generally
prevailed over national interests, and repeated foreign
intervention in Nicaraguan political and economic affairs
has
resulted in nationalistic reactions and a legacy of
suspicion of
foreign governments and their motives.
From precolonial times through the present, the broad
central
mountain range that splits the country in two has also
divided it
into two culturally distinct areas. Before the arrival of
the
Spanish, western Nicaragua was populated by indigenous
peoples
related to the Maya and Aztec in the north; eastern
Nicaragua's
earliest inhabitants were believed to have migrated to the
region
from South America. The fertile volcanic soils and more
salubrious climate in the west attracted Spanish settlers
throughout the colonial period. As a result, most of
Nicaragua's
present-day population lives in the western part of the
country.
The eastern Caribbean coastal area with its sultry climate
and
nonfertile soils attracted only a handful of English
settlers and
pirates and some blacks (many of whom were runaway slaves)
from
the West Indies.
Europeans first saw what is now Nicaragua when
Christopher
Columbus sailed south along the Caribbean coast on his
fourth
voyage to the Americas in late 1502 and claimed the entire
area
for Spain. Several land expeditions were launched in the
1520s to
subdue the indigenous population, but in general the
Spanish were
more interested in exploiting the vast riches of Mexico
and Peru
than in settling
Central America (see Glossary). The
population
of the area dropped precipitously in the sixteenth
century.
Incoming Spanish settlers were few, and the indigenous
population
was all but wiped out by exposure to new diseases, with
the
remainder forcibly sent to Peru to work the silver mines.
Administratively during this period, the region became a
backwater province of the Audiencia of Guatemala.
The seventeenth century proved no more auspicious than
the
previous century. Although the population of Nicaragua
grew
somewhat because of the introduction of livestock, the
province's
economy was devastated by trade restrictions imposed by
Spain, by
natural disasters, and by foreign attacks. The local
government
neglected agricultural production, preferring to import
food. The
economy of Nicaragua also suffered because of the massive
destruction caused by three powerful earthquakes during
the
period. During the second half of the century, Nicaragua
was
subjected to bloody incursions from English, French, and
Dutch
pirates. In 1668 and 1670, these buccaneers captured and
destroyed the city of Granada, center of the province's
agricultural wealth. Control of the eastern half of the
country
eluded the Spanish, and the English declared eastern
Nicaragua to
be a protectorate of the English crown.
The eighteenth century saw the beginnings of economic
growth
based on agriculture but also the birth of a pernicious
political
rivalry that was to plague the country for two centuries.
By the
1750s, a powerful elite was well established in the cities
of
León and Granada. The landowners in León concentrated on
cattle
raising and the export of animal products, and Granada
became the
center of regional agricultural trade. Although these
local
elites agreed on promoting Nicaragua as the site for a
transisthmian canal linking the Caribbean Sea and Pacific
Ocean,
they differed violently on the trade policies of the
province
(free-trade or protectionist). During the colonial period,
these
two cities fought for political control over the province.
After
independence, the rivalry only intensified, often breaking
into
open warfare. The hatred between the two factions, the
liberals,
or free-traders, in León and the conservatives, or
protectionists, in Granada, became so institutionalized
that the
factions often forgot the original philosophical
difference that
had spawned their rivalry. The violent conflict between
liberals
and conservatives was one of the most important and
destructive
aspects of Nicaraguan history, an aspect that would last
until
well into the twentieth century. Politicians frequently
chose
party loyalty over national interest, and the nation was
often
the loser in interparty strife.
Establishment of an independent Nicaragua came in
several
stages. The first step occurred when the Audiencia of
Guatemala
declared its independence from Spain in 1821 and became
part of
the Mexican Empire. Separatist feelings throughout the
isthmus
grew, and the United Provinces of Central America declared
their
independence from Mexico in 1823. Under a weak federal
government, each province of the new nation created its
own
independent internal administration. Efforts to centralize
power
led to civil war between 1826 and 1829. The federation
finally
dissolved in 1837, and Nicaragua's independence was
formally
declared on April 30, 1838.
The mid-1800s were marked by unstable national
governments
and a rivalry between the United States and Britain to
bring
Nicaragua under their spheres of influence. The goal of
both
foreign powers was control of a transisthmian transit
route,
either overland or via a new Caribbean-to-Pacific canal.
Continued domestic turmoil in the 1850s provided the
opportunity
for William Walker, a soldier of fortune from the United
States,
to take over Nicaragua. The struggle to expel Walker was
long and
costly, ultimately involving intervention from all of
Nicaragua's
neighbors, the British Navy, and an invasion by the United
States
marines. The Walker affair left a bitter legacy in
Nicaragua and
was the first example of what was to become a common
occurrence
in the country: a penchant for Nicaraguan politicians to
call on
the United States to settle domestic disputes and an
eagerness by
the United States to respond by military intervention.
Nicaragua's thirty-five-year period of relative calm
under
conservative administrations was broken in 1893 by liberal
José
Santos Zelaya. Zelaya's rule proved to be one of the most
controversial periods in Nicaraguan history. Zelaya, a
ruthless
dictator who managed to stay in power for sixteen years
despite
strong foreign and domestic opposition, was responsible
for the
creation of a professional army and the growth of strong
nationalist feelings. Zelaya opened the country to foreign
investment, expanded coffee production, and boosted banana
exports. His government promoted internal development and
modernized Nicaragua's infrastructure. During his tenure,
new
roads and seaport facilities were constructed, railroad
lines
were extended, and many government buildings and schools
were
built. Opposition from conservatives eventually erupted
into a
revolt that, with the support of United States marines,
drove
Zelaya from power in 1909.
Zelaya's fall ushered in another era of political
instability
and foreign intervention. The United States, flush with
its new
colonies in the Caribbean won after the Spanish-American
War
(1898), entered a new era of interventionism in the
Caribbean and
Central America. The United States marines who helped
topple
Zelaya remained in Nicaragua to support subsequent
conservative
governments. United States banks lent money to Nicaragua
on the
condition that these banks would retain complete control
of
Nicaraguan customs and all revenue from the railroads and
steamships. By the end of World War I, United States
military
presence and supervision of the economy had turned
Nicaragua into
a near United States protectorate.
As isolationist sentiment grew in the United States in
the
1920s, there were increased calls in the United States for
removal of the marines from Nicaragua. United States
officials
decided that an honorable way to withdraw forces was to
create a
national Nicaraguan constabulary, the National Guard, to
maintain
order after the marines withdrew. The National Guard was
formed
in June 1925, and the last United States marines withdrew
in
August.
The worst predictions regarding Nicaragua's future
after the
departure of United States marines soon came to pass. The
Nicaraguan government dissolved into chaos, and liberal-
conservative fighting erupted anew. The United States,
fearing a
full-scale civil war would result in a leftist victory, as
had
been the case after the Mexican Revolution (1911-17), sent
the
marines back to Managua in January 1927. This time,
however, the
rapid buildup of United States forces led only to
increased
mayhem. The fighting did not stop until massive United
States
power and the growing strength of the National Guard
forced most
combatants to sign a truce. Out of this latest struggle
would
emerge two of the most influential Nicaraguans of the
twentieth
century, Augusto César Sandino and Anastasio Somoza
García.
Sandino was the only major player who refused to abide
by the
truce. Initially a combatant for the liberals in the
fighting, he
turned his forces against the United States marines and
the
National Guard, which he considered merely a tool of the
United
States, after the implementation of the peace accord.
Sandino led
a force of several hundred who engaged in classic
guerrilla
warfare in remote rural areas. Never a serious threat to
the
national government, Sandino's forces nevertheless proved
a drain
on the economy and a constant gadfly and embarrassment to
the
National Guard. Sandino's hit-and-run tactics were also
the
excuse that allowed 2,000 United States marines to remain
in
Nicaragua.
Once again, domestic events in the United States had
powerful
repercussions in Nicaragua. The deepening Great
Depression,
outrage in the United States over the growing number of
names on
marine casualty lists, and a desire to improve relations
with
Latin America in the face of a growing threat from Japan
and
Germany resulted in president Herbert Hoover's withdrawing
all
marines from Nicaragua in the waning days of his
administration
in January 1933.
The National Guard and its new director, Somoza García,
immediately moved to fill the power vacuum left by the
departure
of the United States. Recognizing the potential power of a
strong
army in a weak nation, Somoza García rapidly began
consolidating
power within the National Guard and soon was acting
independently
of his uncle, President Juan Bautista Sacasa, who was
nominal
head of the guard. In January 1934, upon leaving the
president's
house where he had been conducting peace negotiations,
Sandino
was assassinated by National Guard associates, who had
acted
without approval of the president. As Somoza García's
power over
the National Guard strengthened, his control of national
affairs
became more evident. Finally, in June 1936, Somoza García
forced
his uncle to resign as president and instructed the
Nicaraguan
Congress name him as his uncle's replacement. A Somoza
dynasty
that would last for more than four decades was hence
founded.
For the next twenty years, Somoza García was dictator
of
Nicaragua, always in control of the National Guard and
ruling
either directly as president or indirectly through a
hand-picked
and compliant family associate who held the post of
president. A
weak opposition was tolerated but only to give a
democratic
facade to the regime. Real opposition was met with
incarceration,
torture, exile, or assassination. A clever politician,
Somoza
García maintained power by changing roles to gain the
support of
one or another influential group in Nicaragua, while
keeping the
support of the United States. He, for example, expressed
sympathy
with fascism in the late 1930s in order to win support
from the
business sector and the upper classes. However, he was an
ardent
supporter of the Allies in World War II and was rewarded
with
large amounts of United States military aid. In the late
1940s
and early 1950s, domestically he supported labor
(generally on
the left politically), while keeping a fervent
anticommunist
stance in international forums.
Control over the country also meant almost complete
control
over its economy. The 1940s and 1950s were boom times for
the
Nicaraguan economy as coffee prices soared, but most of
the
country's profit went into the pockets of Somoza García
and his
cronies. (Somoza García is reported to have quipped,
"Bucks for
my friends, bullets for my enemies.") They bought or
expropriated
farms, mining interests, and companies until by the late
1940s,
Somoza García was the nation's largest landowner. He owned
most
of the country's cattle ranches and coffee plantations
and, as
well, owned or controlled all banks, the national
railroad, the
national airlines, a cement factory, textile plants,
several
large electric power companies, and extensive rental
property in
the cities. Somoza García's policies made him many
enemies,
including a disgruntled citizen, who assassinated him in
September 1956.
Somoza García had changed the presidential succession
so that
it devolved on the director of the National Guard, a post
held by
his older son, Luis Somoza Debayle. Luis Somoza Debayle
immediately assumed the post of president, and his younger
brother, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, took over as director
of the
National Guard. The brothers' different personalities soon
became
apparent. Although both had been trained to take over as
president in turn, the older Somoza brother appeared to
favor a
slight liberalization of his father's repressive style of
governing. The younger brother, in contrast, lacked his
father's
political skills and increasingly commanded the National
Guard
through brute force. Because of the older brother's poor
health,
Anastasio Somoza Debayle assumed more and more power.
The formal transfer of power came in 1967, shortly
before
Luis Somoza Debayle suffered a fatal heart attack. Decades
of
pent-up grievances against corruption and repression had
created
opposition to the Somozas, however. Having none of his
father's
ability to finesse the opposition, the new president,
Anastasio
Somoza Debayle, reacted to any criticism by increasing
political
repression. Instead of being trumped as in the past,
opposition
forces now seemed only to be strengthened by Anastasio
Somoza
Debayle's repressive tactics. For the next dozen years, a
cycle
of active opposition to Anastasio Somoza Debayle's regime
and the
regime's ever more ruthless response threatened to destroy
Nicaragua's economy and society.
As the 1970s progressed, all sectors of Nicaraguan
society
joined the opposition to Anastasio Somoza Debayle's
regime. The
turning point for many was the December 1972 earthquake
that
destroyed Managua. National Guard members joined in
looting the
city after the tremor, and it was later revealed that most
of the
international aid after the earthquake enriched the Somoza
family
instead of reaching the victims. As a result, almost all
political figures drifted over to the opposition. The
president
was nominally identified with the liberals and therefore
was
opposed by the conservatives from the beginning of his
rise to
power. Anastasio Somoza Debayle's loyalty to family,
cronies, and
the National Guard over party, however, gradually
alienated
former fellow liberals. The country's rapid economic
decline
after the earthquake lost him the support of labor, the
middle
class, and Nicaragua's elite. The left and student groups
had
long been vocal opponents of the regime. The Roman
Catholic
Church and elements of the press, especially the
influential
La Prensa, also became outspoken in their
condemnation of
the government's repressive actions.
The group that was eventually to take the lead in
opposing
Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the Sandinista National
Liberation
Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional--FSLN),
was
formed in 1962. Taking its name and much of its ideology
from
Sandino, the FSLN grew from a group of university students
to a
small Marxist revolutionary organization operating in
rural
areas. Fueled by growing disenchantment with the dictator
and
foreign help, the FSLN was militarily challenging the
National
Guard throughout the country by the late 1970s. Despite
the
collapse of the economy and the loss of all domestic and
international support, the tenacity of Anastasio Somoza
Debayle
and the National Guard made it increasingly apparent that
a
change in Nicaragua would come through revolution instead
of
peaceful reform.
After two years of violent struggle, Anastasio Somoza
Debayle
finally fled Nicaragua, and on July 20, 1979, the FSLN and
other
members of the revolutionary force entered Managua. A new
five-
member junta assumed power, pledging political pluralism,
a mixed
economic system, and a nonaligned foreign policy. The new
government inherited a country in ruins; an estimated
50,000
Nicaraguans were dead, 120,000 exiled, and 600,000
homeless.
Despite the destruction, most Nicaraguans supported the
new
regime because they saw the
Sandinista (see Glossary)
victory as
an opportunity to end the repression and economic
inequalities of
the almost universally hated Somoza regime.
As leaders in the military struggle and the
best-organized
and most powerful group in postrevolutionary Nicaragua,
the
Sandinistas rapidly began consolidating their political
power.
The constitution was abrogated, and the Congress was
replaced by
an appointed Council of State, dominated by Sandinista
members.
The two influential non-Sandinista members of the ruling
junta
resigned, and by 1983 it was clear that Daniel José Ortega
Saavedra, a long-time member of the FSLN, controlled the
junta.
The National Guard was abolished and replaced by the new
Sandinista People's Army (Ejército Popular
Sandinista--EPS),
headed by Humberto Ortega Saavedra. Mass popular groups
were
formed to represent labor, peasants, and women.
Domestic and international support for the new
Sandinista
government was not universal, however. The ethnic
minorities from
the Caribbean coast, neglected by national governments
since
colonial times, rejected Sandinista efforts to incorporate
them
into the national mainstream and demanded autonomy.
Worried that
Nicaragua would become "another Cuba," the United States
government launched a campaign to isolate the Sandinista
government in 1981. Later that year, the Reagan
administration
(1981-89) authorized support for groups trying to
overthrow the
Sandinistas. Using camps in southern Honduras as a staging
area,
the United States supported groups of disgruntled former
members
of the National Guard. This effort became known as the
Nicaraguan
Resistance; members of the group were later called the
Contras
(short for
contrarevolucionarios--see Glossary).
As the Contra war intensified, the Sandinistas'
tolerance of
political pluralism waned, and the government imposed
emergency
laws to ban criticism and organization of political
opposition.
Social programs also suffered as a result of the war
because the
Sandinista regime was forced to increase military spending
until
half of its budget went for defense. Agricultural
production also
sharply declined as refugees fled areas of conflict.
Throughout the 1980s, as the Contra war expanded, the
economy
continued to deteriorate, in part because of a devastating
embargo on Nicaraguan goods imposed by the United States
in early
1985. In 1987, in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair,
the
United States Congress, however, stopped all military
support to
the Contras. The result of the cutoff was a military
stalemate;
the Contras were unable to keep on fighting without United
States
support, and the Sandinista government could not afford to
continue waging an unpopular war that had already
devastated the
economy. The Contras and the Sandinistas had few options
other
than to negotiate.
International negotiations among the Central American
countries in the late 1980s laid the groundwork for a
peace
settlement. Elections, originally scheduled for the fall
of 1990,
were moved to February 1991. President Ortega also agreed
to
guarantee fair participation for opposition parties and to
allow
international observers to monitor the entire electoral
process.
The Sandinistas felt confident of their success at the
polls
despite deteriorating socioeconomic conditions. On June 6,
1989,
fourteen parties, united only in their opposition to the
Sandinistas, formed a coalition called the National
Opposition
Union (Unión Nacional Opositora--UNO), whose support was
drawn
from a broad base, including conservative and liberal
parties.
Despite its determination to vote the Sandinistas out of
power,
however, the UNO coalition remained a weak opposition
lacking a
cohesive program.
Despite some violent incidents, the electoral campaign
took
place in relative peace. In an effort to divert attention
from
the critical economic situation, the Sandinista campaign
appealed
to nationalism, depicting UNO followers as pro-Somoza,
instruments of United States foreign policy, and enemies
of the
Nicaraguan revolution. The UNO coalition under Violeta
Barrios de
Chamorro directed a campaign centered around the failing
economy
and promises of peace. Many Nicaraguans expected the
country's
economic crisis to deepen and the Contra conflict to
continue if
the Sandinistas remained in power. Chamorro promised to
end the
unpopular military draft, bring about democratic
reconciliation,
and promote economic growth. The UNO coalition won a
surprising
victory on February 25, 1990. Exhausted by war and
poverty, the
Nicaraguan people opted for change.
The new administration inherited a country in ruins.
Agriculture remained the country's primary economic
resource, but
production of the two main crops, coffee and cotton, had
dropped
during the 1980s. Manufacturing, always a small part of
the
economy, had practically ceased by 1990. The
transportation and
telecommunication networks, found almost exclusively in
the
western half of the country and inadequate even during the
Somoza
era, were damaged by nearly two decades of fighting.
Blackouts
were frequent because the electric power system was often
the
target of sabotage during the Contra war and because the
country
frequently was unable to pay for petroleum, all of which
was
imported, to generate electricity. The entire banking
system was
bankrupt, and more than half the labor force was
unemployed or
underemployed. A per capita gross domestic product
(GDP--see Glossary)
of less than US$500 gave Nicaragua the dubious
distinction of being one of the poorest nations in the
Western
Hemisphere. Perhaps the only bright spot in the economic
morass
was that the collapse of the economy stopped the
ecological
destruction of the rich forest lands in eastern Nicaragua.
Social conditions largely parallelled the poor state of
the
economy. Although in their early years in power, the
Sandinistas
put great effort into improving the health and education
systems
and the literacy rate, diversion of half of the national
budget
to the military during the second half of their
administration
largely wiped out the significant gains made in their
first few
years. Even using spartan standards for what is adequate
for
survival, official government statistics in 1992
classified two-
thirds of Nicaraguans as poor. Only slightly more than
half of
primary-school age children attended school. Most rural
inhabitants (45 percent of the population) and many urban
dwellers (55 percent out of a total of nearly 4 million
people)
lacked access to health care.
The ethnic divide adds to the country's social
problems.
Nicaragua continues to be ethnically divided in two: the
west is
relatively homogeneous, Spanish-speaking, culturally
Hispanic and
racially mestizo; the east is a multiracial, multicultural
and
mostly English-speaking region. Although the people are
nominally
Roman Catholic, various Protestant denominations have made
significant inroads in recent years, particularly in the
east.
In addition to its overwhelming economic and social
challenges, the new Chamorro administration faced
immediate
political problems. Almost from the day it took power, the
Chamorro government was a stepchild. Even though Chamorro
personified the Nicaraguan people's aspiration for peace,
neither
the UNO nor the FSLN recognized the government as the
legitimate
representative of its political, social, and economic
aspirations
for Nicaragua. The strong constitutional powers of the
executive
branch theoretically should have given the president
adequate
control over the political and economic systems, but the
transition agreements left the Sandinistas in control of
the
military and police.
President Chamorro's first four years in power were
marked by
social, political, and economic instability. The economy
continued deteriorating. Although the demobilization of
the
Contras concluded in June 1990, violence continued in
rural
areas, especially in the country's northern departments.
Rearmed
members of the Nicaraguan Resistance, now known as
Recontras,
argued that the Chamorro government did not comply with
commitments made during the demobilization process. In the
spring
of 1991, an estimated 2,000 Recontras rearmed and resumed
guerrilla operations in the northern part of the country.
They
charged the Chamorro government with not fulfilling its
promises
of land and economic assistance to the Contras as they
disarmed
and demobilized. The reorganization of the police and the
army,
as well as the removal of Humberto Ortega as army chief,
was
necessary, according to the Recontras, for their
disbandment.
After the Recontras staged uprisings in support of
their
demands, demobilized Sandinista soldiers, calling
themselves
Recompas, took up arms during late August 1991 to fight
against
anti-Sandinista forces and protect the accomplishments of
the
Sandinista revolution, which they perceived as being
threatened
by the UNO government. Recompas clashed with Recontras and
government forces and demanded compliance with the
commitments
made to them during the peace process. Government and army
intervention persuaded the two groups to halt the
fighting.
Ironically, the Recontras and Recompas discovered that
they had
common grievances and joined forces in a new group called
the
Revueltos. To achieve political conciliation, the
government
launched a plan for reconciliation. The government
initiative
failed, however, to disarm the civilian population. In the
spring
of 1992, the Revueltos had an estimated 2,000-member force
operating in northern Nicaragua.
At the end of 1992, continued confrontation between the
Chamorro government and the UNO coalition also threatened
the
country's democratic institutions. A conflict over
politics
developed among UNO representatives in the National
Assembly.
The UNO group in the assembly split into two groups: a
larger
conservative wing, headed by Alfredo César Aguirre, that
demanded
a complete rupture with the Sandinistas and began to
oppose the
president; and a smaller, more moderate group, headed by
Antonio
Lacayo Oyanguren, that insisted on cooperation with the
FSLN as a
prerequisite for national reconciliation and continued to
support
the president's policies. The group headed by César was
backed by
conservatives in the United States Senate, who threatened
to
freeze United States aid to Nicaragua in an effort to
persuade
the Chamorro administration to oppose the Sandinistas more
strongly.
The political crisis grew during the summer of 1992,
when
César launched a political offensive against Lacayo in an
effort
to implicate Lacayo in fraud and embezzlement of
government
funds. César also directed attacks on Humberto Ortega and
high-
ranking police officials. Conflict in the National
Assembly
heightened when eight UNO deputies broke ranks and began
voting
with the Sandinistas. This new UNO/Sandinista bloc
represented a
majority within the legislature, and César, backed by most
of the
remaining UNO coalition, took over the National Assembly
in what
many considered a political coup. The Sandinista faction
boycotted César's actions by walking out of the National
Assembly.
The UNO bloc in the National Assembly headed by César
demanded Humberto Ortega's removal from the army and
Chamorro's
ouster from the presidency. It also demanded property
legislation
to abolish the Piñata--the FSLN legislation giving the
Sandinistas titles to considerable state property put into
effect
immediately following the 1990 elections. At the same
time, the
United States Congress froze US$116 million in economic
aid to
Nicaragua pending restructuring of the police. In an
effort to
unfreeze the United States economic package, the Chamorro
administration negotiated the removal of top Sandinista
police
leaders, including its chief, René Vivas Lugo. The
Nicaraguan
president appealed to the courts, which in turn ruled that
all
legislation passed by the César faction of UNO was
unconstitutional. On December 29, 1992, President Chamorro
used
her executive powers to authorize a military takeover of
the
congressional building and the removal of César as
president of
the National Assembly. The following day, police occupied
the
National Assembly building and seized all of its assets
and
documents. The government appointed a provisional
administration
to run legislative affairs until new authorities were
elected on
January 9, 1993.
The takeover of the assembly, which César called a
coup,
marked the end of UNO support for President Chamorro. Ten
of the
fourteen political parties that in 1990 formed the UNO
coalition
now openly opposed the Chamorro administration, accusing
it of
"co-governing" with the Sandinistas. The supporters of
Chamorro
from the old UNO coalition formed a progovernment center
bloc
called the Center Group (Grupo de Centro-GC). The FSLN
delegation, along with deputies from the GC, elected
Gustavo
Tablada Zelaya, from the former Communist Party, as
president of
the National Assembly. The vice presidency of the
legislature
went to a Sandinista, Reinaldo Antonio Tefel.
After four years of government under Violeta Barrios de
Chamorro, Nicaragua faces difficult times on its road to
economic
recovery and national reconstruction. Its government must
cope
with insufficient economic aid to carry out economic
reforms,
lagging growth in investments, intense partisan struggle,
and an
increasingly frustrated populace. The internal political
situation is exacerbated by the need for compromise with
the
Sandinistas, who themselves suffered a crisis of identity
and
credibility after their loss in the 1990 elections.
The role of the armed forces remains the center of
debate
among political forces. Criticized by its neighbors and by
the
United States because it was deemed to large to be a
purely
defensive force, the army has gone through a major
reduction in
force, going from 97,000 troops in 1989 to 15,200 in 1993.
However, despite repeated promises by the president that
the army
chief would be replaced and control be transferred from
the
Sandinistas to the national government, Humberto Ortega
still
commanded the Nicaraguan army in mid-1994.
In mid-1994, Nicaragua is still far from enjoying the
social
and political peace necessary to attract foreign
investment and
achieve economic growth. The Chamorro administration, as
well as
the Sandinista leadership and the UNO coalition are caught
between their respective ideals and the need for a
pragmatic
political reconciliation. Popular dissatisfaction with the
democratic process prevails. Despite its internal
conflicts,
however, the FSLN remains the strongest and best organized
political force in Nicaragua and is the only party with
the
organizational skills and political experience to carry
out a
government program. As the country prepares for the 1996
elections, conditions similar to those faced in
1990--social
instability, political polarization, and economic
uncertainty--
leave Nicaragua with few means for overcoming its
political and
socioeconomic crisis.
June 28, 1994
Tim L. Merrill
Data as of December 1993
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