Nicaragua The UNO Electoral Victory
As a result of the Esquipulas II peace accords, the
FSLN
government reinstated political freedoms. At first, the
various
anti-Sandinista groups were weak and divided and did not
have a
cohesive government program to challenge the FSLN. The
Sandinistas, therefore, felt confident of their success at
the
polls despite deteriorating socioeconomic conditions in
the
country. On June 6, 1989, fourteen parties, united only in
their
opposition to the Sandinistas, formed a coalition called
the
National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositora--UNO),
whose
support was drawn from a broad base, including
conservative and
liberal parties as well as two of Nicaragua's traditional
communist factions. Despite its determination to vote the
Sandinistas out of power, however, the UNO coalition
remained a
weak opposition lacking a cohesive program.
The UNO and the Sandinistas began their political
campaigns
in the summer of 1989. Although sharp divisions within the
UNO
remained, all fourteen parties finally compromised, and on
September 2 the anti-Sandinista coalition nominated
Violeta
Barrios de Chamorro, publisher of La Prensa and
former
member of the junta, as their candidate for president.
Virgilio
Godoy Reyes, head of the PLI and former minister of labor
under
the Sandinistas, was chosen as her running mate. The FSLN
nominated Daniel Ortega for the presidency and Sergio
Ramírez
Mercado as his running mate.
The political campaign was conducted under the close
international supervision of the OAS, the UN, and a
delegation
headed by former United States President Jimmy Carter. The
administration of United States president George H.W. Bush
provided economic assistance to the Sandinista opposition.
Most
of this aid was channeled through the National Endowment
for
Democracy, which contributed more than US$9 million.
Despite some
violent incidents, the electoral campaign was carried out
in
relative peace. The FSLN was better organized than the
opposition
and used government funds and resources--such as school
buses and
military trucks--to bring Sandinista supporters from all
over the
country to their rallies. In an effort to divert attention
from
the critical economic situation, the Sandinista campaign
appealed
to nationalism, depicting UNO followers as pro-Somoza,
instruments of United States foreign policy and enemies of
the
Nicaraguan revolution. Despite limited resources and poor
organization, the UNO coalition under Violeta Chamorro
directed a
campaign centered around the failing economy and promises
of
peace. Many Nicaraguans expected the country's economic
crisis to
deepen and the Contra conflict to continue if the
Sandinistas
remained in power. Chamorro promised to end the unpopular
military draft, bring about democratic reconciliation, and
promote economic growth. In the February 25, 1990,
elections,
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro carried 55 percent of the
popular
vote against Daniel Ortega's 41 percent. Exhausted by war
and
poverty, the Nicaraguan people had opted for change.
Although the election results surprised many observers,
both
sides began conversations to bring a peaceful transfer of
power.
In March a transition team headed by Chamorro's
son-in-law,
Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren, representing the UNO, and
General
Humberto Ortega, representing the FSLN, began discussions
on the
transfer of political power. However, Sandinista
bureaucrats
systematically ransacked government offices and gave
government
assets to loyal government supporters, destroyed records;
consolidated many of the government agencies (in
particular, the
Ministry of Interior, whose security forces were
incorporated
into the EPS), and passed legislation to protect their
interests
once they were ousted from the government. On May 30, the
Sandinista government, along with the UNO transition team
and the
Contra leadership, signed agreements for a formal
cease-fire and
the demobilization of the Contras. Despite continued
sporadic
clashes, the Contras completed their demobilization on
June 26,
1990
(see The Chamorro Government Takes Power
, ch. 4).
The FSLN accepted its new role of opposition and handed
over
political power to Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and the UNO
coalition on April 25, 1990. President Chamorro pledged
her
determination to give Nicaragua a democratic government,
bring
about national reconciliation, and keep a small
nonpartisan
professional army. Nicaragua underwent yet another sea
change as
the country stepped out of the Cold War spotlight.
* * *
Although the study of Nicaragua dramatically increased
among
scholars all over the world after the 1979 revolution, a
comprehensive history of Nicaragua in English is still not
available. The most current references on the subject are
part of
large volumes on Latin American and Central American
history, all
of which include chapters on Nicaragua. The best volumes
currently available are James Dunkerley's Power in the
Isthmus: Political History of Modern Central America
and
Central America: A Nation Divided, written by Ralph
Lee
Woodward Jr. Nevertheless, there are many books treating
specific
periods of Nicaraguan history. Information on Nicaragua's
colonial history can be found in Benjamin Keen's A
History of
Latin America as well as in Thomas E. Skidmore and
Peter H.
Smith's chapter on "Central America: Colonialism,
Dictatorship,
and Revolution," in their Modern Latin America. The
six
decades of transition from colonial status to incipient
nation-state are brilliantly covered by E. Bradford Burns
in
Patriarch and Folk: The Emergence of Nicaragua
1798-1858.
A detailed account of British and United States
interventions is
presented by Neill Macaulay in The Sandino Affair.
The
first half of the twentieth century including the rise and
fall
of the Somoza dynasty is covered in Politics in Central
America by Thomas P. Anderson. Somoza and the
Legacy of
U.S. Involvement in Central America by Bernard
Diederich is a
comprehensive look at the Somoza era, and Karl Bermann's
Under
the Big Stick: Nicaragua and the United States since
1848
covers United States-Nicaragua relations.
Many works cover the history of the Sandinista period.
The
most comprehensive analysis of the first half of the
Sandinista
regime is Nicaragua: The First Five Years, edited
by
Thomas W. Walker. An excellent source for information on
the FSLN
leaders, as well as the inner workings of the FSLN as a
political
party, is Dennis L. Gilbert's Sandinistas: The Party
and the
Revolution. Contra Terror in Nicaragua by Reed
Brody
presents the testimony of victims of Contra attacks.
Banana
Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua,
1981-1987 by Roy Gutman provides a comprehensive
account of
United States foreign policy toward Nicaragua during the
Reagan
administration. (For further information and complete
citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1993
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