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Panama NATIONALISM, POPULISM, AND MILITARISM: THE LEGACY OF OMAR TORRIJOS
From 1968 until his death in an airplane crash in 1981, General
Torrijos dominated the Panamanian political scene. His influence,
greater than that of any individual in the nation's history, did
not end with his death. Since 1981, both military and civilian
leaders have sought to wrap themselves in the mantle of Torrijismo,
claiming to be the true heirs of the general's political and social
heritage. As of the late 1980s, none had been particularly
successful in this effort.
Before 1968, Panama's politics had been characterized by
personalism (personalismo), the tendency to give one's
political loyalties to an individual, rather than to a party or
particular ideological platform
(see The Oligarchy under Fire
, ch.
1). The dominant force had been the traditional elite families,
known as the rabiblancos (white tails), concentrated in
Panama City. They manipulated nationalist sentiment, largely
directed against United States control over the Canal Zone, the
National Guard, and various political parties in order to maintain
their control. The most dominant individual in the pre-1968 period
was Arnulfo Arias, a charismatic, right-wing nationalist who was
both feared and hated by the National Guard's officers. His
overthrow in 1968 marked the third time that he had been ousted
from the presidency, never having been allowed to finish even half
of the term for which he had been elected.
It soon became apparent that the 1968 coup differed
fundamentally from those that preceded it. Torrijos actively sought
to add lower- and middle-class support to the power base provided
by his control over the military, using a mixture of nationalism
and populism to achieve this goal. He cultivated laborers, small
farmers, students, and even the communists, organized in Panama as
the People's Party (Partido del Pueblo--PdP). He excluded the
traditional elites from political power, although he left their
economic power base largely untouched. Political parties were
banned, and the legislature was dissolved (until replaced in 1972
by the National Assembly of Municipal Representatives, 505 largely
government-selected representatives of administrative subdistricts
supposedly elected on a nonpartisan basis). Torrijos justified his
policies as being required by the pressing social needs of the
population and by the overriding need to maintain national unity in
order to negotiate a treaty with the United States that would cede
sovereignty over the Canal Zone and ultimately give control of the
Panama Canal to Panama.
In the early 1970s, the strength of the populist alliance
forged by Torrijos was impressive. He had reduced the traditional
antagonism between the National Guard and the students, purging
disloyal elements within both in the process. The loyalty of the
middle classes was procured through increased public-sector
employment. Major public housing projects, along with expanded
health, education, and other social service programs, helped
maintain support in urban areas. Labor leaders were cultivated
through the adoption of a much more favorable labor code, and a
constant emphasis on the necessity of gaining control over the
canal undercut the nationalist appeal of Arnulfo Arias. By 1976,
however, rising inflation, increased unemployment, and the
continued failure to negotiate a canal treaty had begun to
undermine the general's popularity.
The 1977 signing of the Panama Canal treaties, giving Panama
full control over the canal in the year 2000, actually added to the
problems confronting Torrijos. There was considerable opposition in
Panama to some provisions of the treaties, and it took all of the
general's prestige to secure the needed two-thirds majority for
ratification in an October 1977 national plebiscite. Resentment
further increased when the government acceded to several amendments
passed by the United States Senate after the plebiscite
(see The 1977 Treaties and Associated Agreements
, ch. 1). At the same time,
in order to facilitate United States ratification of the treaties,
Torrijos found it necessary to promise to restore civilian rule and
return the military to the barracks.
The 1978 amendments to the Constitution were the first step in
the process of restoring civilian rule. That same year, the
government allowed exiled political opponents to return, permitted
the re-emergence of political parties, and promised to hold
legislative elections in 1980 and presidential elections in 1984.
Only parties that could register 30,000 members, however, would
gain official recognition. Torrijos and his supporters used the new
system to create their own political party, the PRD, which tried to
combine the old elements of the Torrijos coalition into a single
political structure. Torrijos also appointed a new civilian
president, Aristides Royo, and announced that he was relinquishing
the special powers he had exercised since 1972.
Opponents argued that the pace of democratization was too slow
and called for immediate, direct election of both the president and
a representative legislature. Ultimately, however, most sought to
achieve legal status for their parties. A major exception was
Arnulfo Arias's Panameñistas, who initially boycotted the entire
process. In the 1980 elections for nineteen of the fifty-seven
seats in the legislature, the principal parties to emerge were the
PRD, with twelve seats, and the opposition National Liberal Party
(Partido Liberal Nacional--PLN), with five seats, and Christian
Democratic Party (Partido Demócrato Cristiano--PDC), with one seat.
Data as of December 1987
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