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Panama POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POST-TORRIJOS ERA
The death of General Torrijos in a July 1981 airplane crash
represented a major break in the pattern of Panamanian politics
(see The Post-Torrijos Era
, ch. 1). The next several years saw
considerable turmoil both in the National Guard and among the
political leadership, as various individuals jockeyed to fill the
void created by Torrijos's untimely death. Command of the National
Guard was initially assumed by Colonel Florencio Florez Aguilar,
but in March 1982, a struggle for power among the officers resulted
in his replacement by Colonel Rubén Darío Paredes, who promptly
promoted himself to general and, four months later, forced
President Royo to resign. In December, further changes in the
National Guard's command structure saw the emergence of Colonel
Noriega as chief of staff and the likely successor to Paredes.
On April 24, 1983, nearly 88 percent of the voters in a
national referendum approved further amendments to the Constitution
designed to set the stage for the 1984 presidential and legislative
elections. Much of the rest of the year was devoted to maneuverings
by Paredes and other potential presidential candidates, seeking to
gain support for their ambitions and to form coalitions with other
political groups and parties, in order to further enhance their
prospects. By September, 13 parties had gained the 30,000
signatures necessary for official registration. These included the
Panameñistas, as Arnulfo Arias reversed his longstanding boycott of
the political process. Nominated by the PRD and several other
parties, Paredes resigned from his post as the Guard's commander to
pursue his presidential ambitions. Nevertheless, after Noriega was
promoted to general and took over command of the National Guard, he
quickly moved to undercut Paredes, leading to a sudden announcement
of Paredes's withdrawal as a presidential candidate in September.
Paredes's withdrawal led to considerable confusion in the
political process. Ultimately, two major coalitions emerged and
presented candidates for president. (Although the parties united
behind their presidential candidates, they nevertheless ran
separate slates for seats in the legislature.)
The National Democratic Union (Unión Nacional Democrática--
UNADE) was formed by six parties: the PRD; the Labor and Agrarian
Party (Partido Laborista Agrario--PALA), frequently referred to
simply as the Labor Party; the PLN; the Republican Party; the
Panameñista Party (Partido Panameñista--PP), a small faction that
broke away from the majority of Panameñistas, who continued to
follow Arnulfo Arias; and the Broad Popular Front (Frente Amplio
Popular--FRAMPO). UNADE's presidential candidate was Nicolás Ardito
Barletta, an international banker with little political experience.
Republican Party leader Eric Arturo Delvalle and PLN veteran
Roderick Esquivel received the vice presidential nominations.
UNADE's principal competition was the Democratic Opposition
Alliance (Alianza Democrática de Oposición--ADO), which encompassed
three major parties: the majority of Panameñistas organized in the
Authentic Panameñista Party (Partido Panameñista Auténtico--PPA),
the PDC, and the National Liberal Republican Movement (Movimiento
Liberal Republicano Nacional--MOLIRENA). A number of smaller
parties also joined the coalition. ADO's presidential candidate was
eighty-three-year-old Arnulfo Arias. Carlos Francisco Rodriguez and
Christian Democratic leader Ricardo Arias Calderón were its vice
presidential candidates.
Five minor candidates also entered the race. They included
General Paredes, who reentered the field as the candidate of the
Popular Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Popular--PNP);
Carlos Iván Zúñiga of the Popular Action Party (Partido de Acción
Popular--PAPO); and the candidates of three small, far-left
parties.
The campaign and election were marred by violence and repeated
charges by Arnulfo Arias and other opposition candidates that the
Guard was using force, fraud, and intimidation to promote Ardito
Barletta's candidacy. Official counting of the vote was delayed for
several days and the Electoral Tribunal appeared divided, but
ultimately the government certified Ardito Barletta as president,
declaring that he had won with 300,748 votes to 299,035 for Arias.
None of the minor candidates won more than 16,000 votes. All
parties outside the major alliances plus the smallest members of
the UNADE coalition (FRAMPO and the PP) lost their legal status by
failing to receive 3 percent of the total vote. Supporters of
Arnulfo Arias charged that Ardito Barletta's victory was the result
of massive government fraud and organized several protest
demonstrations, but to no avail. Charges of fraud also were
launched against the winners of several legislative seats. In these
races, official returns gave a large majority to members of the
government coalition; the PRD won thirty-four seats, the PPA
fourteen, PALA seven, the PDC five, the Republican Party and
MOLIRENA three each, and the PLN one.
Disturbances continued for weeks after the announcement of
Ardito Barletta's victory, contributing to a decision to postpone
scheduled municipal elections. The disturbances also aggravated an
already deteriorating economic situation, fueled by a massive debt
and a rising budget deficit. In November 1984, shortly after his
inauguration, Ardito Barletta attempted to implement an austerity
program and to reduce the budget deficit through increased taxes.
These measures led to a wave of
strikes and public demonstrations, and the president was forced to
back off on some of his proposals.
Conditions continued to deteriorate in 1985. Elements of the
government coalition joined in protests against Ardito Barletta's
economic policies, and pressures from the Guard and the PRD forced
the president to agree to changes in several key cabinet posts.
Both business and labor confederations withdrew from government-
sponsored meetings to discuss the situation, and labor disturbances
increased. In August, Noriega publicly criticized the government.
Rumors of a coup were spreading when, on September 14, 1985,
the headless body of a prominent critic of Noriega, Dr. Hugo
Spadafora, was found in Costa Rica. This discovery unleashed
another round of protest demonstrations. Noriega and the National
Guard denied any involvement in the murder, but they refused to
allow an independent investigation. When Ardito Barletta seemed to
indicate some willingness to do so, he was hurriedly recalled from
a visit to the United Nations (UN) and, on September 28, forced to
resign. Vice President Delvalle became the fifth president in less
than four years.
The ousting of Ardito Barletta failed to calm the situation.
Protests over Spadafora's murder and over the economic situation
continued. In October the government was forced to close all
schools for several days. Rising tensions also began to affect
relations with the United States, which had opposed the ousting of
Ardito Barletta, and even created problems within the major pro-
government party, the PRD, which underwent a shake-up in its
leadership.
The new administration initially attempted to reverse the
rising tide of discontent by returning to the populist policies of
the Torrijos era. Prices of milk, rice, and petroleum were lowered,
and President Delvalle announced that any agreement with the
International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary)
would be based on
negotiations with labor and with the private sector. Economic
realities, however, soon forced the government to impose an
austerity program remarkably similar to that advocated by Ardito
Barletta and to introduce, over strong objections from the unions,
sweeping reforms in the labor code, designed to make Panama more
attractive for foreign and domestic investment
(see Wage Policy and Labor Code
, ch. 3). A national strike protesting the new policies
failed when Noriega and the FDP supported Delvalle. The new
policies produced some economic improvement but did nothing to
resolve mounting political problems.
Panama's domestic problems were paralleled by growing criticism
abroad, notably in the United States. In March 1986, the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the United States
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations began holding hearings on the
situation in Panama, and the following month hearings also began in
the House of Representatives. In June a series of articles by
Seymour Hersh alleging involvement by Panamanian officials in
narcotics trafficking, the murder of Spadafora, and the passing of
sensitive intelligence to Cuba were published in the New York
Times
(see Involvement in Political and Economic Affairs
, ch.
5). Both within and outside Panama, the increased criticism focused
attention on the military and on General Noriega. Delvalle's
civilian government found it increasingly difficult to contend with
the perception that it was little more than a pliant tool of the
military. These perceptions were further strengthened in October
1986, when the president, despite open protests, was forced to
dismiss four cabinet ministers and appoint their replacements from
a list prepared by the PRD.
Tensions also increased between the government and opposition
media within Panama in 1986. Roberto Eisenman, Jr., editor of La
Prensa, took refuge in the United States, alleging that there
was a government plot to kill him. Radio Mundial, owned by
opposition political leader Carlos Iván Zúñiga, was ordered closed.
But despite increased protests and international pressures, the
government's hold on power seemed unshaken.
The situation changed abruptly in June 1987. A long-time power
struggle within the FDP between Noriega and his chief of staff,
Colonel Roberto Díaz Herrera, led to the forced retirement of Díaz
Herrera on June 1. Six days later, the colonel responded by a
series of public denunciations, accusing Noriega of involvement in
the deaths of Torrijos and Spadafora and of using massive fraud to
ensure the victory of Ardito Barletta in the 1984 elections. The
result was widespread rioting. The opposition demanded that both
Noriega and Delvalle resign, and numerous civic and business groups
formed the National Civic Crusade (Crusada Civilista Nacional--CCN)
to press for changes in the government. As demonstrations spread,
the government declared a state of emergency, suspending
constitutional rights and instituting censorship
(see Administration of Justice and
National Security
, ch. 5). The CCN
responded by calling a national strike that paralyzed the economy
for several days. Violent actions by government forces and
antigovernment demonstrators further polarized public opinion. The
leadership of Panama's Roman Catholic Church joined in criticism of
the government but urged a peaceful solution to the national
crisis. Such calls were ignored by the government, which, instead,
threatened to arrest those involved in the protests and seize the
property of businesses that joined in the strike, closed the
schools, and unleashed a virulent propaganda campaign accusing its
opponents of being linked with United States interests that wanted
to abort the Panama Canal treaties.
The general strike collapsed after a few days, but protests did
not end. Periodic protests, strikes, and demonstrations continued
throughout the summer and fall of 1987. Relations with the United
States deteriorated rapidly as the government charged the United
States embassy with supporting the opposition and bitterly
protested a United States Senate resolution calling for an
investigation of the charges made by Díaz Herrera. An attack on the
embassy by a mob and the arrest of United States diplomatic and
military personnel by the FDP led to a suspension of military
assistance by the United States. At the end of 1987, relations were
more strained than at any time since the 1964 riots.
The continued civil strife also badly damaged Panama's economy.
The future of the banking sector seemed especially imperiled if the
deadlock between the government and its opponents should be
prolonged.
In late 1987, it seemed clear that the CCN and the opposition
political parties could not, by themselves, force a change in
either the military or civilian leadership. Indeed, their efforts
may have solidified military support behind Noriega and Delvalle.
But it was equally clear that the incumbent leadership could
neither restore business confidence nor stop the steady flight of
capital from the country. Efforts to portray the conflict as a
class struggle, or as part of a United States plot to retain
control of the canal only exacerbated the situation. Restoring
order, rebuilding the economy, and creating faith in the political
system were formidable tasks that became more difficult with each
passing month. Panama, in late 1987, was a society in crisis, with
a political system that could not function effectively, but the
government appeared determined to resist any effort to produce
fundamental changes.
Data as of December 1987
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