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Panama Business, Professional, and Labor Organizations
Traditionally, sectoral interest groups have played a minor
role in Panamanian politics. Commercial and industrial interests
were expressed largely within the extended family systems that
constituted the oligarchy. A heavy reliance on government jobs
inhibited the development of professional organizations that could
reflect middle-class interests. The slow rate of industrial
development, the major role of the United States as an employer of
Panamanians in the Canal Zone, and fragmentation and infighting
within the labor movement all contributed to keeping that sector
chronically weak. Nevertheless, the absence of political parties
during most of the 1970s, accompanied by economic expansion, led to
a growing importance for sectoral groups as vehicles for the
expression of political interests. Frustrations over the failures
of the political process and the evident inability of political
parties to control the military gave this trend further impetus
during the 1980s. As a result, sectoral groups emerged during the
1987 upheavals as major political actors, mounting a significant
challenge to military domination of the political process.
In the late 1980s, Panamanian businesses and professions were
organized into numerous specialized groups, such as the Bar
Association, the National Union of Small and Medium Enterprises,
the Panamanian Banking Association, and the National Agricultural
and Livestock Producers. Two of the most important organizations
were the Chamber of Commerce, Industries, and Agriculture of Panama
and the Panamanian Business Executives Association. These and
numerous other organizations were included in the National Free
Enterprise Council (Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada--CONEP).
The various groups within CONEP have often disagreed on issues,
making it difficult to present a position of common interest. On
two issues, however, protection from government encroachments on
the private sector and the maintenance of their position vis-à-vis
labor, members of CONEP consistently have found a unified position.
Moreover, sentiment has grown increasingly within CONEP and many of
its affiliated organizations that the problems facing the private
sector extend beyond specific issues to growing problems within the
political system as a whole. Resentment over continued military
domination of the political system, a perception of increased
corruption and inefficiency within the government, and a feeling
that political conditions were increasingly unfavorable for
business all combined to make many business leaders willing to
join, and even lead, open opposition to the government when the
June 1987 crisis erupted.
During the June 1987 crisis, business groups played a key role
in the organization and direction of the CCN, which spearheaded
protests against the regime. Many of the major bodies within CONEP,
such as the Chamber of Commerce and Panamanian Business Executives
Association, became formal members of the CCN. A total of more than
130 business, professional, civic, and labor groups joined the
crusade, which undertook the task of organizing, directing, and
coordinating the campaign to force Noriega out of power and to
reduce the role of the military in government. The crusade
deliberately excluded political parties from its membership and
active politicians from its leadership. The presidents of CONEP and
of the Chamber of Commerce took major leadership roles within the
crusade, which emphasized peaceful demonstrations, economic
pressures, and boycotts of government enterprises as means of
forcing change on the government. The FDP responded with a campaign
of measured violence and intimidation against the crusade's leaders
and supporters. By the fall of 1987, most of the original
leadership had been driven into exile and the effort appeared to
have lost much of its impetus. The economic pressures continued,
however; exiled leaders undertook a major international propaganda
campaign against the government, and business groups within Panama
kept up economic pressures, which began to have a serious impact on
the economy and on government revenues. In December 1987, Delvalle
offered an amnesty to most of the exiled crusade leaders, but this
action neither appeased the opposition among the business and
professional classes nor in any way responded to the causes that
had created the crusade.
Although at the end of 1987 the crusade had not been able to
force basic change on the government and the military, neither had
the government and the FDP been able to end the campaign of civic
opposition. How long the CCN would endure and what ultimate success
it might enjoy remained unanswered questions, but the role and
power of business and professional organizations within the
Panamanian political structure had undergone fundamental change.
The Panamanian labor movement traditionally had been fragmented
and politically weak. The political weakness of labor was
exacerbated further by the fact that Panamanians working in the
Canal Zone belonged to United States rather than Panamanian labor
unions. The 1977 Panama Canal treaties made provisions for the
collective bargaining and job security of these workers, and it was
likely that Panamanian unions would replace United States unions
when Panama assumed full control over the canal, but in the late
1980s, most canal workers remained with the original unions.
Labor organizations grew significantly in size and importance
under Torrijos, who actively supported this trend. Major labor
federations included the relatively moderate Confederation of
Workers of the Republic of Panama, which had approximately 35,000
members, and the somewhat smaller, leftist, antibusiness National
Workers' Central, which had ties with the Moscow-oriented PdP.
There was also the Isthmian Workers' Central, a small confederation
linked to the PDC. In 1972 these three bodies created the National
Council of Organized Workers (Consejo Nacional de Trabajadores
Organisados--CONATO) to give them a more unified voice and greater
influence on issues of interest to organized labor. Other unions,
including the important National Union of Construction and Related
Workers, have since joined CONATO, increasing its affiliates to 12
with a claimed combined membership of 150,000. The diverse labor
alliance in CONATO was an uneasy one, but the council succeeded in
generating greater unity and militancy than had its component
unions individually. A 1985 general strike called by CONATO forced
the government to suspend plans to amend the labor code.
Ultimately, however, the code was amended, reducing workers' job
security. A March 1986 strike protesting these changes failed.
CONATO reacted by urging its members to resign from parties that
supported the government.
Despite the 1985-86 problems, labor generally was more
supportive of the government than of the political opposition. This
situation, however, was strained by the disturbances that began in
June 1987. A few smaller labor groups joined the civic crusade, but
CONATO did not. The government's problems, however, were compounded
by a series of strikes by the public employees' union, the National
Federation of Associations and Organizations of Public Employees
(Federación Nacional de Asociaciones y Sindicatos de Empleados
Públicos--FENASEP). The leadership of FENASEP even went so far as
to threaten to respond to any government effort to dismiss
government workers by publishing lists of all those on the
government payroll "who do not go to work." CONATO was also
critical of many government actions, demanding that closed
newspapers and radio stations be reopened and that the government
open a dialogue to end the continuing crisis. Whereas labor's
influence in Panamanian politics remained limited, it was
increasing steadily and was something that neither the government
nor its political opposition could control or take for granted.
Data as of December 1987
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