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Panama The Panama Defense Forces
Although Panama's Constitution expressly prohibits military
intervention in party politics, there was general agreement in the
late 1980s that the FDP and its commander, General Noriega,
controlled the internal political process. The PRD and, to a lesser
extent, PALA, were seen as vehicles for military influence in
politics. Presidents served at the pleasure of the military, and
elections were widely viewed as subject to direct manipulation by
the FDP. The officer corps had virtually total internal autonomy,
including control over promotions and assignments and immunity from
civil court proceedings. The military was supposed to have begun a
turnover of power to civilians in 1978, but, in 1986 Professor
Steve Ropp noted that "the system of government, established by
General Torrijos, which allows the Defense Forces high command to
rule through the instrument of the Democratic Revolutionary Party,
remains largely intact."
If anything, the influence and power of the FDP increased after
1978. The force expanded from a total of 8,700 in 1978 to nearly
15,000 by the end of 1987. The military retained direct control of
all police forces and expanded its influence in such areas as
immigration, railroads, ports, and civil aviation. Three presidents
were forced to resign, and the military itself changed commanders
several times without consulting the president or the legislature.
The small size and pyramidical rank structure of the FDP's
officer corps has helped maintain unity and concentrated effective
power in the hands of the commander. This situation facilitated
communications and consultations among senior officers, inhibited
dissent, and made any effort to defy the wishes of the commander
both difficult and dangerous. The total failure of the efforts of
former Colonel Díaz Herrera to gain support from within the officer
corps, following his forced retirement in June 1987, illustrated
both the cohesion of this body and the ability of its commander to
dominate subordinate officers. Internal discipline within the
officer corps was very strong, pressures to support existing
policies were constant, and any deviation from these norms was
likely to be fatal to an officer's hopes for future advancement.
The gap between the FDP and the civilian population was great
and probably widening in the late 1980s. Part of this distance was
the result of a deliberate policy by the high command, which
actively promoted institutional identity defined in terms of
resisting any external efforts to reduce the military's power or
privileges or to gain any degree of control over its internal
affairs. In this context, any criticisms of the FDP's commander, of
the FDP's role in politics or the economy, and any charges of
corruption have been viewed as attacks on the institution, and mass
meetings of junior officers have been held to express total support
for the high command.
Although there was no ideological unity within the officer
corps, there was a consensus in favor of nationalism (often defined
as suspicion of, if not opposition to, United States influence),
developmentalism, and a distrust of traditional civilian political
elites. There was also an overwhelming consensus against allowing
Arnulfo Arias to return to power. The FDP was very proud of its
extensive civic-action program, which it has used to gain political
support in rural areas. It also saw itself as the promoter and
guarantor of the populist political heritage of Torrijos.
Data as of December 1987
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