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Philippines The Counterinsurgency Campaign
The armed forces' primary mission in the late 1980s was
combating the communist insurgency. During Marcos's last years,
the communist movement expanded rapidly in political influence
and military strength. By 1986, when Aquino came to power, the
armed forces estimated that there were some 22,500 regular NPA
guerrillas active in sixty-three of the country's seventy-three
provinces. Reported insurgent strength peaked the following year
at about 26,000 people. The Muslim insurgency, meanwhile, was
relatively quiet. Although the military maintained forces in Moro
areas, clashes with government forces were infrequent and the
threat of a full-scale resurgence was low
(see
The Communist Insurgency;
The Moros
, this ch.).
Despite many well-publicized programs, the counterinsurgency
effort in the early and mid-1980s was clearly failing to stem the
rising tide of communist influence. Government estimates of NPA
strength more than tripled between 1983 and 1986, from around
6,000 to more than 20,000. Recognizing the growing problem,
Marcos escalated the counterinsurgency effort, emphasizing civic
action. Under the aegis of the Home Defense Program, military
units constructed roads and schools, provided disaster relief,
assisted in maintaining security and public utilities, and
performed law enforcement. Army engineer units, greatly expanded
with United States assistance, played a key role in these
development efforts. The armed forces also took part in literacy
projects and the National Livelihood Program, which were designed
to improve the standard of living in rural areas.
These programs notwithstanding, the government lost ground in
its efforts to win hearts and minds. Part of the reason was the
declining popularity of the Marcos government and increasing
criticism of the armed forces. Many Filipinos felt that those in
the military, particularly in the Philippine Constabulary and the
militia, the Civilian Home Defense Force, had become increasingly
abusive and corrupt. Human rights groups documented numerous
petty crimes as well as more serious instances of unlawful
arrest, torture, and "salvaging," the assassination of suspects
and detainees. Most victims were suspected insurgents or their
supporters. Public respect for the military eroded while
relations between the armed forces and important groups, such as
the Roman Catholic Church, deteriorated. Attempts to improve
discipline within the armed forces through retraining,
punishment, and dismissal appeared to do little to quell growing
public fear and suspicion.
Initially, the Aquino government reversed the decline in
human rights performance and made notable strides in restoring
the tarnished image of the military. The 1987 constitution
outlawed torture and all forms of "secret and incommunicado
detention." It also established a permanent Commission on Human
Rights and directed that the militia, constabulary, and police
forces--frequent targets of abuse complaints--be disbanded. The
armed forces were far less abusive in 1986 according to human
rights groups. However, military discipline apparently worsened
over the next two years. In 1987 military personnel were primary
suspects in the assassination of a prominent leftist political
activist and in two other incidents that resulted in the deaths
of twelve Manila demonstrators and seventeen rural villagers.
International human rights monitors alleged that abuses in 1988
were as bad as they were under Marcos. In an apparent reaction to
mounting criticism, the military renewed efforts to improve
civil-military relations, and reported abuse by the military
declined over the next two years.
Human rights remained a concern in 1991. According to the
United States Department of State's 1990 annual human rights
report to Congress, abuses--including extrajudicial killings--
continued. The report also criticized the government's failure to
prosecute those responsible for the crimes. Lapses in the
administration of justice were attributed in part to the strong
imperative of the military to protect its own members, who were
tried in military courts. Convictions on human rights violations
were rare. Still, by 1990 the overall armed forces human rights
record under Aquino was much improved over the Marcos era.
Although the Aquino government scored other successes in its
counterinsurgency campaign, initial efforts proved disappointing.
The new administration hoped that many NPA personnel could be
coaxed out of the hills following the overthrow of Marcos and
took up the theme of reconciliation in 1986. One of Aquino's
first acts was to release political detainees, including captured
CPP chairman Jose Maria Sison. Later, following talks with senior
representatives of the communists' National Democratic Front, the
government agreed to a sixty-day cease-fire, which ended in
February 1987. The president also issued an executive order
establishing the National Reconciliation and Development Program.
The revived rebel amnesty program was inaugurated in January 1987
to encourage NPA defections by offering land, job training, and
assimilation into society. The reconciliation approach was a
disappointment to the government, however, as few insurgents
surrendered. As a result, Aquino altered government strategy in
March 1987 when she announced the "unleashing" of the military.
Following the 1986 change of government, the military resumed
full-scale counterinsurgency operations with a new strategy known
as Mamamayan, meaning people. Mamamayan was similar in most
respects to the previous counterinsurgency, or COIN, plan,
Marcos's Katatagan (stability), but added President Aquino's
theme of reconciliation to the original program of "clear, hold,
consolidate, and develop." The revised COIN plan called for
military units, with the cooperation of other government
agencies, to systematically clear areas of insurgents, to hold
the region against returning guerrillas, to consolidate support
for the government, and to develop the area economically. The
first task--clearing rebel-infested areas--was seen as the task
of mobile forces--the army battalions and constabulary special
action forces. The role of holding and consolidating liberated
regions was assigned to territorial forces--the constabulary,
police, and militia units.
The updated counterinsurgency strategy was complemented by
revamped armed forces tactics that were generally credited with
contributing to the insurgency's decline during the late 1980s.
Under Aquino, the military continued its shift away from
conventional methods such as food blockades, cordon and search
operations and hamletting (the forced relocation of villages
controlled or threatened by the NPA). These methods, employed
during the 1970s war against the Moros, were too often
ineffective and counterproductive because they frequently
alienated the populace. In other respects, the military's
approach to COIN efforts changed little. Most military units
operated as they had under Marcos, in static positions protecting
town halls, businesses, and major roads.
The deployment of special operations teams beginning in 1987
and the formation of new militia units in 1988 were touted by
military leaders as important steps toward more effective COIN.
Special operations teams were squad-sized military
counterinsurgency teams dispatched to CPP-influenced villages to
dismantle the communists' political infrastructure by conducting
civic action and propaganda programs. These teams worked in
conjunction with the newly revamped militia, now called the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographic Units (CAFGUs), to provide
security to each remote
barangay (see Glossary).
The
CAFGUs replaced the Civilian Home Defense Force, which was
frequently criticized as abusive by human rights groups. Local
anticommunist vigilante groups, some associated with the
military, also proved effective deterrents to communist
organizing and NPA activity in certain areas
(see Organization and Training
, this ch.).
Improved military intelligence also played an important role
in undercutting the insurgency in the late 1980s. Military
intelligence agents repeatedly captured top CPP and NPA cadres
and gathered revealing CPP and NPA documents. Rodolfo Salas, the
CPP's former chairman, was among numerous central committee
members rounded up. The fear of government intelligence
penetrations of communist ranks contributed to devastating purges
of rebel ranks between 1985 and 1988.
Perhaps the biggest contribution to the counterinsurgency
campaign in the late 1980s was political, not military. Communist
leaders admitted that Aquino, by restoring popular government and
democratic institutions, significantly set back the revolutionary
movement. Further civilian contributions in the fight against the
communists were encouraged by the creation in 1987 of Peace and
Order Councils. Established at all levels of government, the
councils consisted of political and military leaders as well as
selected community representatives and were charged with
fostering greater civilian involvement and cooperation in what
traditionally had been a military counterinsurgency struggle. A
1989 United States military study, however, concluded that the
COIN effort remained largely a military effort despite the
communist insurgency's political character.
Foreign and Filipino critics of the government's COIN program
further alleged that the communist insurgency had endured for
more than twenty years because the Philippines had not
effectively addressed the social and cultural roots of the rural
rebellion. The communist rebellion, it was said, was fed by the
same social and economic inequities that had prompted previous
peasant uprisings. The disparity between the small, but very
wealthy, elite and the many impoverished was fundamental to the
appeal of the revolutionary movement. Issues such as land reform
resonated strongly among poor farmers, who also complained of
abuses by landlords and politicians. Until such grievances were
resolved, observers noted, they would continue to fuel insurgent
activity in the country.
Data as of June 1991
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