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Philippines Military Operations and Tactics
The NPA's armed insurrection followed the traditional pattern
of guerrilla warfare. NPA units were formed at the regional and
front levels and were normally company-sized or smaller. Main
regional guerrilla units usually had 80 to 150 fighters, whereas
secondary units had 30 to 60 fighters. NPA operations were, by
design, extremely decentralized, with local commanders having
wide latitude to conduct attacks as they chose. Typically, NPA
elements avoided contact with AFP troops by remaining in remote,
mountainous areas until ready to stage an attack. For an assault,
they concentrated their forces, forming companies and sometimes
battalions to overwhelm government troopers. Afterward, they
dispersed to avoid AFP retaliation.
Isolated government outposts of the constabulary, police, and
militia were favorite targets. The NPA also attacked public
buildings such as town halls as a demonstration of its power. The
property of uncooperative landowners and businessmen was another
common target. The communists normally attacked private property
to punish owners for alleged abuses or to coerce the payment of
"revolutionary taxes." Attacks on the country's infrastructure
were rare; the NPA's demolition of several bridges on Luzon's
Bicol Peninsula in 1987 created a popular backlash that
apparently caused the NPA to abandon the tactic.
The communists' traditionally rural struggle came to the
cities in the mid-1980s with the dramatic increase in NPA
assassinations. Beginning in 1984, Davao City became the
laboratory for the NPA's developing urban warfare strategy.
There, armed city partisan units, known popularly as "sparrow
teams," murdered local officials, constables, police, and
military personnel in a sustained terror campaign. The NPA
selectively targeted unpopular officials, claiming that the
killings provided revolutionary justice. The NPA's Davao City
offensive ended in 1986, but not before Romulo Kintanar, the
mastermind of the Davao City offensive and future NPA chief, had
initiated a similar operation in Manila. The tempo of sparrow
assassinations in the capital increased slowly after 1984, then
rose dramatically in 1987. Some 120 officials, including Aquino's
secretary of local government, were assassinated by the NPA that
year. As sparrow activity escalated, NPA targeting became more
indiscriminate.
The guerrillas also targeted Americans in 1987 for the first
time since the early 1970s. After threatening to strike official
Americans for their support of the Philippine counterinsurgency
effort, the NPA killed two United States airmen, an American
retiree, and a Filipino outside Clark Air Base in October. In
April 1989, NPA assassins struck United States Army Colonel James
N. Rowe, a senior officer at the Joint United States Military
Advisory Group, on his way to work in Manila. Several other
attacks on United States servicemen and contractors followed in
1989 and 1990.
The NPA obtained most weapons from the Philippine military in
raids and ambushes. Some guns and ammunition also were purchased
locally. As a result, the guerrillas were armed much like the
AFP, with an assortment of American-designed small arms, such as
the M-16 rifle. NPA commanders complained, however, that weapons
shortages hampered their operations. The Philippine military
estimated that only one-half to two-thirds of NPA fighters had
high-powered rifles. There were no indications in 1990 of
foreign-supplied weapons.
Overall, life in the NPA was austere and demanding. Living
conditions were harsh, the food generally poor, medical care
primitive, and danger constant. The NPA relied on the party's
extensive network of peasant supporters in remote villages. The
masa (masses) provided food and lodging to mobile
guerrilla bands and warned of approaching government troops. The
CPP's base also facilitated communication among party and NPA
elements through courier, telephone, and telegraph networks. By
the late 1980s, NPA communications had become more sophisticated;
long-range radios were used more frequently. Although women were
given equal status as NPA fighters, they were normally given
secondary support roles in guerrilla units. Discipline in the NPA
was strict, designed to win the support of the people by ensuring
that the NPA was not discredited by its members' misbehavior.
Punishment under the CPP's system of revolutionary justice ranged
from reprimand to expulsion and execution.
Data as of June 1991
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