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Philippines Development of the Revolutionary Movement
Sison's dictums were evident in the party's early
development. On the theory that the Huks were defeated because
their uprising was localized, the CPP emphasized expansion to
other regions of Luzon, and to other islands. After several
devastating routs by concentrated AFP attacks, in 1974 the NPA
abandoned its early attempts to form Chinese-style base areas.
From the CPP's birthplace in Central Luzon, guerrilla cadres
established operations in remote areas of Northern Luzon, the
Bicol Peninsula, Samar Island, and on the southern island of
Mindanao. In each of these impoverished areas, the NPA undertook
to support local residents in disputes with the central
government, local military and civilian officials, and landlords.
In most areas, the communists were able to take advantage of
peasant unrest over land issues by embracing the theme of land
reform.
Government initiatives did little to check the slow, steady
growth of the NPA in the 1970s. Sison and NPA chief Bernabe
Buscayno, alias Commander Dante, were arrested, and more than a
dozen CPP and NPA leaders were captured or killed during 1976 and
1977. The government also mounted major anti-insurgency campaigns
in Northern Luzon and elsewhere. Still, the communists continued
to broaden their base of popular support, expand the geographical
reach of the movement, and escalate their attacks on military and
government targets. Several factors helped the communists gain
support: the NPA's decentralized organization, which granted
local commanders wide autonomy; Philippine geography, which
prevented easy access to remote rebel-dominated areas; the armed
forces' preoccupation with the Moro insurgency; and the continued
appeal of the insurgents' pledges to solve specific grievances
against the government and provide a better life for discontented
Filipinos.
In 1983 Philippine officials estimated that the communists
exercised substantial control over 2 to 3 percent of the nation's
villages and that the NPA fielded some 6,000 full-time
guerrillas. The insurgency grew rapidly after that year, largely
as a result of growing political turmoil and increasing
discontent with the Marcos government. By 1986, when Aquino came
to power, approximately 22,500 NPA fighters were operating
throughout nearly all the country's provinces. Equally important,
some 20 percent of the Philippines' 40,000 villages were
influenced by the communists. Although they admitted that they
were not yet in a position to bring down the government, CPP
leaders calculated that they were in the final phase of the
"strategic defensive" and would soon be able to fight the
government to a draw and take the offensive.
The overthrow of Marcos, however, threw the communist
movement into disarray. The former president's unpopularity was
the party's best recruiting theme. Strategic errors added to the
communists' woes. The CPP's call for a boycott of the 1986
presidential election was overwhelmingly rejected by Filipinos
and by many of the communists' local political organs. Party
leaders later confessed that the strategy was a major blunder
that left the insurgents with no role in the change of
government. The CPP's chairman, Rodolfo Salas, resigned in 1986
in the midst of an unprecedented strategic debate within the
communist ranks. Many party cadres called for a conciliatory
policy toward the new and popular Aquino government, and for open
political participation. Initially the CPP adopted a policy of
"critical collaboration" with the Aquino administration, but
after the lapse of the sixty-day cease-fire in February 1987, the
NPA resumed all-out armed attacks. In 1987, after intense and
prolonged debate, the party's executive committee confirmed the
primacy of the armed struggle and renewed the CPP's commitment to
a protracted people's war.
A series of setbacks challenged the communists through the
end of the 1980s. The advent of a popular president especially
hurt CPP support among the Philippine middle class, students,
labor, and other mostly urban segments of society. Recruiting
suffered, as did domestic financial support for the guerrillas.
Villages in areas largely controlled by the NPA failed to support
CPP-backed candidates in the May 1987 congressional elections.
The government also succeeded in capturing a number of top CPP
and NPA leaders, particularly in 1987 and 1988. Among them were
Rodolfo Salas, the former party chairman, and Romulo Kintanar,
the NPA chief. Kintanar, however, escaped from prison only months
after his 1988 arrest. One result of the repeated roundups of key
leaders was a series of bloody internal party purges during 1987
and 1988; rebels suspected of being government informers were
executed or expelled. Philippine military leaders publicized
widely the mass graves of suspected penetration agents. Popular
support for the insurgents waned, and rebel morale was
devastated. Mindanao, long an NPA stronghold, was especially hard
hit by the loss of up to one-half of insurgent cadres.
By the end of the 1980s, NPA strength had begun to decline.
According to government figures, full-time guerrilla strength was
24,000 to 26,000 in 1988, the year that Aquino said would be seen
as the turning point in the government's counterinsurgency
effort. The NPA was then operating in sixty of the nation's
seventy-three provinces and claimed a following of some 500,000
Filipinos. By 1991, the government estimated that insurgent
strength had fallen to 18,000 to 23,000 guerrillas. Still, the
military believed that the rebels exercised considerable control
over more than 18 percent of the Philippines' roughly 42,000
villages, and around 30,000 Filipinos were thought to be CPP
members. (Other estimates of rebel strength and influence varied
widely; one unofficial source placed NPA strength at 34,000.)
Data as of June 1991
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