Philippines Recruitment and Personnel
The combined strength of the four armed services at the end
of 1990 was approximately 153,500. The army had some 68,000
troops, the constabulary 45,000, the air force 15,500, and the
navy 25,000, including about 8,000 in the marines and 2,000 in
the coast guard. After rapid growth during the 1970s, when armed
forces strength trebled, total military strength remained
relatively stable in the 1980s. (There were 155,000 personnel in
the Philippine military in 1980.) With a relatively youthful
population, maintaining the strength of the armed forces was not
a drain on human resources. More than 8 million men were of
military age, between eighteen and thirty-two. Military strength
per capita was only 2.5 per 1,000 population, lower than nearly
all the country's Asian neighbors.
Although universal service was mandatory, the Armed Forces of
the Philippines was a de facto volunteer force. The 1980 National
Service Law provided the legal basis for conscription and
required all citizens--male and female--to perform service in the
military, civic welfare, or law enforcement agencies. However,
the law was never fully implemented. Conscription was not
necessary during the 1980s because volunteers greatly outnumbered
available slots. Despite the inherent danger of military service
during the fight against the communist insurgency, limited
employment opportunities for unskilled young adults ensured an
abundant supply of volunteers. The armed forces had no recruiting
apparatus; units instead recruited locally to fill vacancies.
Potential recruits had to be eighteen years old, unmarried, and
possess a high school diploma.
Officers were commissioned from three major sources. Regular
officers were commissioned from the prestigious Philippine
Military Academy, which produced 15 percent of all officers. Some
65 percent were graduates of Citizen Military Training, formerly
the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). Most received reserve
commissions, whereas some, called "integrees," were integrated
into the regular officer corps. Enlisted personnel who completed
Officer Candidate School accounted for some 18 percent of all
officers. The other 2 percent of officers received direct
commissions as medical or legal professionals or graduated from
foreign military academies. Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) did
not constitute the professional corps found in most Western
armies and were only marginally involved in leadership and
decision making.
Ethnic and linguistic differences were important in the
military. Local recruiting ensured that personnel were drawn from
all sections of the country, but certain regions were
disproportionately represented. The majority of military
personnel spoke Tagalog and were from the heartland of central
and southern Luzon. Despite continuing efforts to increase the
number of Muslims in the military, Moros from the southern
Philippines were underrepresented. Traditionally, Ilocanos from
northern Luzon comprised a disproportionate share of officer and
enlisted ranks. This emphasis was especially true under Marcos,
who tended to promote fellow Ilocanos to positions of power in
the armed forces and police. Because of this tendency--shared by
previous presidents--the 1987 constitution directs that the
"armed forces shall be recruited proportionately from all
provinces and cities as far as practicable." Although language
and dialect compelled people from the same region to associate
with one another, these groups were not so exclusive that they
formed significant factions.
A variety of internal divisions plagued the officer corps in
the late 1980s. The most significant rifts essentially were
political--between those who supported the government and those
who advocated its overthrow. The military-sparked popular revolt
against Marcos and the subsequent series of uprisings against
Aquino brought military leaders into direct, sometimes bloody,
conflict. A variety of military factions and fraternal groups,
including RAM, Young Officers' Union, and Marcos loyalists,
emerged as important antigovernment players
(see Political Role
, this ch.). In an effort to contain the influence of these groups,
the government ordered military fraternal organizations disbanded
in 1987. However, through clandestine contacts, RAM, the Young
Officers' Union, and Marcos loyalists orchestrated the 1989 coup
attempt with the support of three generals. These groups remained
active in 1991, criticizing government and military leaders and
threatening another coup attempt. Their activities continued to
undermine the authority of the military chain of command.
Following the 1989 coup attempt, the president's military
adviser, a retired army commander, attributed the involvement of
so many junior leaders to a "generational gap" in the armed
forces between mostly loyal senior officers and the more
rebellions junior ranks. He credited younger officers' better
education for the tendency of some, like those in the Young
Officers' Union, to become more involved in politics and to
question the directives of their superiors.
Frictions created by perceived inequity in the military's
personnel system also dogged the officer corps. Although the
divisive Marcos-era practice of extending generals beyond their
scheduled retirement was discontinued in 1986, other
controversial practices continued under Aquino. Officers with
reserve commissions--the majority of the officer corps--
complained that the personnel system favored regular officers,
especially Philippine Military Academy (PMA) graduates. Although
past regimes, such as Marcos's, had advanced ROTC graduates,
nearly all top generals under Aquino were academy alumni. Bond
between PMA graduates, especially classmates, tended to
perpetuate this favoritism. In 1986 reservists formed an
organization similar to the PMA alumni association to promote
their interests. The presidentially appointed Davide Commission
investigating the causes of the 1989 coup attempt identified
another source of discontent--the role of personal ties in
promotions and assignments. Observers noted that the patronclient ties and personal loyalties that were typical of
Philippine society were perhaps the biggest factor in officers'
career prospects.
Women belonged to a separate Women's Auxiliary Corps in each
of the services. Except for Officer Candidate School, they were
trained separately. Women were assigned to a limited number of
specified support positions and were a relatively small part of
the total force.
Data as of June 1991
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