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Spain Political Developments, 1982-88
Following its triumph at the polls in October 1982, the
PSOE,
under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez, formed the first
majority one-party government since the Civil War
(see Growth of the PSOE and the 1982 Elections
, ch. 1). The increase in
voter
participation, which rose from less than 68 percent in
1979 to 80
percent in 1982, seemed a significant indication of
citizen
affirmation of the democratic process. Municipal and
regional
elections, held in May 1983, confirmed the popularity of
the
Socialist government, which obtained 43 percent of the
vote.
A significant factor in the Socialist victory in 1982
was the
popular perception that profound economic and social
reforms were
long overdue. Previous governments had not been able to
deal
effectively with these issues, in part because of the need
to
focus on political and constitutional questions. Whereas
most
Spaniards had been willing to defer their hopes for
economic
improvement and for liberalized social policies in the
interest
of stabilizing the fledgling democracy, they became
increasingly
impatient for the reform process to reach their daily
lives.
The economic reform policies implemented under the
government
of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (Partido
Socialista
Obrero Espanol--PSOE) government were pragmatic rather
than
ideological. Although stressing the need for reform, the
government did not call for traditional socialist
measures, such
as the nationalization of industry, a significant
redistribution
of income, or massive state intervention in the economy.
Instead,
it pursued a program of economic austerity in order to
lower
inflation and raise productivity
(see the Post-Franco Period, 1975-1980s
, ch. 3).
As part of an attempt to achieve greater efficiency in
the
industrial sector as well as in the civil service, the
government
eliminated many jobs. This had the short-term effect of
adding to
the nation's unemployment problem, and it met with strong
opposition from the trade unions, although it gained
support for
the PSOE from the commercial and the financial sectors.
The
government's economic policies resulted in a moderate
reduction
in inflation and an increase in the rate of economic
growth, but
unemployment worsened, and strike activity increased 30
percent
in 1984. In June 1985, there were massive protests against
the
proposed reforms in the social security system and the
reductions
in pension benefits. Nevertheless, the idea of
streamlining the
economy was viewed by most Spaniards as a positive step
toward
economic recovery, in spite of the fact that its costs
were borne
largely by the working class.
Although the Socialists' moderate approach to economic
issues
entailed a relatively slow rate of change, significant
progress
was achieved in other important areas, most notably that
of
military reorganization. In October 1983, Minister of
Defense
Narcis Serra i Serra announced plans for large-scale
reductions
in the size of the military, which was to be reoriented,
toward
national defense rather than internal security.
Legislation
passed in early 1984 placed the armed forces under the
direct
control of the prime minister and the civilian minister of
defense. Increased subordination of the military to the
civilian
government was made more palatable to the military
hierarchy by a
major increase in military spending to modernize the
army's
equipment and weaponry
(see The Defense Budget
, ch. 5).
The Socialist government also brought about significant
reforms in the educational system. Education and Science
Minister
Jose Maria Maravall Herrero introduced legislation, passed
in the
spring of 1984, providing for increased state control over
private schools that received government subsidies. The
law also
gave parents a greater role in the appointment of teachers
and in
establishing the curricula at these schools
(see Education
, ch.
2). This had a major impact on society, because in the
late 1980s
approximately one-third of students attended such schools,
which
usually had a religious affiliation. The Roman Catholic
Church
joined forces with the right-wing Popular Alliance
(Alianza
Popular--AP) to mobilize a large antigovernment rally,
protesting
the new educational policies, in November 1984.
A difficult problem facing the Socialist government was
the
continuing menace of Basque terrorism. Although
democratization
had brought an unprecedented degree of autonomy to the
country's
communities, there was increasing frustration in the
Basque and
the Catalan regions with the protracted process of
transferring
powers to the regional governments. The PSOE's concurrence
with
the implementation of the controversial LOAPA, passed by
the UCD
government in 1981, led the Basques and the Catalans to
consider
the Socialists as proponents of centralization
(see Regional Government
, this ch.). Terrorist activity by the militant
Basque
Fatherland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna--ETA), the
Basque
separatist organization founded in 1959 by a splinter
group of
the Basque Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista
Vasco--PNV),
continued unabated in Spain in the year following the
election
that brought the PSOE to power
(see Threats to Internal Security
, ch. 5). This increased violence, in itself a destabilizing
factor, also threatened Spain's hold on democracy by
tempting
right-wing forces to contemplate a coup in order to
restore
order.
In an effort to control terrorist activity and to calm
the
military, the Socialist government introduced strong
antiterrorist legislation, which received widespread
popular
support. Nevertheless, the violence continued. Moreover,
the
central government received a setback in its antiterrorist
campaign in 1984, when the Supreme Court overruled a
decision by
the Ministry of Interior to ban the political party
Popular Unity
(Herri Batasuna--HB), with which the ETA Military Front
(ETA
Militar--ETA-M) was associated, from representation in
either the
regional or the national parliament.
Prospects for a lessening of tension between the Basque
Country and the Socialist government appeared to brighten
when a
legislative pact was signed in January 1985 between the
president
of the Basque Country and the Basque affiliate of the
PSOE. This
agreement included provisions to expedite the transfer of
powers
to the autonomous institutions and called for a joint
offensive
against terrorism. In spite of vigorous antiterrorist
measures
taken by the central government, however, bombings and
assassinations continued.
While dealing with such demanding domestic concerns as
terrorism and the need for economic and social reform, the
Socialist government was also taking steps to develop a
more
active international role for Spain. The country had
experienced
ostracism under Franco because of the highly undemocratic
nature
of his regime
(see Foreign Policy under Franco
, ch. 1).
After
taking office in 1982, the Socialists made vigorous
efforts to
gain entry into the European Community
(EC--see Glossary).
The
government hoped that membership in the EC would bring not
only
economic advantages but also international recognition of
the
country's successful transition to democracy.
The question of Spain's entry into the EC met with
repeated
delays in 1983 and in 1984, largely because of the
opposition of
France. After protracted negotiations, a Treaty of
Accession was
signed in the summer of 1985, and Spain formally joined
the EC on
January 1, 1986
(see Spain and the European Community
, this ch.).
Although the PSOE government had pursued the goal of EC
membership with single-minded zeal, it was ambivalent with
regard
to participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The Socialists had long advocated neutralism as
part of
their ideology; moreover, latent anti-Americanism was
widespread
in the population.
The Socialists had opposed Spain's decision to join
NATO in
May 1982, and part of their election platform in October
of that
year was the promise of a referendum on the question of
remaining
in the alliance. After coming to power, they soon changed
their
minds and concluded that some form of membership in NATO
was in
Spain's interest. This left Gonzalez with the ticklish
task of
campaigning for a favorable vote on an issue he had
previously
attacked.
In order to gain approval for his new pro-NATO
position,
Gonzalez attached conditions to membership. Spain would be
part
of NATO in a political sense but without military
integration;
furthermore, nuclear weapons were to be banned in Spain.
In an
effort to appease the left wing of his party, the prime
minister
promised that the number of United States troops in Spain,
whose
presence reminded many Spaniards of previous United States
ties
with the Franco regime, would be reduced. The promised
referendum
was held on March 12, 1986, and in spite of public opinion
polls
indicating strong anti-NATO sentiment, the people voted to
continue membership in the alliance
(see Participation in NATO
, ch. 5).
Gonzalez moved to consolidate the gains his government
had
made through EC membership and the successful NATO
referendum by
calling for national parliamentary elections in June 1986,
four
months ahead of schedule. The PSOE benefited from the
fragmentation of both its right-wing opposition and the
communists, and it retained an absolute majority in the
general
elections, winning 184 of the 350 seats in the Congress of
Deputies--18 fewer than it had obtained in the 1982
elections,
but still enough to retain control.
The official opposition was embodied in the
conservative
Popular Coalition (Coalicion Popular--CP), which included
Manuel
Fraga Iribarne's AP, the Popular Democratic Party (Partido
Democrata Popular--PDP), and the Liberal Party (Partido
Liberal--
PL). The CP failed in its attempt to attract the moderate
vote by
moving to the center. Fraga's abrasive personality and
Francoist
past contributed to the defeat of the coalition, which
began to
disintegrate soon after the election. Several leftist
groups and
communist splinter parties formed an electoral coalition,
the
United Left (Izquierda Unida--IU), to participate in the
election, which obtained slightly better results than the
left
did in 1982.
The surprise feature of the 1986 elections was the
resurgence
of the center vote, indicated by the tripling of the
ballots cast
for the Democratic and Social Center (Centro Democratico y
Social--CDS). Its leader, Suarez, continued to be a
popular
figure on the Spanish political scene
(see Transition to Democracy
, ch. 1). Given the disarray at both ends of the
political spectrum, the CDS had a chance to develop into
the
major opposition party
(see Political Parties
, this ch.).
In spite of the PSOE's electoral victory in June 1986,
dissatisfaction with the policies and the actions of the
Socialist government had been mounting, and it increased
even
more as the year drew to a close. The early months of 1987
saw
the strongest outbreak of social unrest in Spain since the
1930s.
Demonstrations by university and secondary school students
were
followed by increasingly violent labor strikes. Doctors
and
teachers joined railroad workers and farm laborers in
protesting
the low wages and the high unemployment that had come in
the wake
of the government's economic austerity policies.
Contributing to
the growing unrest was an escalation in Basque terrorism
and
popular revulsion over a bomb that caused the deaths of
many
innocent civilians. Polls indicated a decline in
confidence in
Gonzalez, whose immense popularity had heretofore been
unaffected
by such vicissitudes.
Elections held in June 1987 at the municipal and the
regional
levels, as well as those for the European Parliament,
confirmed
the declining support for the Socialist government.
Although the
PSOE remained the largest single party, it obtained only
37
percent of the municipal vote, down from 43 percent in
1983. The
June elections resulted in a further erosion of the AP,
which was
under the new leadership of Antonio Hernandez Mancha. The
CDS
emerged, strengthened, as the fulcrum of the center,
although it
was not yet in a position to present a challenge to
Socialist
dominance.
Dissatisfaction with the PSOE government was also
evidenced
within the Socialist party itself. In October 1987,
Nicolas
Redondo, leader of the Socialist-controlled General Union
of
Workers (Union General de Trabajadores--UGT), resigned his
seat
in parliament in protest against the government's 1988
budget. He
criticized the government for favoring employers'
interests over
those of the working class.
Most businessmen approved of the market-oriented
economic
policies of Gonzalez, which had succeeded in reducing the
annual
inflation rate, from 15 percent in 1982 to below 5 percent
in
1987, and in raising annual economic growth rate to 4.5
percent.
The price paid for these accomplishments, however, was an
unemployment rate of 21 percent, the highest in Europe,
and an
increasingly alienated labor force. The UGT joined with
its
communist counterpart, the Workers' Commissions
(Comisiones
Obreras--CCOO), in staging joint protests in October and
in
November 1987 and a general strike in December 1988
(see Political Interest Groups
, this ch.).
At the Socialist party congress held in January 1988,
Redondo
and other left-wing socialists accused Gonzalez of
betraying the
workers and of forsaking the socialist cause. They urged a
relaxation of anti-inflation measures in order to allow
for an
increase in wages and in pensions. They also called for
greater
investment in public works and for a concerted effort to
deal
with the unemployment problem.
In contrast to the growing dissatisfaction with the
government's economic policies, there was widespread
approval
when Gonzalez decided to demand a reduction of the United
States
military presence in Spain, in keeping with the pledge he
had
made at the time of the NATO referendum. In December 1987,
the
government notified the United States that it would have
to
remove its seventy-two F-16 fighter bombers from Spain by
mid-
1991. The two countries reached agreement in principle in
January
1988 on a new, more limited base agreement to last eight
years
(see Spain and the United States
, this ch.;
Military Cooperation with the United States
, ch. 5).
Spanish popular opinion also responded favorably to
indications that there might be hope for an end to the
terrorist
violence that had claimed more than 750 lives in a 20-year
period. In November 1987, the major political parties
signed an
antiterrorist pact in which they pledged to work
peacefully for
the resolution of conflicts in the Basque Country, they
condemned
all forms of violence, and they called on the ETA to lay
down its
arms and to work through democratic channels. In February
1988,
the government accepted an ETA proposal for a sixty-day
truce and
for the opening of formal peace negotiations. A major
factor in
bringing the ETA to hold talks was French cooperation,
beginning
in mid-1986, in hunting down the movement's leaders and in
extraditing those who had sought asylum in France. The
negotiators faced formidable obstacles, most notably the
conflict
between Basque demands for self-determination and
constitutional
provisions for the armed forces to uphold Spain's
territorial
integrity. Nevertheless, by mid-1988 prospects for an end
to
violence were brighter than they had been in many years.
After five and one-half years in office, the PSOE could
take
credit for significant accomplishments, in spite of
rumblings on
the left. Observers generally conceded that the austerity
measures carried out by the government, while far removed
from
socialist concepts, were necessary in order to revive the
economy, and they hoped that a healthier economy would
ultimately
resolve the unemployment problem. More in line with
socialist
policies were the government's measures to lessen the
Roman
Catholic Church's control of Spain's schools, to ease
censorship
laws, and to legalize divorce
(see Social Values and Attitudes
, ch. 2). The PSOE's foreign policy initiatives, gaining EC
membership and reducing dependence on the United States,
also
received popular approval. The democratic process appeared
to
have taken root.
Data as of December 1988
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