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Spain Spain and Latin America
One of Spain's major foreign policy objectives since
the
advent of democracy has been to increase its influence in
Latin
America. Spain has a special interest in this area because
of
historical ties and a common linguistic, cultural, and
religious
heritage. In the post-Franco years, economic investments
and
diplomatic initiatives were added to the more nostalgic
links
between Spain and its former colonies.
Relations between Spain and Latin America have
undergone
profound transformation since Spain's imperial days.
Resentment
of Spain as the imperial power continued long after the
colonial
period, because many Latin Americans blamed Spain for
their lack
of progress and for their problems with democratization.
In the
early years of independence, the attitude of most Latin
Americans
was one of disdain for Spain. This changed, following the
Spanish-American War in 1898. The devastating defeat
inflicted
upon Spain by the United States combined with increased
United
States interference in Latin America led the two Hispanic
areas
to draw closer together in the face of a common enemy.
Both Spain
and Latin America began to re-emphasize their common ties
of
culture, language, and religion, although trade,
diplomatic, and
political relations between the two areas remained
minimal.
During the 1950s, modernized methods of communications
and
transportation facilitated closer contacts between Spain
and
Latin America. Trade increased, and Spain's rapid economic
growth
in the 1960s and the 1970s enabled the country to approach
its
relations with Latin America from a position of greater
economic
strength. A paradoxical foreign policy phenomenon during
this
period was the refusal of the fiercely anticommunist
Franco to
break off relations with Fidel Castro Ruz's Marxist Cuba.
In this
instance, historical ties appeared to take precedence over
ideology.
After Franco's death, Spain's transition to a
democratic form
of government was paralleled by the establishment of
various
forms of democratic rule in some Latin American countries.
The
timing of these governmental changes was largely
coincidental,
although Spain offered its transition process as an
example for
Latin America to follow.
The democratization process in Spain caused a
reorientation
of Spanish foreign policy. Under Suarez, Spain pursued a
more
aggressive foreign policy, which included giving increased
attention to Latin America. Both Suarez and King Juan
Carlos made
official visits to most of the Latin American countries,
and
Spanish investment in the area increased markedly. When
war broke
out between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland
Islands
(Malvinas) in the spring of 1982, Spain supported
Argentina's
claim to the islands, even though the Spanish government
opposed
the military junta that ruled Argentina at the time.
When the Socialists came to power in 1982, Foreign
Minister
Fernando Moran asserted that the amount of influence Spain
could
exert in Europe and on the United States would depend on
Spain's
maintaining special relationships outside these areas,
particularly with Latin America. In keeping with this
policy, the
Socialist government created a special assistance program
for
Latin America that had a budget of tens of millions of
dollars in
1985.
A particular area of concern for Gonzalez was the
intensifying conflict in Central America. Under his
leadership,
Spain took an active part in the Contadora Group, an
association
of Latin American republics seeking peaceful solutions to
the
bloody struggles in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.
Before becoming prime minister, Gonzalez had been
involved in
the articulation of the Socialist International's policies
toward
Latin America and had served as the president of that
organization's committee for the support of the Nicaraguan
Revolution, which was formed in 1980. Although Gonzalez
was
sympathetic to the early goals of the Sandinistas, who had
seized
power in 1979, he later became highly critical of their
radical
Marxist policies. He favored the more pragmatic approach
of Latin
America's social democrats.
It became increasingly apparent that the prime
minister's
moderate views were in marked contrast to the Marxist
orientation
of his foreign minister. Gonzalez was also less stridently
antiAmerican than Moran. Although critical of United States
actions
in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, the prime minister
recognized
that the United States had legitimate interests in the
area and
that it could not be excluded from the negotiating
process. These
increasingly divergent views between Gonzalez and his
foreign
minister led to the latter's removal in the summer of
1985.
Moran's successor, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez,
followed a
more restrained approach--calling for Spain to be the
IberianAmerican conscience of Europe--in furthering Spain's
active role
in Latin America. Spain continued to support efforts for a
peaceful resolution to the strife in Central America. In
January
1988, Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega requested that
Spain
take part in the verification of the peace process in
Central
America. Gonzalez accepted the proposal, provided that the
other
Central American governments were in agreement and that a
ceasefire were in effect. The prime minister reiterated his
support of
the Contadora Group and emphasized that the countries
involved
had the ultimate responsibility for finding a solution to
the
conflict. He also called for an end to United States aid
for the
armed forces fighting against the Sandinista government
(Contras)
so that the peace plan could be implemented.
Although Spain had again become a significant presence
in
Latin America in the 1980s, there was no indication that
it was
on the way to supplanting the United States in the region,
or,
indeed, that it wanted to assume that role. At the same
time, a
vital sense of Hispanic commonality between Spain and
Latin
America appeared likely to continue.
Data as of December 1988
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