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Spain Spain and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Even though popular and official opinion had been
virtually
unanimous in favoring Spain's accession to the EC,
considerable
doubts were expressed with regard to Spanish membership in
the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Spain's
significant
geographical position, astride some of the world's major
sea,
air, and land communication routes, made it a valuable
potential
partner for the alliance. Spanish proponents of NATO
membership
argued that these same geopolitical considerations made
such
membership equally advantageous to Spain, because the
country's
strategic location could make it an obvious target in any
major
conflict unless it had allied support. They also
maintained that
integration into NATO would ensure sorely needed
modernization of
Spain's armed services in addition to the securing of
adequate
national defense. A corollary hope was that NATO
membership would
reorient the focus of army leaders away from reactionary
preoccupations and toward defense of the West.
Many political forces in Spain, particularly the
socialists
and the communists, did not agree that full membership
would
benefit the country's defense and foreign policy aims. On
the
contrary, they felt it would raise the level of tension
between
the rival power blocs and would make Spain a more likely
target
in any future conflict with the Soviet Union. Moreover,
opponents
of NATO membership pointed out that NATO would be of no
assistance in an area of primary concern to Spain: the two
Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which are located
in
Morocco and which are outside the geographic zone of
application
of the North Atlantic Treaty. They also maintained that
NATO
would be of no benefit to Spain in the country's
long-standing
effort to recover Gibraltar, because it could be assumed
that
other NATO members would support Britain on this issue
(see Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla
, this ch.). Resentment of
the
United States as the principal supporter of the Franco
regime was
another factor influencing those who opposed Spain's entry
into
NATO.
Although Suarez had announced Spain's intention of
applying
for NATO membership, his Union of the Democratic Center
(Union de
Centro Democratico--UCD) government remained somewhat
divided
over the question. After Suarez resigned in 1981, his
successor,
Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, gave high priority to this issue,
arguing
that Spain's entry into NATO would expedite negotiations
for
integration into the EC. In December 1981, the Cortes
approved
membership in NATO by majority vote, over the vigorous
opposition
of a large leftist minority. Spain officially joined NATO
in May
1982.
Leaders on the left protested bitterly that NATO
membership
had been pushed through parliament in violation of the
consensus
that had been the basis of all major political decisions
since
1977. The Socialists organized a protest campaign, and the
PSOE
leader, Gonzalez, made the NATO issue a major feature of
his
electoral platform in 1982, promising a popular referendum
on
withdrawal from NATO in the event of a Socialist victory.
No immediate steps were taken to fulfill this promise,
following the overwhelming Socialist victory in October
1982,
although the PSOE confirmed in June 1983 that it would
campaign
in favor of withdrawal when the referendum was held. Many
Socialists took part in a large anti-NATO demonstration
organized
by the PCE in June 1984, but Gonzalez was having second
thoughts,
and he found reasons to delay the referendum. Although
neutralist
opinion remained strong in Spain, the government evolved
toward a
position favoring continued membership in NATO, which it
perceived as the principal guarantor of European security.
A
significant factor in this change of position was the fear
that
withdrawal from NATO might become an insuperable obstacle
to
entry into the EC.
When the referendum eventually was set for March 2,
1986,
Gonzalez engaged in a vigorous campaign for continued, but
limited, NATO membership. The government presented NATO
membership as a corollary to EC membership, and it warned
of the
serious economic consequences of a vote to withdraw. In
spite of
opinion polls indicating the probability of a negative
outcome,
the government secured a clear margin of victory for its
position. With almost 60 percent of the electorate
participating,
52.6 percent of the voters supported Spain's continued
membership
in NATO, while 39.8 percent opposed it. Spain remained the
sixteenth member of NATO
(see Participation in NATO
, ch.
5).
The following year, in a move seen as emphasizing the
European aspect of the defense system, Gonzalez made a bid
for
Spanish membership in the Western European Union (WEU), a
sevennation European defense grouping, originally formed in
1948, that
experienced revitalization in the 1980s. On April 19,
1988, Spain
and Portugal were formally invited to join the
organization.
Data as of December 1988
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