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Spain Gibraltar, Ceuta, and Melilla
The return of Gibraltar to Spain has remained a foreign
policy goal for all Spanish rulers since the area was lost
to
Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713
(see War of the Spanish Succession;
Foreign Policy under Franco
, ch. 1).
Franco's fierce determination to regain Gibraltar
culminated in
his closing the frontier between Spain and Gibraltar in
1969.
Governments that came to power after the regime was
democratized
engaged in calmer but equally persistent negotiations with
the
British and with the residents of Gibraltar over the
future of
the area. These discussions ultimately resulted in the
April 1980
Lisbon Agreement, which was more symbolic than
substantive, but
which served as a framework for subsequent Anglo-Spanish
negotiations.
The Spanish government had intended to reopen the
frontier
between Spain and Gibraltar shortly after the signing of
the
Lisbon Agreement, but it postponed this step in anger at a
series
of British actions, including the use of Gibraltar as a
military
depot and refueling base during the Falklands War in 1982.
The
frontier was finally reopened in the early days of the
Socialist
government that was elected later in the year.
Spain's entry into NATO added new complications to the
Gibraltar question, including Spain's insistence that
Gibraltar
was a NATO naval base as well as a British one, a
contention that
the British government denied. The Spanish navy refused to
participate in joint military exercises with the British
while
Britain maintained a military base on Gibraltar. At the
same
time, Spanish membership in NATO provided a vehicle for
negotiations on the Gibraltar question in a less
competitive
atmosphere. It also put Spain in a better bargaining
position.
The ultimate issue underlying the various twists and
turns of
the Gibraltar problem was sovereignty. The approximately
30,000
residents of Gibraltar remained adamantly opposed to
becoming
Spanish citizens, although the UN continued to pass
resolutions
condemning British rule in Gibraltar as a colonial
situation. As
a more flexible and democratic government took root in
Spain,
however, and as the country achieved greater integration
into
Europe through its EC and NATO memberships, the
possibility of a
resolution of the sovereignty issue became less remote.
The
Socialist government, unlike its predecessors, emphasized
that
any solution to this problem must be in keeping with the
interests of Gibraltar's inhabitants. This led observers
to
conjecture that--through some type of regional autonomy
structure, provided for in the 1978 Constitution--a
long-term
plan for a form of autonomous government for Gibraltar
acceptable
to all concerned, might be possible.
In much the same way that Spain laid claim to Gibraltar
as
part of its territory, Morocco maintained that the Spanish
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla were integral parts of
Morocco's
sovereign territory. The two North African towns and their
tiny
offshore islands, the last vestiges of Spain's far-flung
empire,
had belonged to the Spanish crown for centuries. Both were
administered as integral parts of Spain and had
predominantly
Spanish populations; Spain insisted that they remain
Spanish.
Ceuta, which had become a Spanish possession following
the
union with Portugal in 1580, was historically a focal
point for
trade between Europe and Africa. Located only thirty
kilometers
from metropolitan Spain, it could reasonably be regarded
as a
natural prolongation of the Iberian Peninsula. Although
Ceuta was
used for military purposes, it also functioned as a
fishing port,
and it had close economic links with Andalusia.
There were almost no direct links between Ceuta and the
other
Spanish enclave of Melilla, which had come under Spanish
rule in
the late fifteenth century. Melilla was situated more than
500
kilometers away from the Iberian Peninsula, and it did not
benefit from the lively tourist traffic that Ceuta
enjoyed.
Because of its geographical location, Melilla also was
subject to
greater influence from its Moroccan hinterland than was
Ceuta. In
addition, more Moroccans actually lived in Melilla than in
Ceuta,
where the atmosphere was far more European.
There were protests on the part of the Muslim
communities in
both enclaves over the passage, in July 1985, of an aliens
law,
which required all foreigners in Spain to register with
the
authorities or be expelled. Tensions were especially high
in
Melilla, where less than one-third of the Muslim community
held
Spanish nationality. Promises from Madrid to assist in
integrating the Muslims of both enclaves into Spanish
society
angered portions of the local Spanish communities, who in
turn
demonstrated in support of the aliens law.
The outlook for continued Spanish sovereignty in the
two
enclaves appeared uncertain. When Spain joined the EC in
1986,
Ceuta and Melilla were considered Spanish cities and
European
territory. They joined the EC as part of Spain, and they
hoped to
receive financial assistance from the EC's Regional
Development
Fund. Spain also hoped that membership in NATO, while
providing
no security guarantee to Ceuta and Melilla, might make
Morocco's
King Hassan II less likely to move against territory
belonging to
a NATO member; however, Spanish demands for the return of
Gibraltar could fuel Moroccan claims to the North African
enclaves.
Mounting tensions between the Spanish and the Muslim
populations in Ceuta and in Melilla added to the
precariousness
of the Spanish position. In addition, a few leaders in
both the
socialist and the communist parties expressed sympathy for
Morocco's claim, contributing to a growing fear of
abandonment on
the part of the enclaves' inhabitants. A resolution of
this
tenuous situation did not appear imminent in mid-1988.
Data as of December 1988
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